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ABSTRACT 
Cyber-warfare is frequently discussed and rarely seen. Network incidents classified as warfare 
mostly fall below the required threshold, and instead are varying criminal acts or peacetime 
information operations. That we distinguish where cyber-warfare begins and ends is essential towards 
using it effectively. The spectre of cyberwar can and should be turned into a spectrum of military 
offensive network operations (MONOs). This thesis argues that the underlying characteristics of 
MONOs draw heavily on existing military thought, and that MONOs can be best employed by 
militaries by correctly categorising them. By exploring the idea of intangible warfare – conflict waged 
through non-physical means such as the information space and the electromagnetic spectrum - 
existing operational and strategic doctrine can be adapted rather than reinvented.  
While MONOs are often discussed as a monolithic operational space, they can usefully be divided 
into presence-based and event-based operations. The former are strategic capabilities that begin with 
lengthy network intrusions and conclude with an offensive objective. The latter are directly-activated 
tactical tools that can be field-deployed by personnel to create localised effects immediately. This top-
level distinction is abstract enough to be usable by military planners and researchers and specific 
enough to create two meaningful categories. Once defined, the two categories are applied against 
military thought to show how different MONOs can contribute to the overall military effort. Three 
chapters are then dedicated to an in-depth examination of MONO strategy demonstrated by the 
United States, Russia, and China. Each of the three exhibits a unique approach to intangible warfare 
stemming from differences in culture, resources, history, and circumstance. It thus becomes possible 
to observe the relative advantages and disadvantages of each military and how they stand to benefit by 
better employing MONOs.   
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INTRODUCTION 
THE ARGUMENT 
Computing is an indispensable facet of modern military operations, but attacking computers has 
yet to deliver on the promise of revolutionizing warfare. Intelligence collection, command and control, 
guidance, and weapons platforms themselves are all aided by networks. Even as networks have 
become pivotal in enabling joint operations, the spectre of cyberwar – envisioning battles waged 
between and against networks - has yet to come to fruition; war remains innately kinetic. The twenty-
first century accompanied the explosive rise of the cyber-warfare narrative, but its actual utility in 
warfare remains unclear. It is imperative to have strategic thought lead the use of technology rather 
than have technology create de-facto strategies. As such, this thesis will ask – What limits military 
forces from realising the potential of cyber-warfare, and how could these limitations be mitigated? 
 “I have given Cyber Command really its first wartime assignment… and we’re seeing how it works 
out1”, half-heartedly claimed former U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter in April 2016, referring 
to the use of offensive cyber operations against the Islamic State in Iraq. “Even a few years ago, it 
would not have occurred to a secretary of defense to say, ‘let’s get cyber in the game’, but here we have 
real opportunities2”, he added. It is such broadly ambitious claims that introduce confusion rather 
than clarity, as the contribution from “cyber” to the campaign against the Islamic State seemed murky. 
Practitioners and researchers immediately suspected hyperbole from Carter’s overtures on military 
integration of cyber-offensives. How useful were the so-called “cyber bombs3” against the Islamic 
State? 
Fast forward to eighteen months later. A now-retired Carter candidly admitted in a Belfer Center 
special report on the Islamic State campaign that he was “…largely disappointed in Cyber Command’s 
effectiveness against ISIS. It never really produced any effective cyber weapons or techniques4.” 
Tension arose from the ownership of such capabilities by intelligence agencies, principally the 
National Security Agency; “When CYBERCOM did produce something useful, the intelligence 
community tended to delay or try to prevent its use, claiming cyber operations would hinder 
intelligence collection5.” Finally, he lamented: “none of our agencies showed very well in the cyber 
fight6.” The first declared US attempt at network warfighting was deemed a failure by the very 
individual that spearheaded it.  
                                                             
1 Geoff Dyer, “US Launches Online Assault against Isis,” Financial Times, April 6, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/4d98edd0-fba5-
11e5-b3f6-11d5706b613b. 
2 Dyer. 
3 David E. Sanger, “U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat,” The New York Times, April 24, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directs-cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html. 
4 Ash Carter, “A Lasting Defeat: The Campaign to Destroy ISIS” (Cambridge, Mass: The Belfer Center, October 2017), 33. 
5 Carter, 33. 
6 Carter, 33. 
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In 2018, nations openly incorporate cyber-warfare into their military doctrine. The People’s 
Republic of China and the United States – among many others - have declared doctrine, formed units 
and invested considerable funds towards conducting operations over and against networks. The 
United Kingdom recently acknowledged that it “…has conducted a major offensive cyber campaign 
against Daesh7.” Chinese military doctrine highlights cyberspace as a significant new aspect of 
warfare, accompanying the internal rise of networked combat capabilities8. Russian forces have 
deployed offensive network capabilities against Ukrainian critical infrastructure by causing a limited 
power outage at a power station concurrent to a low-intensity kinetic campaign in Ukraine9. Nations 
are increasingly realising that the potential in targeting networks ranges from manipulating news 
organisations to crippling military hardware; the usefulness of network operations lies within a broad 
spectrum of possibilities. Yet cyber-warfare did not appear in a vacuum; it is rooted in military 
history, technological progress and the development of modern doctrine. Identifying and mapping 
how such capabilities can be made useful in warfare is thus the focus of this thesis.   
Some network attacks push against the accepted boundaries of warfare. In 2017, a destructive 
strain of malware flimsily masquerading as ransomware spread virulently around the world, wiping 
devices and inflicting billions of pounds in damages to numerous organisations and corporations10. 
The sum global damage inflicted by NotPetya was unprecedented. Production and operations were 
affected in multiple industries as companies scrambled to reimage computers and restore lost data. 
The infection vector soon pointed to a small Ukrainian software company used locally to pay taxes11, 
though others were later discovered. It was suspected that the original intent was to wreak digital 
havoc within Ukraine, yet it was eminently clear that the malware had escaped its original boundaries. 
Whether that was intentional or not remains uncertain. 
NotPetya is now publicly attributed to the Russian military by the United States12, United 
Kingdom13, and others. This unusual attribution was conducted both publicly and to a startling level of 
specificity. The message sent was anything but subtle; this was a military operation sanctioned by the 
Russian government. Yet nuance is needed in order to identify what is the utility of attacks such as 
NotPetya, how they contribute to a strategic narrative, and whether they even fundamentally can be 
classified as warfare. As the models presented in this thesis will suggest, based on targeting, impact, 
identity of the attackers, the underlying goals and existing relationships between victim and attacker, 
                                                             
7 Jeremy Fleming, “GCHQ Director’s Speech at CYBERUK 2018” (April 12, 2018). 
8 The State Council Information Office, “China’s Military Strategy” (2015). 
9 Robert M. Lee, “Potential Sample of Malware from the Ukrainian Cyber Attack Uncovered,” SANS Industrial Control Systems Security 
Blog, January 1, 2016, https://ics.sans.org/blog/2016/01/01/potential-sample-of-malware-from-the-ukrainian-cyber-attack-uncovered. 
10 Cybereason, “Paying the Price of Destructive Cyber Attacks,” 2017, 2, https://hi.cybereason.com/hubfs/Content%20PDFs/Paying-
the-Price-of-Destructive-Cyber-Attacks.pdf?t=1505592823490. 
11 David Maynor et al., “The MeDoc Connection,” Cisco Talos (blog), July 5, 2017, http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/the-
medoc-connection.html. 
12 U.S. Press Secretary, “Statement from the Press Secretary,” The White House, February 15, 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-25/. 
13 NCSC, “Russian Military ‘Almost Certainly’ Responsible for Destructive 2017 Cyber Attack,” UK National Cyber Security Centre, 
February 15, 2018, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/russian-military-almost-certainly-responsible-destructive-2017-cyber-attack. 
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NotPetya can be viewed as an act of cyber-warfare against the Ukraine, but not against the collaterally 
affected nations14.  
Incidents against networks occur daily, in troves. The overwhelming majority of these attempted 
intrusions are no more than an exploratory probe for weaknesses, easily shrugged off by automated 
defences. Beyond those, many successful compromises occur, leading to an unprecedented aggregate 
loss of sensitive data. Fewer still seek not just to extract data but also influence it and the systems that 
host it, resulting in attacks. Only a sliver of intrusions are carried out under a military mandate, 
seeking to achieve political-strategic goals by way of network attacks. Often conflated with intelligence 
operations or criminal activity, this fragment of malicious network activity has distinct characteristics 
that are explored within this thesis. 
The primary goal is therefore to address how military offensive network operations (MONOs) 
optimally can contribute to battlefield success on all levels of operation. Rather than discussing the 
spectre of cyberwar, the goal is to piece together the spectrum of cyber-warfare. Military doctrine is 
built on accrued experience and historical analysis that can contribute immensely towards crafting a 
modern joint cyber-warfighting approach; the introduction of cyber does not necessarily mean 
abandoning conventional wisdom. By examining the intersection of established military strategy, 
information security, and the technical characteristics of military-used technology, it is possible to 
construct practical models that both help determine what constitutes military cyber-attacks and how 
these could reliably be integrated into military strategy across all three key facets of warfighting; 
strategic, operational, and tactical. A combination of doctrinal, technical, and strategic analysis helps 
bridge the gap between established practice and the seemingly new circumstances of cyber-warfare.  
Typologies already exist for offensive network activities. US doctrine divides by purpose; MONOs 
may disrupt, destroy, degrade, deny, or manipulate their targets15. This is a useful distinction when 
attempting to distinguish between potential impacts but less compelling as overarching categories for 
the operations themselves. Each of the potential five purposes may just be a different payload at the 
end of identical processes. Healey and Rattray suggested a dozen parameters with which to categorize 
offensive network operations, creating a granular framework that is best applied to individual cases16. 
When comparing strategic implementation of MONOs between nations at scale, the framework 
becomes more unwieldy. A simpler solution would offer simple, easily identifiable categories with 
impactful distinctions.  
At its core, this thesis will argue that all MONOs can be usefully divided into two primary 
categories; tactical event-based operations, and strategic presence-based operations. This distinction 
helps divide between areas of responsibility in military forces and intelligence agencies, and between 
capabilities that can be designated as field-deployed weapons and those that would require high-
                                                             
14 The 5-step cyber-warfare assessment model will be detailed in the first chapter.  
15 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations,” June 8, 2018, 41. 
16 Gregory J. Rattray and Jason Healey, “Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Their Use,” in Proceedings of 
a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (Washington D.C.: National Academic 
Press, 2010), 82–83. 
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echelon political approvals. The differences between the two categories manifest across the entire 
operational lifecycle, thereby serving as an instructive way of classifying offensive activities by 
practitioners and researchers alike.  
The categorical division presented in the thesis helps prevent both over-simplification and over-
complication of offensive network operations. The tendency to lump all network intrusions as “cyber” 
strips away crucial distinctions that then make clear analysis immensely difficult. Intelligence 
operations are not attacks and placing information operations alongside destructive malware leaves 
much to be desired. At the same time, while offensive network capabilities introduce numerous 
intricate variables and technological circumstances, these considerations must be abstracted to the 
level where researchers, strategists, and policy-makers can make sense of them with their existing 
toolsets.   
Four layers will be introduced forming an analytical funnel for MONOs. The first layer will provide 
a five-step model towards assessing if a given incident should be classified as cyber-warfare. The 
model allows independently standardizing all assessment of offensive activities to the same scale, 
excluding those that do not meet a threshold of relevance. The second layer will then offer a historical 
analysis contending that MONOs draw heavily from existing warfighting doctrine, essentially 
grouping electronic warfare and network warfare in a century-long effort to conduct intangible 
warfare. The third layer will contend that distinguishing between immediate-effect event-based 
operations and time-consuming, clandestine presence-based operations can help form more coherent 
doctrine for each. The fourth and final layer will apply the above distinction to established military 
stratagems, showing how existing strategic thought can usefully apply to MONOs.  
It is possible and desirable to disambiguate between military operations in wartime and 
information operations in peacetime. Hacks that manipulate a nation’s elections process17 may be an 
egregious violation of sovereignty, but do not necessarily meet the threshold of warfare. Unless carried 
out by military forces and for a commensurate conflict goal, shaping public perception by 
manipulating news and social media is not inherently an in-conflict venture. To give policy makers, 
strategists, doctrine-crafters, and battlefield commanders a robust understanding of what they can 
and cannot expect from offensive network operations, we must first dispel the “grey areas” currently 
afflicting such capabilities. While it is tempting to leave “cyber” as a porous concept where wartime 
and peacetime inherently bleed into each other, doing so introduces risk and waste. The risk entails 
undue escalation between nations as a result of misidentifying peacetime operations as ones of war-
like intent18. Waste may stem from the misapplication of offensive network capabilities by strategists 
and battlefield commanders. 
Cyber-warfare has the potential to provide a set of capabilities that act as a force multiplier in 
armed conflict, yet these will not supplant but rather complement existing warfighting doctrine. 
                                                             
17 DHS Press Office, “Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on 
Election Security,” Department of Homeland Security, October 7, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/node/23199. 
18 Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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Uniquely, MONOs primarily allow attackers to weaponise an enemy against itself by subverting its 
systems, networks and weapons, thereby contributing to - but not single-handedly generating - 
victory. The more advanced and interconnected the adversary is, the more it may be susceptible to this 
form of operation. History instructs us about the many similarities between the advent of cyber-
warfare and the introduction of other forms of warfare, specifically manoeuvres and tactics employed 
via the electromagnetic spectrum throughout the 20th century.  
CONCEPTS 
Clearly defined concepts are crucial to the scoping agenda at the heart of this thesis. An 
uncomfortable realisation is that information security professionals often skew negatively towards 
“cyber” as a term of art. In its most abstract, appending cyber as a prefix simply means “involving a 
computer”. A reasonable concern is that as most human functions and interactions become more 
reliant on some form of computed involvement, the term itself becomes redundant. Yet for now, cyber 
is unavoidable. The term appears in policy documents, media coverage, Western military strategy, and 
official public reports. Irrespective of the sentiment towards it, cybersecurity is a meaningful concept 
because we ascribe it as such. As of now, using cyber as a linguistic qualifier effectively reflects the 
intersection of all other topics with networks and computing.  
However, for the purpose of this thesis, “cyber” and “network” will be used nearly interchangeably. 
Both entail the use of interconnected computing resources, and thus effectively mean the same. Thus 
network-warfare and cyber-warfare are analogous, as are network attacks and cyber-attacks. This 
substitution is not particularly new; the National Security Agency has relied on the term “computer 
network operations” for several decades. To encourage robust application of concepts introduced 
through this work, use of the cyber prefix is often limited to where referencing existing terminology, 
titles, or organisations. 
The concept most fundamental to this thesis is the military offensive network operation (MONO). 
For the purpose of this research, it shall be defined as any means of digitally affecting adversary 
systems and networks for a military goal or objective; affecting data by using data. This definition 
includes a wide swathe of possible offensive vectors while excluding non-offensive operations or 
kinetic operations against network equipment19. Most of what is characterized as network-warfare 
today is in fact routine intrusion operations conducted by intelligence agencies in peacetime. When 
espionage and corporate sabotage are intermixed with actual network attacks, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to distinguish what passes the threshold of warfare. If nations were to adopt the wider view of 
cyber-warfare that incorporates espionage, the escalatory ramifications for international diplomacy 
would be dire.  
                                                             
19 Cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare routinely get fused together by media outlets and researchers, muddling the observable 
space.   
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In a 2015 Wall Street Journal article titled “Cyberwar Ignites a New Arms Race”, the authors 
claimed that “more than two dozen nations have accumulated advanced cyberweapons in the last 
decade.20” While this may be true, the corroborating evidence in the piece was limited to espionage 
and wiping of corporate workstations. As targeting of corporate entities occurs frequently in 
peacetime, it is dangerous to repeatedly insinuate that the world is engulfed in constant unrelenting 
cyber-warfare. By itself, cyberwar is an awkward term attempting to depict a conflict through 
networks that is detached from other forms of political contest. As a result, this thesis will only briefly 
address cyberwar as a term of art and instead focus on a more integrative perception of cyber-warfare.  
To accurately frame what falls within the remit of cyber-warfare, a coherent depiction of offensive 
cyber capabilities is necessary in a manner that exceeds mere acts of espionage or localized sabotage. 
Cyber-warfare must be framed to generate proper boundaries and thresholds.  
No widely accepted term currently exists to describe the evolution of forms of warfare that do not 
have a kinetic, physical manifestation. Jamming, electronic warfare, computer network operations, 
cyber-warfare, and information warfare all share several common characteristics: they rely on the 
unseen transmission and manipulation of data. As military forces become increasingly physically 
distant from the violence they inflict upon people and property, data conduits become significantly 
more meaningful to the conduct of war. Data affects communication, telemetry, coordination, 
targeting, command, intelligence, navigation, and planning. Striking at the channels which silently 
enable these functionalities is an understandably important undertaking, one that has 
commensurately evolved as they themselves have. The term offered by this thesis to encompass all 
efforts to undermine transmission, reception, and processing of data is intangible warfare. While it is 
a more descriptive rather than technical label, exploring how it practically evolved over the last eight 
decades will illustrate the continuity it embodies. Intangible warfare may differ in technique, 
approach or effect, but there is strong historical scaffolding that ties all such operations together; this 
will be explored throughout.  
STRUCTURE 
This thesis has two essential parts – the development of three core conceptual arguments, and 
their subsequent application to doctrine and use-cases. Conceptual work is meant to gradually 
disambiguate elements of MONOs that are often mischaracterised. Chapter one introduces a model to 
assess what constitutes cyber-warfare, chapter two examines how cyber organically grew out of other 
operational arts, and chapter three identifies the core categories within offensive network operations. 
These principles are then applied to modern warfighting doctrine in chapter four, and then 
subsequently tested against three case studies – US joint operations doctrine, the Russian use of 
network force in modern conflict, and a potential flaring of a Chinese-led Taiwan contingency. The 
                                                             
20 Damian Paletta, Danny Yadron, and Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, “Cyberwar Ignites a New Arms Race,” Wall Street Journal, October 
12, 2015, sec. World, http://www.wsj.com/articles/cyberwar-ignites-a-new-arms-race-1444611128. 
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final eighth chapter briefly examines how the provided models may be challenged by near-future 
trends. 
Chapter one will argue that most network intrusions today do not meet the threshold of an attack, 
and most attacks do not meet the threshold of warfare. Put simply, a jarring majority of what is 
colloquially labelled cyber-warfare does not merit the label. To alleviate the classification challenge, 
the chapter will describe a detailed five-step process to qualify an incident as a cyber-warfare event. 
The steps accumulate and are increasingly difficult to meet. The five parameters inspected in order 
are; the affected target, the impact of the incident, the identity of the attacker(s), the goals behind the 
incident, and the existing relationship between victim and attacker. These five characteristics form to 
create the assessment model, made purposefully generic as to be applicable to a wide variety of 
malicious network incidents.  
Chapter two will argue that offensive network capabilities are a natural evolution of technological 
warfare. In contrast to present US doctrine21, “cyber” does not have to stand as a distinct warfighting 
domain; networks wholly permeate the existing physical domains. William Lynn, former U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense stated already in 2010 that “...the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace 
as a new domain of warfare22.” He then continued to explain that “although cyberspace is a man-made 
domain, it has become critical to military operations.” The perspective that networks are a novel, 
distinct domain of warfare with previously unseen characteristics is a loaded one. It is possible to 
challenge this perspective both by observing how cyber-warfare came to be and it is potentially and 
practically employed. Offensive capabilities are developing in a world where increasingly complex 
warfighting platforms breed increasingly digitized countermeasures. Tanks gave birth to anti-tank 
weapons; warplanes necessitated the advent of radars and anti-aircraft platforms. Active radars 
rapidly led to electromagnetic countermeasures. Commensurately, the rise of thickly networked, 
informationised warfare is now giving birth to offensive network operations. Some elements may be 
novel but the discipline is not devoid of context; eight decades of counter-innovation warfare birthed 
network operations.  
Within the historic analysis, the development of increasingly intangible forms of warfighting will 
be grouped under the term intangible warfare. As the historical analysis will show, most elements 
that exist within modern network warfare are borrowed from other operational arts. It is an 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary advancement; intangible warfare has existed for decades and 
had simply evolved as technology progressed and networking permeated both life and warfare. 
Existing characteristics of intangible warfare have rapidly exasperated to the point where they appear 
revolutionary. From the need to hide abilities lest they be compromised to the debilitating dependency 
on accurate intelligence, cyber shares key commonalities with electronic warfare that should not be 
                                                             
21 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations,” May 2, 2013, 3-12. 
22 William Lynn, “Defending a New Domain - The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 5 (October 2010): 101. 
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ignored. Shared characteristics can in turn help understand how existing doctrine can instruct on 
better use of network operations.  
Chapter three will offer a doctrinal model in which offensive network military operations will 
primarily fall into one of two categories; event-based, and presence-based. While the former 
describes near-instantaneous effects achieved over and against networks, the latter entails all 
operations which include purposeful, lingering manoeuvring within adversary networks in order to 
plant and eventually activate offensive capabilities against targeted systems. Event-based attacks are 
thus roughly similar to classic weapons, and more suitable for deployment by battlefield commanders 
and individual warfighters. Presence-based attacks must include breaching adversary networks in 
advance – often by intelligence organisations – and are carefully activated by senior decision-makers23 
as to properly incorporate the risks involved in doing so. Differences between presence-based and 
event-based operations are explored by an in-depth examination through the prism of the US 
Department of Defense’s Common Cyber Threat Framework24. The framework details the network 
operation life-cycle by splitting it into four principal phases; preparation, engagement, presence, and 
effect. 
Demarcating between event and presence-based lends organic clarity to analysing offensive 
network operations. The two categories are so distinct that grouping them together causes a dilution 
of any attempt to operationalise network warfare. Operational considerations, technical limitations, 
personnel requirements and most importantly – the potential contribution, are so disparate between 
event and presence-based operations that it becomes nearly meaningless to observe them together. By 
separating them so, evaluating the utility, purpose and role of offensive military network operations 
becomes more feasible. The distinction also allows easier allocation of resources and can help alleviate 
issues where nation-state intelligence agencies indiscriminately hoard capabilities for fear of losing 
precious access to adversary sources.  
Chapter four then argues that event-based operations are largely effective militarily on the 
tactical-operational level, while presence-based attacks are primarily useful to facilitate 
operational-strategic effects. The application of such operations to the conduct of war is explored by 
analysing military strategy across military history, applying relevant observations to offensive network 
operations. Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Corbett, Freedman, and others all contribute valuable lessons on 
how technology can reshape the conduct of warfare, but not fundamentally alter its nature. Military 
strategy draws on millennia of accumulated wisdom. While it is tempting to infer that the man-made 
nature of the internet alters the underlying calculus of war somehow, it yet remains a contest of 
political will embodied through the application of coercive violence. Cyber-warfare may upset existing 
symmetries and enable creative manoeuvres, but utilising it correctly requires understanding where it 
                                                             
23 For example in official U.S. cyber-warfare doctrine, only the Secretary of Defense and the President can authorise such operations. 
See U.S. Army, “Army Field Manual 3-38 - Cyber Electromagnetic Activities,” February 12, 2014, 38. 
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has the most utility. This can be done by dissecting technical characteristics and cross-referencing 
them with stratagems.   
Event-based attacks will most commonly have a localised effect, thus limiting their utility to the 
tactical or at most the operational levels of warfare. This parameter is offset by their generic 
reusability; they are intended to be repeatedly employable against various targets and are more 
difficult to defend against. Whether it is destructive malware which will wipe computers and servers25, 
a denial of service capability that prevents access to a vital communication network, or even a plane-
mounted exploit against an aging air defense radar26, these capabilities are intended to provide 
battlefield support, erode specific adversary assets and interrupt local decision-making.  
 Presence-based attacks may manifest as deep target network intrusions with effects extending into 
the strategic level. Sabotaging logistics may result in military assets incorrectly resourced away. 
Disrupting military satellites may adversely affect communications and GPS service across a theatre. 
By their nature, however, strategic attacks are highly specialised, require extended periods of 
preparation, research, and maintaining access to protected adversary networks. In many cases, 
potential targets of presence-based attacks are also valuable intelligence assets; such considerations 
must be accounted for at the highest echelons prior to deployment. In some cases, a presence-based 
capability may be a one-off chance at inflicting strategic harm; it is therefore best saved for when 
crucially needed.  
Chapters five, six, and seven then endeavour to apply the entire theoretical scaffolding to different 
case studies. Models are best tested against disparate examples, embodying nations that have wildly 
different approaches to offensive network operations. Analysing how American, Russian and Chinese 
militaries can and do operate against adversary networks tests the offered models and highlights the 
unique advantages and disadvantages that each military has. The US has vast technical capabilities, 
the Russians have prolific, aggressive use of full spectrum MONOs, and the Chinese have developed a 
cogent yet largely untested doctrine.  
Chapter five will dive into the US approach to cyber as a distinct domain of warfighting. Since 
the late twentieth century, the US has de-facto developed a broad array of potent technical capabilities 
meant to target networks and devices. Publicly, significant slivers have been made available through 
leaks, public sector research, government doctrine, and technical data from the sprawling defence 
industry.  Yet much like in the earlier days of modern warfare, the US adopted a capability-first 
approach, which resulted in numerous potential MONOs that were mismatched with available 
doctrine. As a result, battlefield successes were reportedly limited, with presence-based offensives 
relegated to a war-prevention role and event-based capabilities limited to supporting special forces 
and operations. With its global rivals increasingly adopting the same principles of highly-networked 
                                                             
25 Ryan Faughnder, Dave Paresh, and Saba Hamedy, “Hack at Sony Pictures Shuts Computer System,” The Los Angeles Times, 
November 24, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-fi-sony-hack-20141125-story.html. 
26 Sean O’Conner, “Access Denial - Syria’s Air Defence Network” (Jane’s International Defence Review, 2014). 
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joint operations, the US could effectively employ MONOs to enhance its existing asymmetries and 
deny adversaries their own. 
Chapter six will examine Russian military network activity. Since 2007, Russia has increasingly 
exerted coercive will against other nation-states. In a desire to occlude the appearance of actual war, 
Russian doctrine heavily favours deploying semi-clandestine forces and low-visibility capabilities. As a 
result, conflicts involving Russian forces or interests exhibit numerous references to offensive network 
operations, ranging from degrading fighter aircraft27 to direct attacks against critical infrastructure28. 
Where the United States has created a separate unified combatant command to oversee “cyber 
operations”, the Russians engage with offensive network capabilities holistically in a spectrum that 
blurs distinction between peacetime and wartime, and between information operations and network 
warfare. Russian doctrine borrows heavily from well-established Soviet principles of reflexive control 
– the desire to covertly shape adversary behaviour to a more favourable pattern. While Russia is 
incredibly prolific in its employment of offensive network behaviour, the vast majority of its 
operations do not merit being labelled as warfare. This will be shown to be intentional and in line with 
Russian aims; by consistently remaining below the threshold of all-out war, their leadership can avoid 
a military response from capable adversaries. 
Chapter seven will explore the evolving Chinese doctrine to network operations, particularly 
through the prism of a potential conflict with Taiwan. This possibility is neither remote nor entirely 
theoretical; several previous crises have already occurred, and both external assessment and internal 
doctrine envision the two parties on a collision course which will eventually require resolution. The 
scenario pits three highly networked militaries – China, Taiwan, and the United States - all seeking 
swift resolution of hostilities. As a result, such a conflict is a prime case study for the potential 
employment of offensive network capabilities in order to prevent effective command and control, and 
degrade networked warfighters from achieving objectives. China has undertaken great strides to 
modernise its approach to MONOs, including the concentration of capabilities in a new independent 
Strategic Support Force meant to provide capabilities to the existing domains. Yet, as with other 
aspects of the People’s Liberation Army the doctrine remains largely untested under conditions of 
conflict, with a dearth of operational expertise a crucial deficiency in achieving superiority in MONOs. 
The final eighth chapter will draw conclusions based on all tiers of analysis. The conclusions 
include the culmination of efforts to fuse historical, technical and military perspectives towards a 
cohesive examination of cyber-warfare. The underlying arguments will be shown to indicate that 
despite the rapid pace of advancement, militaries worldwide can adopt conceptual tenets of 
cyberwarfare that would then aid in its battlefield deployment. On a foundational level, it is useful to 
decouple information operations from network warfare. The lessons of electronic warfare can 
similarly allow militaries to accommodate network forces without altering doctrine too heavily. 
                                                             
27 Marco Giannangeli, “Russians ‘Hacking into’ RAF Crews over Syria,” The Daily Express, January 15, 2017, 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/754236/russia-raf-bombers-syria-hacking-missions-military-army. 
28 Dragos, “CRASHOVERRIDE: Threat to the Electric Grid Operations” (Dragos, June 12, 2017). 
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Finally, the distinction between combatants carrying out presence and event-based operations can 
help resolve organisational tensions and vastly different operational lifecycles.   
This thesis attempts to map the utility of cyber-warfare and place it within a wider military context. 
While we yet lack more of the desired observable evidence, we by no means are without the tools to 
assess the shape of digital warfare. If an informed strategic debate is meshed with a practical technical 
analysis, the resulting amalgamation is a realistic assessment of the characteristics of cyber-warfare. 
The existing lack of clarity manifests in overstatements and alarmism; countering it yields boundaries, 
advantages and possibilities. 
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCING 
Direct evidence of military engagements against networks is relatively lacking, but an interleaved 
pattern of different sources creates a tapestry of complementary information. This work relies on 
critical assessment of sources across four axes; technical, operational, doctrinal, and strategic. Until 
history provides a richer offering of case studies to examine, those seeking to understand network 
operations must rely on cautiously informed assessments based on existing evidence.  
The technical axis entails an examination of how networks and devices may be targeted for effect. 
Put simply, some effects are either infeasible or unrealistic to carry out. Whereas disabling a tactical 
communication network is both possible and plausible, causing a nuclear submarine reactor to 
undergo a critical failure is a far more remote possibility due to existing failsafes and mitigation 
procedures. Expectation alignment is a key part of a thesis that seeks to chart what warfare may 
realistically look like when carried out through and against networks. Technical assessment is carried 
out by inspecting the specifications of military equipment and networks and the potential 
vulnerabilities that these may be afflicted with. Examples to this include difficulty due to the 
overreliance on aging, hard-to-update technology, or the increasing tendency to introduce remote 
command and control directly into weapons.  
Sourcing on technical specification of military hardware and software includes freely available 
manuals on military standards, officially published reports, leaked sensitive data, and even 
promotional materials published by military contractors entrusted with designing and manufacturing 
military equipment. US government accountability reports shine a fascinating light on assessed 
vulnerabilities and limitations of newly developed warfighting platforms. Combined, a fairly robust 
mesh of military-deployed technologies emerged supporting an analysis of how these may be targeted 
in wartime.  
An example of covering emerging technologies from complementary angles is the F-35 Lightning II 
Joint Strike Fighter. This ambitious project includes numerous contractors and participating nations 
spanning over a decade of research and development. By design, the project is meant to both integrate 
well into existing orders of battle, while simultaneously offering state-of-the-art sensors, onboard 
software, and peripheral logistics and maintenance systems. Sources on the F-35 platform include 
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official accountability reports detailing software flaws29, public coverage on recurring errors on the F-
3530, official specifications of the F-35’s “ALIS” semi-autonomous logistics system31, and even leaked 
classified documents pertaining to BYZANTINE HADES32, the network operation in which crucial 
intelligence pertaining to the F-35 project was exfiltrated - presumably by Chinese threat actors. By 
and large, the F-35 exhibits deep flaws that may be exploited for effect by a determined adversary. 
Possible operations may include disruption of the onboard radar suite, interference in the next-
generation communication protocols used by the craft, or even a lengthy presence-based operation to 
disrupt logistics and maintenance by corrupting regionally-deployed ALIS units. Such attack vectors 
are not merely theoretical when the plane itself exhibits numerous issues, and its own auditors 
express scepticism at the craft’s software readiness for sustained operations in a contested airspace.  
Network attacks are ubiquitous. There is no dearth of evidence when it comes to mapping a 
multitude of techniques for targeting networks and devices. The unprecedented public scrutiny of 
nation-state network intrusion tools meant an explosion of public-sphere analysis of offensive 
network operations and capabilities. These vary in quality and relevance, but uniquely provide a 
glimpse into how networks are targeted by nation states for effect. As the intelligence agencies behind 
network intelligence campaigns are often those that will precipitate network attacks, learning of their 
craft and methodology by dissecting analysing their intrusions is paramount. There are lessons to be 
learned from analysing they excel, make errors, and perhaps most importantly, how they adapt to 
challenges and evolve their capabilities33. Visibility into network operations spans numerous 
countries, threat actors, and underlying goals. In some cases, coverage of intelligence operations 
reveals complex, modular toolsets34 that could be applied to a variety of offensive purposes should 
there be an inclination to do so. In other cases, reviewing how nations successfully degraded adversary 
systems hints at how similar operations may materialise against equivalent military targets. The 
toolsets apply to both generic event-based attacks and the most targeted and expansive of presence-
based attacks.  
Sourcing for network intrusion analysis extends beyond the information security industry. Several 
batches of leaked materials pertaining to compromised intelligence agencies provide intimate access 
to internal documentation and assessments of operational capabilities within some of the most 
capable network aggressors. Disclosures include the expansive Snowden documents leaked from 
numerous U.S. agencies and units including the National Security Agency (NSA) in 2013, the leak of 
                                                             
29 See for example two reports from 2015- U.S. Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year 2015 DoD Programs - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF)” (U.S. Department of Defense, January 2016). and 2016 - U.S. Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year 2016 DoD Programs - F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF)” (U.S. Department of Defense, January 2017). 
30 Sean Gallagher, “F-35 Radar System Has Bug That Requires Hard Reboot in Flight,” Ars Technica, March 10, 2016, 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/03/f-35-radar-system-has-bug-that-requires-hard-reboot-in-flight/. 
31 Lockheed Martin, “Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS)” (Lockheed Martin, November 2009), 
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/alis/CS00086-55%20(ALIS%20Product%20Card).pdf. 
32 U.S. Department of Defense, “Chinese Exfiltrate Sensitive Military Technology,” 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-
35687.pdf. 
33 See for example the evolution from Duqu to Duqu 2.0, malware families from 2011 and 2015 respectively, both ostensibly 
attributed to Israel. GReAT, “The Duqu 2.0: Technical Details” (Kaspersky Lab, June 11, 2015), https://securelist.com/the-mystery-of-duqu-
2-0-a-sophisticated-cyberespionage-actor-returns/70504/. 
34 See for example the intrusion toolset known as APT, a highly modular platform used to compromise high value targets. GReAT, “The 
ProjectSauron APT” (Kaspersky Lab, August 9, 2016), https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/. 
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sensitive information from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit by a group calling itself “The 
Shadow Brokers” in 201635, and the leaks codenamed Vault-7 allegedly containing a vast repository of 
information on CIA intrusion and attack capabilities36.   
The doctrinal axis is evaluated by relying on official publications and de-facto nation-state 
behaviour. Most simply, nations often publicise their relationship with offensive network operations 
within their core official documents, such as national military strategies. The detail level of these 
documents varies greatly based on the country analysed, with the United States arguably engaged in 
the most significant public discourse around shaping its operational capabilities. However, in order to 
generically assess doctrinal elements to offensive network operations, documents, reports, and 
speeches from several key nations are addressed. 
Nations vary greatly in their approaches to network warfare doctrine. Extensive US literature on 
the topic reveals an evolutionary approach which increasingly views “cyber” as an independent 
domain of warfare. If taken at face value, the new domain then requires distinct doctrine and 
allocation of resources. Evidence for this is most immediately reflected in Joint Publication 3-12 – 
Cyberspace Operations37, which then has complementary implementations in branches such as the US 
Air Force38 and the US Army39. Other documents, including manuals on joint operations40 also shed 
light on how existing strategies could be updated to reflect the inclusion of novel capabilities. Other 
declassified documents similarly contribute complementary elements.  
For other nations, some high-level documents allow identification of how policy makers and 
military strategists view the role of network operations. The evolution of official military doctrine from 
Russia41 and China42 are highly indicative of the role of network operations as capable of altering 
conventional asymmetries and creating unique advantages. Views of network warfare vary based on 
the overall perception of information and its role in conflict. This in turn affects how nations seek to 
weaponise information against their adversaries. 
Official publications need not be the only doctrinal elements considered. As language expertise is 
lacking, academic coverage of regional publications provides invaluable access to strategic 
perspectives of network warfare within military-academic circles. Dedicated limited-distribution 
journals in Russia and China – most commonly written to by senior staff – reveal how those within 
their respective systems view offensive network operations. Russian doctrinal assessments from 
NATO’s Cyber Centre of Excellence43 or Project 2049’s assessment of how a Chinese operation against 
                                                             
35 The actual publication of materials was carried out by a group calling itself “The ShadowBrokers”, suspected as a Russian false-flag 
information operation.  
36 As of this writing, The Vault leaks are hosted on WikiLeaks and can be found here - Wikileaks, “Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed,” 
Wikileaks, March 7, 2017, https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/. 
37 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations,” June 8, 2018. 
38 U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12,” July 15, 2010. 
39 U.S. Army, “Army Field Manual 3-38 - Cyber Electromagnetic Activities.” 
40 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning” (US Joint Chief of Staff, June 16, 2017). 
41 Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” December 25, 2014, http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 
42 The State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy. 
43 Keir Giles, NATO Defense College, and Research Division, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare (Rome, Italy: NATO Defence 
College Research Division, 2016). 
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Taiwan44 may manifest are useful towards scoping a realistic set of potential offensive operations 
available to these nations. 
The strategic axis includes the wealth of accumulated knowledge from two millennia of strategic 
thought. Since Thucydides first charted the course of the Peloponnesian Wars and Sun Tzu remarked 
on the value of subterfuge for warfare, military thinkers have grappled with the contribution of 
technology to warfare. Particularly with the dawn of machine warfare in the early twentieth century, 
the notion of technology permanently altering the nature of war itself has been pervasive yet 
contested. By looking for applicable lessons from military strategists and academics, it becomes 
possible to identify where opportunities for offensive network capabilities truly lie.  
Several of cyber-warfare’s core appeals and limitations can be dissected through the prism of 
historic strategists. In many cases, some elements appear to fit while others do not. Such for example 
with one of warfare’s most oft-referenced figures, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. 
Supposedly, the over-emphasised Clausewitzian focus on destruction as the key means of creating 
battlefield success hints at its inapplicability to network warfare, where most operations cannot create 
such an effect. At the same time, the gradual creation of networked nerve centres for command and 
control have effectively created new centres of gravity, which if struck successfully by a network attack 
could have a reverberating effect.  
Other parallels exist. Liddell Hart’s praise of indirect warfare45 and Douhet’s adherence to strategic 
bombing are both useful theoretical constructs through which we can assess the significance of 
offensive network operations. It is meaningful to examine whether MONOs can disrupt the balance of 
power by bypassing concentration of forces or enact coercive punishment. Perhaps, but history 
instructs that previous such attempts have largely been unsuccessful. Thus, we can avoid repeating the 
follies of previous new technologies by learning from their attempted integrations. Corbett’s 
identification that strategy manifests differently in the maritime and land domains holds fascinating 
analogies to the so-called cyber domain. Modern cyber-warfare researchers such as Libicki46, 
Denning47, Rattray48, and Healey49 all have contributed analyses and conceptual frameworks that 
comment on the viability of such attack vectors.  
LIMITATIONS 
Research undertaken to explore military network operations immediately encounters two 
interconnected difficulties; capabilities are often highly classified, and evidence of use is scarce. These 
difficulties are not insurmountable, but merely complicate attempts at fashioning an inclusive 
                                                             
44 Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, 1st ed. (Arlington, Virgina: Project 2049 
Institute, 2017). 
45 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed (New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Meridian, 1991). 
46 Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). 
47 Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare and Security, 4th ed. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1999). 
48 Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001). 
49 Rattray and Healey, “Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Their Use.” 
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framework that would accurately reflect MONOs as they may be used. The diverse sourcing employed 
when dissecting such capabilities is the answer; assembling a mosaic of network warfare from 
disparate fragments of information reveals a rather compelling result. Available technical data 
informs about military equipment vulnerabilities. Leaked information and public-domain analysis of 
nation-state network operations instruct on the techniques and strategy used by nations. Strategic 
documents, official statements and academic analysis help fashion assessments on the potential use of 
MONOs to military campaigns. 
The above approach does not fully alleviate the concern regarding the partiality of coverage. 
Considering the rapid pace of development in the field, commenting on modern capabilities may be 
difficult. However, that should not preclude the attempt. While technology evolves, most of its 
underpinnings have remained unchanged for the last five decades. The modern internet has inherited 
an architecture first developed in the 1960s50. Military equipment today must still support 
communication protocols first introduced in the 1970s. By design, military warfighting equipment is 
designed to last decades, with internal software and hardware gradually evolving over time. Thus, 
looking at the military network space reveals that much of it relies on technology incepted decades 
ago, now fully understood and accessible to researchers.  
An intentional limitation imposed is wholly excluding broader information operations from the 
scope of analysis. As previously said, the impetus to doing so is clear; information operations cover an 
immense swathe of non-violent activities that muddle analysis of capabilities employed in warfare. 
While combat operations may certainly incorporate information warfare, and some nations such as 
Russia fuse them seamlessly with other facets of intangible warfare, they remain sufficiently distinct 
as to merit exclusion. Without excluding information operations from the analysis, attempting to 
scope where military responsibility lies becomes near-impossible. How can network warfare 
capabilities be relegated to battlefield commanders if the distinction between them and psychological 
operations is hazy? Rather than being a detriment, segmenting information operations to a separate 
frame of observation lends clarity to the ontologies offered in the thesis. Different frameworks exist to 
discuss information warfare.  
A third limitation relates to future-proofing the argument and models offered in this thesis. With 
the rise of artificial intelligence and increased automation, it is unclear whether the considerations 
offered in this thesis will effectively persist. While this is always a concern when researching 
technology, it is especially so for network warfare which is intrinsically vulnerable to shifts in 
technological trends. However, this realisation does not necessarily impair the validity of the 
arguments offered.  
Artificial intelligence represents a potential future reality in which military operators are further 
distanced from the decision-making process by relegating more responsibilities to software. It is at 
times heralded as the next great “game-changer”, an introduced element that will upset the existing 
                                                             
50 See for example the ARPANET and the rise of packet-switch networking, the tenets of which remain applicable to date. 
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advantages and disadvantages of network operations. Supposedly, human operators seeking to target 
networks protected by artificial intelligence would struggle to bypass it’s heightened situational 
awareness. However, while artificial intelligence signifies a meaningful leap in the predictability of 
doing so, it is in fact quite congruent with the existing trends. Once artificial intelligence becomes 
ubiquitous in defending network assets from man-made attacks, operators on the offensive side may 
naturally turn to such capabilities to devise counters51. In this sense, artificial intelligence may yet 
form the next step in a long-existing process, an escalation of trends that have begun with the radar 
wars of the Second World War.   
                                                             
51 This process has already begun, as presented by a DARPA program for AI-based network defence, see Wade Shen, “The Information 
Domain and the Future of Conflict” (June 1, 2017).  
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1. A THEORY OF CYBER-WARFARE 
 
OVERVIEW 
How can warfare be waged with software? The practice of military combat evokes imagery of 
opposing forces colliding against each other in increasingly sophisticated ways. The spear, the horse 
and the shield gave way to the bow, the rifle and the missile. Throughout the ages, war has charted an 
evolutionary course in which the finest technology of the time was wielded to facilitate organised acts 
of violence. Efforts into maintaining an edge in the art of war had a tremendous effect on other walks 
of life. The same forge used to craft the blade was also used to craft the work tool. The same 
innovations in rocketry devised to fuel Cold War ballistic missiles were used to send humans into 
space. A tight-knit symbiosis formed between military technology and its civilian counterparts; one 
bred the other, the former fed the latter, and vice versa. The development of combat waged over 
networks – what is colloquially called cyber-warfare – is one iteration of that same cycle of innovation. 
If this thesis strives to gauge the boundaries and roles of cyber-warfare, this chapter seeks to 
deconstruct the term into its component parts. The primary purpose of the chapter is an exercise in 
boundary-setting; an examination of what acts perpetrated through networks do and do not meet the 
threshold of network warfare.  The contemporary environment is replete with network intrusions, 
ranging from exfiltration of information to tangible asset loss reaching millions of dollars and even 
physical damage. Where many of the tools of warfare are distinctly operated by militaries, the most 
influential intrusions have notably been perpetrated by intelligence agencies. Should they be assessed 
on the spectrum of intelligence operations or warfare?  
The chapter will seek to answer these questions by offering five cumulative parameters with which 
network attacks can be individually assessed, those being target, impact, attacker, goals and 
relationships. Together, the parameters form a model that excludes most incidents which are out of 
scope for analysis of MONOs. Discerning that the affected targets (1) are of sufficient significance or 
quantity is the first milestone in identifying a warfare-threshold activity; a think tank does not equate 
to a military target. Impact (2) includes both the immediate observable effects of the attack and its 
wider consequences, as most public domain incidents have little or no physical effects on the afflicted 
party. Attributing the attacker (3) allows establishing affiliation or subordination to a state or sub-
state entity overseeing the attacks. Goals (4) relate to assessing that the agenda of the perpetrators is 
military-strategic, crucial in an ecosystem where most intrusions are motivated by criminality or loose 
ideology. Finally, relationships (5) address the larger geopolitical and strategic considerations in 
which the attack takes place, and is often the key differentiator between warfare and other adversarial 
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Standardised assessment based on the above five parameters can help discern an act of war from 
an intelligence campaign, or a criminal enterprise from a well-organised precursor to a military attack. 
These distinctions are often less trivial than it may seem in software-based attacks. In the wake of 
mass exfiltration of sensitive information and nation-sponsored attacks against the banking sector as 
occurred in the US52, the most resonating question is often “what does this attack mean?”  If the 
answer is the devolution of the political circumstance into war, it is far more consequential than an 
embarrassingly successful espionage campaign. Incidents that are below the model’s threshold are 
thereafter considered out of scope when dissecting MONOs, and would only be addressed insofar as to 
demonstrate how nations often blur the lines between MONOs and other types of network operations. 
The second process included in the chapter is disentangling cyber-warfare and cyberwar. While the 
former can be established as a distinct sub-element of generalised warfare, the latter holds little 
tangible value beyond colloquialism and theoretical debate on the instrumentality of war through 
networks. Cyberwar and cyber-warfare are often used interchangeably in publication and media to 
denote any friction between two parties over the internet; that lack of distinction can be harmful to the 
overall quality of the discussion. cyberwar does not inherently exist as a meaningful independent 
construct and may subsequently be replaced with the appropriate label based on the underlying 
context and motivation, be it crime, espionage or actual acts of war.   
Similarly, although it is a thoroughly Western concept, a comprehensive framing of cyber-warfare 
must extend beyond the manner in which it is perceived by the United States. Awkward and 
misappropriated analogies have only detracted from generating agreed upon standards. The 
difficulties in crafting a cohesive ontology of MONOs was noted at least as early as 2001, when US Air 
Force veteran Gregory Rattray noted in his book, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, that “Frameworks 
for evaluating the capabilities of international actors to conduct conflicts based on attacking 
information infrastructures remain underdeveloped53”. He continued to aptly warn that the label of 
information warfare was being too broadly applied.  
This was exemplified in April 2016 when US deputy secretary of defence Robert Work colourfully 
exclaimed - “We are dropping cyberbombs54” when discussing the ongoing military campaign against 
the Islamic State. The particular phrasing drew sharp criticism from observers, but it served to reflect 
the military perception of the value of offensive network capabilities. At the same time, the Russian 
term for cyberwar – kibervoyna - mostly only exists as an acknowledgement of Western thinking 
rather than an actual centrepiece of Russian doctrine55. As a rising number of nations openly or tacitly 
acknowledge the significance of various offensive software capabilities to their strategy, cyber-warfare 
must appropriately expand as a concept to envelop its different manifestations.  Concurrently, 
                                                             
52 Ilan Berman, “The Iranian Cyber Threat, Revisited,” § US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee 
on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies (2013), 2, 
http://www.china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/legacy/AppImages/house-2013-berman-cyber-threats.pdf. 
53 Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, 2. 
54 Sanger, “U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat.” 
55 Keir Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West” (London, U.K.: Chatham House, March 2016), 9. 
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expanding the scope of MONOs risks dilution of analysis beyond utility. Striking a balance between 
inclusiveness and cohesion is thus at the core of this effort.   
This chapter will explore numerous examples of malicious network activities that despite their 
elevated public profiles should not be depicted as warfare. In 2014, Sony Pictures was the victim of a 
destructive network attack that resulted in data loss, exfiltration of sensitive information, severe 
disruption in daily operations and many millions of US dollars in damages56. In a relatively rare act of 
public attribution, then FBI Director James Comey publicly pointed an accusatory finger at the 
attackers: “…we know who hacked Sony. It was the North Koreans who hacked Sony57”.  The offensive 
was widely indicated to be a continuation of North Korean policy by cyber means, a strike at the heart 
of the American studio that dared to publish the parody movie The Interview. The movie presented 
revered North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in a comical manner with the entire film centred on his 
attempted assassination.  Public attribution efforts of the attack pointed to Unit 121 of the North 
Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau, one of the hermit nation’s more notorious hacking units58 
often associated with offensive network activities59. By 2018, the US government had indicted an 
operative affiliated with the North Korean government for this attack and others60. In this sense, the 
Sony attack straddled the grey area between warfare and non-warfare activities, with its unique set of 
capabilities applicable to both.  While the visible, high-profile attack held the possibility of escalation, 
it resulted in no apparent kinetic or virtual countermeasures save heated rhetoric. As the offered 
model will subsequently show, the Sony hack failed to meet multiple criteria necessary to qualify as a 
warfare-threshold incident. 
THE BOUNDARIES OF CYBER-WARFARE 
When the virtual medium itself is mostly intangible, communication of consensually agreeable 
limitations on the conduct of war becomes even more significant.  The barrier of entry for conducting 
some forms of offensive action over the internet has decreased immensely; it is arguably easier to 
generate a noticeable effect against a military network than it is to physically affect a missile battery. 
In this sense, the global internet has provided both opportunity and capability, and has reduced the 
barrier of entry somewhat61. The novelty of modern networking entails that we must be able to 
distinguish between the various sub-categories of friction in cyberspace between two entities.  
The delineation is crucial, as improperly establishing the boundaries of warfare can lead to 
peacetime operations being incorrectly classified as belligerent. In 2015, an intrusion into the US 
                                                             
56 Peter Elkind, “Sony Pictures: Inside the Hack of the Century,” Fortune (blog), July 1, 2015, http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part-1/. 
57 James B. Comey, “Addressing the Cyber Security Threat,” Speech, Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 7, 2015, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/addressing-the-cyber-security-threat. 
58 HP Security Research, “Profiling an Enigma: The Mystery of North Korea’s Cyber Threat Landscape” (Hewlett Packard, August 16, 
2014). 
59 Jenny Jun, Scott LaFoy, and Ethan Sohn, “North Korea’s Cyber Operations” (Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 
2015), 41. 
60 Nathan P. Shields, United States of America V. Park Jin Hyok, No. MJ 18-1479 (United States District Court June 8, 2018). 
61 To successfully affect operational military assets would still require a complete operational cycle and devotion of resources that are 
far beyond the capabilities of most non-state actors. See follow-up chapters for extensive elaboration on the unique calculus of MONOs. 
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Office of Personnel Management led to the exfiltration of sensitive personal information of over 
twenty million former and active members of the US security community62. Some Western political 
researchers such as Eurasia Group’s president Ian Bremmer63 were quick to tie the event into a large 
cyber-warfare narrative in which the US is in active contest with China. At the same time, the Chinese 
government attempted to diffuse the tensions from its hack by perceptibly collaborating with the US. 
It formally acknowledged the intrusion but labelled it an act of crime rather than a nation-state breach 
of sovereignty64. The distinction mattered even if the US did not fully accept the Chinese explanation; 
both parties had no desire to escalate, and the situation eventually diffused. Ascertaining why the 
OPM incident did not herald the onset of further hostilities can be made clearer by assessing each 
incident characteristic separately.   
As indicated before, five characteristics have been chosen to distinguish warfare-level attacks to 
other offensive incidents, such as financially-motivated criminality or illegal ideological incidents. The 
parameters are target, impact, attacker, goals and relationships. They are not ordered by importance 
as all five parameters must be met, but rather by increasing difficulty of assessment. Put differently, 
while discerning the exact intended victim of an attack is often the easiest endeavour, surmising the 
significance of the underlying strategic and political relationship between attacker and target is the 
most daunting of tasks in the process. There is a gradual, steep increase in the complexity of analysis 
required to meet each subsequent parameter. 
The proposed five-step model is an evolution of existing approaches. In a lengthy 2012 analysis of 
offensive network capabilities by Harvard researchers Noyes and Belk65, they proposed an ontology 
observing three criteria; target, effect, and objective. The ontology is used to aptly note that “…it is 
clear that the current classifications of offensive network operations are overly broad…66”. While a 
meaningful step forward, the proposed ontology stops short of offering a complete solution for 
effectively reducing the existing breadth of operations classified as offensive or warfare. Healey and 
Rattray offered their own model in 2010, detailing a model that offered six types of military cyber 
missions that can then be categorised based on twelve parameters67. This model served as a useful 
inspiration from which the chosen parameters were distilled, as the inordinate number of 
characteristics and categories can make a model cumbersome to repeatedly apply.   
Incident response to network attacks is an incremental process in which forensic evidence is 
analysed and subsequently connected to additional collected data. The sequence of parameters 
commensurately reflects this same natural order of inference. Identifying the victim is the genesis of 
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any investigation. Once the exact target – or targets - have been identified, it becomes possible to 
deduce the incident’s impact on it, by observing deviations from the target’s steady-state. Based on the 
victim and the evidence of the attack itself, it then becomes plausible to attempt and identify the 
incident’s instigator by way of a careful attribution process. Only if attribution has been reasonably 
successful can the observer gauge motivations and underlying goals. Finally, the pre-existing 
relationship between the target’s owning nation and the aggressor can be coupled with the 
overarching context in which this relationship exists.  
The first examined parameter is assessing the incident’s affected target. Initiating the process with 
a victim assessment provides an early opportunity to classify the attack’s underlying purpose. Attacks 
against military assets, infrastructure and logistics will clearly meet this threshold as they are 
immediately indicative of an adversarial relationship of which at least one party is the warfighting 
apparatus of a nation or a nation-like entity. Almost unerringly, safeguarding the multitude of military 
networks and systems is an internal military responsibility and where most resources and efforts are 
allocated. As indicated by the US Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy from 2015: 
“…DoD must defend its own networks, systems and information. The Defense Department 
must be able to secure its own networks against attack and recover quickly if security measures 
fail… Network defense operations on DoD networks constitute the vast majority of DoD’s 
operations in cyberspace68”. 
Thus a direct attack targeting any military asset would result in a response cycle initiated by the 
military responders. The affected party may in turn - based on the nature of the attack and its assessed 
perpetrators - choose to respond in force. 
Critical national infrastructure forms the second major category against which attacks will meet 
the required threshold of warfare. China69, Russia70, the United Kingdom71 and the United States72 
have all separately acknowledged that attacks against networks associated with critical national 
infrastructure such as energy, banking and communication shall be considered as potentially 
indicative of an armed attack against the nation itself. Critical infrastructure has largely been defined 
similarly by different nations. To quote a 2013 Turkish strategy document, critical infrastructure 
includes those networks “…who host the information systems that can cause, [1] loss of lives, [2] large 
scale economic damage, [3] security vulnerabilities and disturbances of public order at the national 
level [if compromised]73”. 
Two incidents are worth evaluating as contrasting examples of targets. The 2014 attacks by North 
Korea against Sony’s networks, destructive as they may have been, are immediately disqualified as 
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being warfare due to the nature of Sony Pictures Entertainment as the victim entity; it is a wholly 
private multi-national corporation that serves no critical function in the various services it offers. 
Thus, it immediately becomes apparent that the high-profile nature of the attack does not grant the 
US military recourse over the hack. Conversely, the alleged US-Israeli campaign to inflict physical 
harm against the Iranian nuclear program could – solely based on targeting of the Natanz uranium 
enrichment facility74 - be initially construed as a warfare-threshold target. Interestingly, that attacking 
Natanz risks escalation may explain why Stuxnet was waged painstakingly covertly75; the underlying 
desire may have been to avoid the risk of retaliation for choosing such a sensitive target. 
Finally, a third option towards meeting the target parameter is replacing quality with quantity. 
Where an attack against Sony is insufficient on its own to merit an escalation cycle, a simultaneous 
attack against all major movie studios – Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Sony and others – may be 
interpreted as a fundamental attack against American soft power. Similarly, governments would be 
hard pressed to ignore simultaneous destructive attacks against thousands of targets of opportunity, 
even if they are relatively insignificant on their own. The actual quantity to qualify the target threshold 
can either be a meaningful enough percentage of the targeted industry, or conversely simply hundreds 
or more of consecutive targets. 
A popular approach to measuring the type and quality of network attacks is by examining their 
impact rather than the actions themselves. Michael Schmitt, an international law expert that served as 
one of the key architects of the norm-setting Tallinn Manual, previously claimed that the breadth of 
armed attacks conducted through cyberspace includes all acts that generate consequences analogous 
to their kinetic equivalents76. In a reality bereft of empirical examples upon which to assess “cyber 
armed attacks”, anchoring the discussion on existing guidelines is reasonable. The existing legal 
framework is also useful when seeking to tether cyber-warfare to the laws of armed conflict, as 
Schmitt and his Tallinn Manual associates originally attempted. However, the disparity in effects 
between digital attacks and kinetic ones is insurmountable. Most offensive network capabilities are 
not consequentially analogous to physical attacks and will usually not yield comparable results. 
Otherwise put, barring the most extreme cases, offensive network capabilities will not physically 
destroy or impair their targets.   
Schmitt and the first Tallinn Manual reflected that a cyber-armed attack is “…any action that 
causes death or injury… to individuals or damage or destruction of objects77”. Impact is thus a primary 
source of divergence between cyber-warfare and kinetic warfare.  By shackling the comparison to the 
physical domain as the Tallinn manual does, the end result suffers by excluding whole categories of 
attacks. One such example, data disruption attacks, would be left out of the narrow definitions 
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requiring observable damage. By the same metric, crippling the defensive capabilities of an adversary 
with a software-only attack is not an action permitting escalatory recourse.  
Legal scholars do not uniformly agree with the parallel to physicality, as do many policy makers. In 
2010, US Colonel and operational law expert David Graham noted that some interpretations of the 
1949 UN Geneva Convention indicate that a use of force is deemed an armed attack if it is of 
“sufficient scope, duration and intensity78”. This perspective affords a wider range of offensive actions 
to be folded into the scope of an attack. Official United States policy seems to echo this with the claim 
that any significant attack against critical infrastructure - to include banks and key service providers - 
may constitute an attack for which retaliation is merited; a complete metric is still lacking however79.  
The importance of understanding the variance in possible impacts has been echoed by renowned 
international relations scholar Joseph Nye. In his remarks on the roles of “cyber-power”, Nye 
contrasted between hard and soft-power manifestations of cyber-activities, differentiating but 
ultimately recognising the importance of both tangibly affecting networks while also manipulating real 
world network-dependent public processes80. In short, cyber-warfare capabilities may adversely affect 
military networks, and they may also impact the functionality of critical public services in a disruptive 
but ultimately non-destructive manner.  
That the attackers are organs of a nation-state or at least state-affiliated is crucial; the identity of 
the perpetrators is significant for determining culpability and the available countermeasures. Put 
differently, if an individual or an organised crime unit performs a hack of sensitive military networks, 
it does not immediately qualify that the nation hosting the unaffiliated attackers is culpable and must 
be penalised directly. Some form of affiliation must be established, or at the very least provable 
negligence in pursuit and resolution efforts by the host nation’s law enforcement agencies. Nations 
cannot conduct war against criminal organisations, nor can they against individuals. A state or 
meaningful political sub-state entity must be the responsible party to the attack before a warfare 
approach can be used to assess the incident. This requires reaching an acceptable threshold of high-
level attacker attribution.  
Attribution of an attacker to a politically acceptable degree is a well-known challenge in network 
intrusions. The People’s Republic of China’s government has long been indicated to rely on a corps of 
a loosely-affiliated “non-governmental forces” (民间力量), capable of being tasked with pursuing 
national intelligence requirements and even conduct networked attacks81. Comparably, Russian 
network attacks against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 have both been publicly depicted as 
citizen participation in weaponised online protest rather than an organised Russian assault, despite 
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indications pointing to the alternative82. The plausible deniability baked into the internet’s easily 
achieved relative anonymity makes high degrees of certainty difficult when performing attacker 
attribution. As passionately echoed by Russian doctrine, the confusion sown in the wake of a network 
attack is one of the prominent advantages of the medium83. 
Attributing attackers thus becomes an issue of reaching an acceptable level of confidence in their 
identity. As Rid and Buchanan illustrated when presenting their model; “attribution is what states 
make of it84”. Accepting that there are no absolute certainties, nations can turn to several approaches 
towards making assessments; an accumulation of technical forensic evidence, known operational 
techniques of the adversaries, external intelligence sources, and political context.  The combination of 
the above can and has previously resulted in public attributions. In 2010, The Obama administration 
publicly directed allegations at the Chinese government for possibly facilitating a series of cyber 
intrusions against major US tech corporations, including Google85. In 2016, The Ukrainian security 
services publicly indicated that the Russian government was to blame for the network attack against a 
local power station86 that resulted in a brief period of service disruption87. Reaching acceptable levels 
of attribution in cyberspace is therefore possible, even if it is a challenging endeavour.  
Goals determine attacker motivation, and motivation is pivotal to assessing an attack’s significance 
and appropriate countermeasures. The consequences of a network attack are fundamentally different 
if it was intended to pilfer sensitive information, influence public opinion, or disable an air defence 
radar. The mere characterization of an attack as both emanating from a nation-state organ and being 
highly disruptive or even destructive does not automatically mean it should be decried as an act of 
war.  Whether the perpetrator was conducting economic espionage or seeking to subvert the 
sovereignty of the afflicted nation, the distinction is crucial towards assessing the afflicted party’s 
available set of countermeasures.  
The ambiguity of network operations means that goals and intent are often difficult to assess88. 
Whether an intrusion is an attack or meant for intelligence collection may in some cases only become 
apparent once the intruder decides to activate a malicious payload – or instead does not. It is roughly 
analogous to observing a burglar entering a house and inspect the rooms, waiting for him to attack the 
sleeping residents – or simply leave with their jewellery and cash. As with forensic assessment of 
burglaries, intruders may be sloppy and leave some indicators as to their intent. To pursue the break-
in analogy further, the burglar may had left a knife as he fled. Indeed, Buchanan has indicated that 
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this very issue stands at the core of what he called the “cybersecurity dilemma”89. Nations may 
inadvertently be drawn into a cycle of escalation as a result of misinterpreted network intrusions.   
A basic distinction required is for intelligence operations, namely the demarcation between 
extraction of information and destructive sabotage. As history instructs, espionage has been a 
mainstay of international relations for millennia, dating back to ancient Egypt90.  While compromise 
during espionage operations is nationally embarrassing and dangerous to the operatives involved, it 
rarely results in escalation to the level of open hostilities. Mutual espionage between rivals and allies is 
unfortunate but ultimately desirable conduct. Successful spying may reduce the levels of uncertainty 
as to an adversary’s capabilities, disposition and intent, potentially allowing observers to make more 
informed decisions91.  
This differentiation is crucial, as no international legal framework bars non-destructive 
surreptitious espionage between adversarial nations92. To wit, a spy extracting information – as 
successful as they may be – does not grant the afflicted nation any legal recourse in the international 
arena. If captured, the spy would undoubtedly face the ramifications of breaching domestic anti-
espionage laws, but therein the complications conclude. Between the two nations, the implications of 
such an ordeal rest squarely on the existing nature of the relationship between them. Internationally, 
the treaties governing non-harmful espionage and intelligence gathering are underdeveloped and 
vague, even if they do recognise that spying constitutes a breach in the targeted nation’s sovereignty93. 
A notable caveat exists for cases in which active network intelligence collection appears to be a 
prelude to an armed attack; such instances may be considered a threat of use of force on their own 
standing94. As an example, spy plane sorties intent on highlighting targets for a subsequent attack 
meet this standard and may trigger self-defence countermeasures. A spike in network intrusion 
attempts on tactical military networks, if intertwined with a reasonable threat context and existing 
heightened tensions, may similarly reach the threshold meriting self-defence. Such acts are 
sufficiently escalatory as to be on a spectrum of operations that may lead up to hostile engagement 
and war.   
Destructive acts of espionage, often referred to as sabotage, are tricky to classify. As previously 
stated, all aspects of modern life are reliant upon networks and computers. Adversely subverting their 
normal operation in a purposeful act can incur heavy financial losses, loss of critical functionality and 
in rare cases even manifest as physical damage and loss of life. Yet not all such cases are created equal. 
Attacks designed to disturb the flow of data and restrict access to services occur frequently, even with 
nation-state sponsorship. At least publicly not a single one of the purported cases culminated in open 
hostilities between nations, unless the attacks already transpired in the context of an existing conflict. 
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Most directly, if an aggressor acts in pursuit of military objectives or to prevent the accomplishment of 
those by the target, that shall be meet the cyber-warfare threshold for the “goals” parameter. This 
subset of goals has the clear determination of being directly carried out by armed forces or 
subordinate groups in order to achieve military goals – whether within active combat or without. US 
Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-12 titled ‘Cyberspace Operations’ makes clear the 
boundaries in which the armed forces operate in cyberspace to this effect where it states: 
“Commanders conduct cyberspace operations (CO) to retain freedom of maneuver in 
cyberspace, accomplish the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives, deny freedom of action to 
adversaries, and enable other operational activities95.“ 
The viability of network capabilities as part of a military objective is not unique to Western 
doctrine. Although a single cohesive Russian doctrinal document cementing the definition of network 
warfare is lacking, abundant official and unofficial Russian texts separately relate to information as 
crucial to modern battlefield dominance. As several Russian military theorists have posited in the 
journal Moscow Military Thought in 2009: 
“[The] main objectives will be to disorganize (disrupt) the functioning of key enemy military, 
industrial and administrative facilities and systems, as well as to bring information-
psychological pressure to bear on the adversary’s military-political leadership, troops and 
population, something to be achieved primarily through the use of state-of-the-art information 
technologies and assets.96” 
The further important subset of goals relevant to cyber-warfare includes any and all operations 
intent on disrupting the sovereignty or integrity of the targeted nation and its affiliated organs. To wit, 
the Russian approach to examining what constitutes an act of cyber-warfare is purposefully broad and 
can be inferred from the nation’s overall strategy on utilisation of such operations by the armed forces 
and intelligence agencies. Russian military doctrine from 2014 is fairly explicit on the perceived threat 
of cyber-warfare when it enumerated the top external threats to Russia: 
“Use of information and communication technologies for the military-political purposes to 
take actions which run counter to international law, being aimed against sovereignty, political 
independence, territorial integrity of states and posing threat to the international peace, security, 
global and regional stability97”.    
This is then mirrored by an equally broad internal military threat perception: 
“Activities aimed at changing by force the constitutional system of the Russian Federation; 
destabilizing domestic political and social situation in the country; disrupting the functioning of 
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state administration bodies, important state and military facilities, and information 
infrastructure of the Russian Federation98”. 
Combining the internal and external threat equates to the claim that any attack of significant 
potency against the state, its various organisations, its citizens or any infrastructure that serves them 
could constitute an attack worthy of a military response. The irony of this approach is palpable, as 
Russia has been frequently alleged to conduct such attacks against its neighbours and global peers.  
A proper example to the significance of this parameter would be the hack of the US Democratic 
National Convention (DNC), initially publicised in June 201699. In the incident, a hacker operating 
under the moniker Guccifer 2.0 released a trove of internal documents emails allegedly exposing the 
inner workings of the Democratic campaign’s seedy underside. While the hacker self-declared himself 
to be a Romanian hacktivist, extensive analytical commentary by security organisations such as 
ThreatConnect100, academics such as Thomas Rid101 and media outlets such as the New York Times102 
quickly raised the assessment that the attack originated from state-affiliated Russian perpetrators. 
Rather unusually, attribution to the Russian government itself was publicly acknowledged by the US 
Department of Homeland Security; “The U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) is confident that the 
Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails… from US political organizations103”.   
The DNC hack satisfies the target, impact and attacker parameters. However, when observing the 
assessed goals in compromising a national election race they certainly appear political, yet not 
military-strategic. While there is extensive potential utility in favourably shaping the US political 
landscape to better accommodate Russian political grand-strategy, at least the incident itself does not 
appear to be motivated by a distinct military agenda. Conversely, assessing the 2014 attacks against 
the Ukrainian voting infrastructure104 appears markedly different. As military conflict was already in 
progress in part around the issue of Ukrainian government legitimacy over disputed territories, 
upsetting the tenets of Ukrainian democracy fuels destabilisation efforts that may then convert to 
reduced military resolve.     
The fifth parameter, relationships, can form the strategic demarcation between open hostilities 
and an otherwise adversarial relationship. Even the gravest of incidents can be overcome if they occur 
between friendly nations, or otherwise between two parties which have a vested interest in avoiding 
conflict. Therefore, in order for a network attack to qualify as a warfare-level incident we must 
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establish the existence of appropriate context, one in which the incident is weaved into the larger 
political climate and relationship between the involved parties accounted for.    
In 2013, online access to multiple US banks was intermittently cut off by a distributed denial of 
service attack (DDoS)105; a form of attack characterised by a large subset of computers overflowing the 
victim with frivolous data to prevent legitimate access. Denial entails inherently transient attacks, 
usually incapable of causing permanent damage save financial losses incurred from the temporary 
lack of access to the victim’s services. In this case, the outrage expressed by US officials at the 
continuous attacks was palpable, with the desire for attribution and retribution mounting. 
“There is no doubt within the US government that Iran is behind these attacks,106” claimed James 
Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, formerly a high-ranking US government 
official on cyber-security issues. As compelling as the attribution against Iran may have been, it did 
not result in any significant military action or meaningful retaliation. As expected, the attacks were 
handled by the judicial system, resulting in a rare indictment of seven Iranian nationals107. Notably, 
this was an action taken against the involved individuals, not the sovereign entity that had seemingly 
set them on their disruptive course to begin with. As a limited disruptive attack with a political but 
ultimately non-military goal, it was contained and not pursued further in the international arena.  
Examining the first four parameters, at least the first three appear to be distinctly met. It was a 
successful attack against US critical financial infrastructure, conducted by nation-state affiliated 
Iranian actors. Arguably, the claim could be made that the impact parameter was similarly insufficient 
to warrant classification as warfare; but sustained denial of functionality to critical financial 
institutions may indeed pass this threshold.  The fourth parameter does not appear to be easily met, as 
the goals do not readily translate to a military-strategic agenda. But indeed, even if the banking 
attacks were military-oriented, it is the existing dynamics of the US-Iran relationship, the deferential 
character of the Obama administration, and the pre-established behavioural patterns by the US  
government all cumulatively prevented the fifth and final context parameter from being met. 
Political analysis of the United States simply does not corroborate interpretation of the Banking 
attack as an act of warfare. A powerful regional actor, the United States acted upon its regional agenda 
to prevent Iranian entrenchment in current and future negotiation of its nuclear capabilities108, while 
simultaneously roping its government into a relatively productive role in regional hotspots in Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Libya109. A nexus of Shia influence and a source of funding, military 
technology and training for many of the US’s adversaries, Iran’s brinksmanship proved its potency in 
the way the attack was contained by the United States. It had successfully fashioned a political climate 
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in which conflict was to be avoided unless absolutely necessary. Similarly, the Obama administration 
has at that point established a prior history of non-reaction, even when faced with adversaries 
crossing its self-defined red lines for mobilization. Such for example was the case when embattled 
Syrian president Bashar Assad crossed US President Obama’s red line by deploying chemical weapons 
against rebel forces and the civilian population110. The US, in turn, did not implement its own threat, 
thereby reducing its deterrence and further establishing itself as a noncommittal defender of its own 
policies and interests.   
The context of a sabotaging network attack is thus highly meaningful. Also involving Iran, one of 
the only confirmed acts of physical damage perpetrated through protracted network operations is 
Stuxnet, the malware used to retard the Iranian nuclear program by damaging its centrifuges between 
2009 and 2011. The case was heavily lauded as the first militarised “cyber-weapon”111 and a herald of a 
new era of cyber-warfare112. However, deeper observation of the Stuxnet campaign reveals how little it 
has to do with facilitating war. Perhaps, it even sought to prevent it.  
As reported extensively by journalists113 and information security companies114, Stuxnet was a 
clandestine campaign allegedly jointly waged by the US and Israel. While the operation itself was 
complex, the underlying goals were seemingly straightforward; stunt the accumulation of enriched 
Uranium by the Iranian government. The goals in turn supported efforts at keeping the possibility of 
nuclear militarisation distant thereby obviating the need for a military attack against Iranian nuclear 
facilities. The involved malware was characterised as being highly covert and self-restrictive115. 
Specifically, Stuxnet’s developers made exorbitant efforts to conceal its physical disruption from 
technicians by falsifying maintenance signals116, thereby opting for gradual, incremental loss rather 
than a high-profile strike against the Natanz facility. It was an intelligence sabotage operation, 
managed and conducted by at least one intelligence agency117, within the scope of a larger political 
agenda keen on preventing a nuclear Iran without actual warfare taking place. 
The Stuxnet attack induces more confusion than clarity. If such a brazen, damaging campaign 
against a declared enemy nation does not constitute warfare, what does? The incident seemingly ticks 
most relevant boxes; it was physically damaging, targeted critical national infrastructure, conducted 
by nation-level actors and served a coercive military-political goal. It is oft cited as the perennial 
example of cyber-warfare, and yet it was neither predicated nor followed by any other acts of war 
between the parties involved. A component was thus differentiating this incident from others.  
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The crucial element in which Stuxnet’s Operation Olympic Games118 falls short of warfare is the 
relationships. The adversarial relationship between Israel, the United States and Iran did not merit 
the event devolving into a state of armed conflict. Nor was this attack conducted within pre-existing 
conditions of open hostilities. When separated of such indicators, even a physical network attack may 
not reach the threshold of warfare if it is not sufficiently damaging or high-profile. Assessing the 
context of any network attack is therefore critical towards their classification as acts of war. 
When is equipment sabotage warfare? The 2007 Israeli operation against the Syrian nuclear Syrian 
reactor allegedly including a network attack against the Syrian air-defence grid is more thoroughly 
discussed later in the chapter. It is – if the reported details are correct - the most easily palatable 
instance of cyber-warfare. When appraising the five elements presented above it becomes apparent 
that the operation meets all criteria. It was a nation-state actor (perpetrator) attacking a nation-state 
actor (victim) with significant consequence (impact) for a military-political objective (goal) within the 
context of a larger kinetic military operation (context) designed to hamstring any attempts by Syria to 
attain nuclear status. Thus, tactical cyber-operations launched in conjunction with a kinetic attack are 
perhaps the quintessential embodiment of easily discernible cyber-warfare. But they are not the only 
such cases. 
Borrowing from the Russian doctrinal playbook, mass-impact network attacks on civilian 
infrastructure may be a notable subset of warfare-level operations. If a nation-affiliated actor strikes 
at a nation-affiliated adversary with an attack designed to severely impact civilian life, the conduct of 
warfare my appropriately apply. It must, however, meet all parameters to properly qualify. As a result, 
such an attack must either be a prelude or in tandem with other acts of violent aggression and be 
sufficiently impactful as to cause severe disruption or harm. Finally, there must be an underlying 
military political goal rather than a criminal one, a goal reflecting the national agenda espoused by the 
attackers.  
Re-examining the alleged Russian network attack against the Ukrainian power station with the aid 
of the five accumulative parameters shows it too does not reach the threshold of warfare, though it 
comes very close. On the affirmative side, the attack was supposedly conducted by a nation-state 
participant in the form of Russian security services and targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure119. As 
there are intermittent active hostilities between Russia and the Ukraine over Crimea and its adjacent 
territories120, the context parameter is also fulfilled. However, the attack itself was of limited impact 
and did not appear to contribute to the larger regional military goals. Instead, the two unmet 
parameters – impact and goals - indicate the attack was intended as a political signalling in the form 
of digital sabotage, which would likely not (and did not) result in escalated hostilities. Were the power 
grid attack geared towards creating greater damage in order to directly coerce the Ukrainian 
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government into altering its strategy on its eastern borders, it would successfully meet all criteria of 
cyber-warfare. Operational success was not even necessary, merely the visible intention to create a 
significant effect within a military context.   
To conclude, offensive network operations embody the continued evolution of warfare as a result of 
the adoption of networked hardware into every aspect of modern living. While demonstrable acts of 
cyber-warfare are rare, the discussions conducted by various nations on the role of cyber-warfare 
within their national doctrines and the threats emanating from cyberspace is highly edifying when 
attempting to frame cyber capabilities as tools of war. Some of the examples used within this chapter 
are more palatable than others, but by utilising the five provided parameters, assessing network 
intrusion incidents becomes a more direct endeavour. Were it applied to most of the instances widely 
panned as warfare in modern journalism and novels, it would show that most incidents are wholly 
outside the boundaries of warfare. The global state of cyber-warfare is actually quite calm. 
The spectrum of cyber-warfare includes attacks which are either directly supporting kinetic 
campaigns, or are otherwise generating an impactful influence upon the adversary within a larger 
military-political context. When viewed thusly, only a very specific – but still significant – subset of 
operations is included. Upon reaching this standardization, inspection of the advantages and 
disadvantages of cyber-warfare and their larger role within conflict becomes a more feasible 
endeavour to undertake. War remains a violent struggle between groups vying to upset the existing 
power dynamics, and offensive network capabilities do not as radically alter this underlying truth.  
CYBERWAR & CYBERWARFARE 
The inescapably political nature of war presents the first challenge to assessing cyberwar as an 
term of art. As Kenneth Waltz once posited, “War begins in the minds and emotions of men, as all acts 
do”121.  Warfare has changed, but its fundamental tenets have not. While warfare may rely on 
increasingly complex tools, it remains at heart a contest between people. Computers, devices or 
networks cannot declare and wage war against one another, at least not yet. Therefore cyberwar – if at 
all a valuable concept - is simply war as waged by actors through the use of computers and networks.  
It is curious to note how prevalent the use of cyberwar is, as if wars can be waged and won through 
network attacks alone. War does not routinely restrict itself to a single domain be it land, sea, air, or 
indeed cyberspace. Basil Liddell Hart’s suggestions in 1952 that “Airpower might attain a direct end by 
indirect means122” did not assert itself as a viable ethos for winning wars. As NATO realised in Kosovo, 
as the United States experienced in Iraq, and as Israel internalised in Lebanon123, avoiding entire 
domains in favour of safer, indirect forms of warfare merely delays and intensifies future cross-
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domain warfare. In this respect, Waltz’s remarks proved prescient once more; “In reality, everything is 
related to everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from the others124”. 
Cyberwar is ubiquitous because it is conflated with cyber-warfare. Cyberwar too often encompasses 
acts of aggression that do not equate to war, threading those together in a narrative of conflict limited 
to digital means. Much like previously vaunted theories of complete battlefield dominance through 
overwhelming airpower, offensive network capabilities are unable to singularly achieve political goals.  
In the opening chapter to their oft-referred book Cyberwar, Richard Clarke and Robert Knake 
artistically depict the suspected use of offensive network capabilities in 2007. Israeli air force (IAF) 
warplanes supposedly bypassed the thick Syrian air defences to clandestinely strike at the Kaibar 
nuclear reactor in Deir-Azzor125. While this attack is arguably one of the most easily classifiable 
publicly known instances of cyber-warfare126, it falls short as a depiction of cyberwar. Irrespective of 
the role of offensive network capabilities in the strike, it was guided bombs and missiles that reduced 
the facility to ruin. The Israeli incident is a textbook depiction of a combined arms package, in which 
an alleged network attack enabled an immediate kinetic strike for lasting effect. The political objective 
underpinning the conflict, which was to curtail non-conventional abilities that would upset the 
strategic balance in the Middle-East, was supposedly achieved by jointly operating cyber and air 
power.  
Viewed independently, the Israeli incident is a shining example of cyber-warfare as an integrative 
capability rather than a standalone domain of warfare. It does not validate the existence of cyberwar; 
there was no reciprocal conflict waged through networks. Where war is an exercise of aggression to 
attain political goals, offensive network capabilities are poorly positioned to single-handedly ensure 
success.  Analogising this to other domains of warfare, the fallacy of this perceived reality becomes 
readily apparent; modern wars to not neatly constrain themselves to a single domain or set of 
capabilities.  To analogise, renowned naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan posited heavily upon the 
momentousness of the naval arena in power struggles between nations127. He did not, however, decree 
that naval engagements exist in a vacuum, devoid of additional domains of warfare.  
Analysis of modern warfare can benefit from setting aside cyberwar as a concept. Instead it is more 
useful to observe cyber-warfare as a set of integrative offensive network capabilities used to engage an 
adversary in a period of armed conflict.  By emphasizing cyber-warfare as part of a broader tapestry of 
armed conflict, we discount the notion that network intrusions are immediately indicative of an 
overall, war-level conflict between two or more parties. Focusing on operations rather than war then 
leads to a range of critical questions about the utility and role of networked capabilities. Can network 
attacks trigger war? What forms of network attacks fall within the remit of warfare and which are 
                                                             
124 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 615. 
125 Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It, 1st ed (New York: 
Ecco, 2010), 9. 
126 The final part of the chapter revisits Operation Orchard in order to examine how it is indeed one of the only instances that fully 
align with an acceptably standard definition of cyber-warfare.  
127 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Read Books Ltd, 2013). 
37 
 
  Daniel Moore 
merely acts of espionage or sabotage? As the next chapter details, MONOs are in fact more similar to 
electronic warfare than they are to the other distinct battlefield domains – air, sea, land or even space.  
“It is not correct to call every bad thing that happens on the internet ‘war’…”, correctly exclaimed 
James Lewis in 2010 in his paper titled “Thresholds for Cyberwar”128.  Around that time, many 
network intrusions and even rudimentary scanning attempts were problematically and incorrectly 
labelled as attacks129. Tallies were inflated to enormous, unfathomable numbers to present an 
alarming image of constant digital warfare occurring between global political adversaries. Thankfully, 
coverage of digital warfare has since vastly improved, though a problematic narrative persists 
somewhat.  
A well-established approach is to classify network warfare as a subset of information warfare 
conducted through computers and networks130131.  As a notable example, the Russian military has no 
independent conceptualisation of “cyber” except when remarking on Western doctrine132. Instead, 
warfare conducted via the internet or against enemy networks is folded into the struggle for 
information dominance, one pursued aggressively by Russia133.  By adopting this approach, networked 
attacks operate within similar parameters to electronic warfare, information warfare and 
psychological operations.  
Lumping electronic warfare with cyber-warfare is attractive. Much like electronic warfare, 
offensive network operations seek to disrupt, alter, corrupt or otherwise influence the operation of the 
targeted system.  While classic electronic warfare most often seeks to achieve this by emitted radio 
frequency (RF) transmissions, cyber-warfare attempts to achieve the same by interfacing directly with 
the targeted system’s hardware and software. The attack vector may differ; the underlying logic and 
desired effect often remain the same.  
The Russian government has visibly adopted this approach in its political and military 
manoeuvers, yet it is not singularly Russo-centric in nature. In 1999, John Arquilla - a notably early 
scholar of cyber-warfare – revisited his previous statements and claimed that “information warfare is 
a concept that ranges from the use of cyberspace to attack communication nodes and infrastructures 
to the use of information media in the service of psychological influence techniques134”. Arquilla’s 
RAND colleague Martin Libicki expressed a similar sentiment as early as 1995135. As the United States 
gradually became more transparent in its acknowledgement of offensive network capabilities, the 
Department of Defense’s 2003 Information Operations Roadmap initially outlined the perspective in 
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which electronic warfare and computer network operations are viewed as equally significant pillars of 
information operations136. In an unusually motivational-like phrasing the document awkwardly 
declared; “We Must Fight the Net.” 
Russia is unusual as its approach to information warfare audaciously blends the civilian with the 
military, influence with coercion, and the digital effect with the kinetic. It does not matter whether a 
general seeks to influence global perception of Russian forces or achieve command and control 
dominance in a battlefield – it all falls under the purview of offensive information operations. 
Controlling the flow and shape of information is thus a key tenet of modern Russian doctrine. An 
approach clustering different facets of manipulating the flow of information is understandably useful. 
The digital building blocks that make up civilian communication are often highly similar when broken 
down. Networks of different types, sizes and purposes often use the same protocols and thus can be 
targeted in similar ways. Where manipulating computer networks may yield military results one day, 
it may similarly disrupt the flow of terrorist propaganda the next. But herein the similarities end.  
There are important limitations to the Russian perspective. A monolithic approach to information 
operations may risk muddling the important distinctions between its different sub-categories. When 
providing the military and supporting security organisations carte blanche to conduct full spectrum 
information warfare across all targets and agendas, the results may bleed into one another with 
reduced effectiveness. The degree of finesse required in order to successfully influence mass global 
media is incomparable to disconnecting aircraft from their regional command. Where the former 
relies on subterfuge, nuance and an intimate socio-cultural familiarisation with the target, the latter 
requires technical acumen and an operational intelligence cycle to breach hardened networks and 
identify vulnerabilities137. 
A secondary risk by blurring the boundaries between information warfare and militarized cyber-
warfare is undue escalation. Simply put, if information operations are within the discussion of war, 
even low-yield, minimally affective operations may be treated as jus ad bellum.  We must then 
consider whether an American digital influence campaign in occupied Crimea desirably constitutes an 
act of war against Russia. Information operations are pervasive in peacetime as a means of 
manipulating the political landscape to generate favourable conditions. Affixing such operations to the 
spectrum of war greatly increases the risk of friction between otherwise low-contact adversarial 
relationships.  
An alternate way to observe the development of cyber-warfare is as a counter-innovation 
phenomenon. In this view, rather than the pristine outlook of offensive network capabilities as 
independent means of securing battlefield goals, these toolsets become means to offset the capability 
of the adversary to achieve said goals.  It is an evolutionary concept, borne as a response to the rise of 
the interconnected battlefield. Where digitisation and networks have once enabled the precise, 
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coordinated operations of the 21st century, we now see the techniques that materialise to mitigate 
them.  
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a staunch advocate of this doctrine, and understandably 
so. During the First Gulf War of 1991, Chinese military leadership were suddenly in full view of a 
revolutionary theatre-level campaign against the Iraqi military138. The US-led military coalition 
assembled to expel Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard from Kuwait was so successful as to result in 
near-surgical evisceration of Iraq’s conventional forces, previously considered to be well-trained, well-
equipped and capable. Precise joint operations were made possible by the interleaving of intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance assets (ISR) with guided ordnance. Data from ISR assets was fed into 
command and control centres of gravity which allowed effective operational decision making on an 
unprecedented scale. 
This new approach was later coalesced into the US Network-Centric Warfare doctrine. It was 
defined as focusing “…on the combat power that can be generated from the effective linking or 
networking of the warfighting enterprise139”.  Integration of digital networks into the full range of 
wartime decision would significantly enhance the quality, quantity and response rate of actions taken. 
Sensors from assets deployed both within and without the battlefield were to provide critical mission 
support and assist in dispelling the fog of war. To nations such as the PRC, which were – at the time –
gradually increasing the indigenous investment into modernisation efforts of their armed forces140, 
observing joint warfare in its full capacity was alarming.  
Lessons learned from observing integrated coalition forces in the Gulf War were eventually co-
opted into PRC operational doctrine. The People’s Liberation Army was directed towards focusing on 
integrated joint warfare as a key means of defeating asymmetrically preferable adversaries. As 
explained in the key account of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy, “The Science of 
Military Strategy”, achieving this reality was made (and remains) uniquely possible by increasingly 
adopting information sharing on an operational level: “[s]upported by information technology… 
various combat factors are woven into a unity141”. 
From network-centric warfare grew the PRC’s brand of network warfare as a form of military 
counter-culture. When the PRC internalised that their conventional forces were heavily outmatched, it 
resulted in concerted effort to rebalance this asymmetry by turning the unique characteristics of the 
US command and control structure into a vulnerability142. If all battlefield operations were now reliant 
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upon timely, consistent and numerous data inputs from multiple sensors, interrupting this flow could 
potentially wreak havoc upon the adversary. 
China’s new approach to counteracting the advantage of C4ISR systems was pithily labelled “local 
wars under the conditions of informationisation143”. Although cyberspace was viewed holistically in 
the PRC’s national strategy as a “… new pillar of economic and social development144”, it was also 
immediately christened an altogether new domain of national security145.  Within this doctrine, 
degrading or disabling the adversary’s information hubs became paramount towards attaining initial 
operational dominance, thereby facilitating subsequent victories on the battlefield. 
The PLA’s views on digital warfare - which hold numerous similarities to their US counterparts146 – 
characterize offensive network capabilities as a combined arms package to be employed alongside 
kinetic hard kill operations147.   In this sense, attacks targeting computer software are a crucial asset 
for the modern warfighter, as they deny adversary capabilities, reduce threat and enable kinetic 
operations. This perspective reflects the evolution of PLA doctrine to react to the primary processes 
undertaken by its adversaries. While the true potency of the PLA’s militarized offensive capabilities 
remains uncorroborated, the focal shift reflected in official writing and organizational changes is 
telling. However publicly visible the adoption of offensive network operations seems to be, it is not the 
PLA that has been the purest embodiment of the integrative approach, but rather Israel. 
As previously mentioned, in late 2007, numerous international media outlets reported a surprise 
airstrike against a previously publicly unknown Syrian nuclear facility in Deir Azzor148. The strike was 
widely and immediately attributed to the Israeli Air Force, known for its adoption of a proactive 
operational doctrine bent on preventing regional powers from attaining the capability to produce 
nuclear weapons. The results were staggeringly successful; complete destruction of the facility, wide 
international condemnation after a follow-up UN-sponsored probe confirmed the presence of nuclear 
materials149 and perhaps most importantly – no retaliation from the incensed Syrian regime. It was a 
clear tactical, operational and strategic success for the aggressors.  
Breaching the Syrian air defences to accomplish a surgical strike with no friendly casualties, loss of 
materiel, and minimal collateral damage is especially noteworthy when matched with the perceived 
high quality of Syrian air defences150. Known as the most tightly-interwoven modernised air defence 
network in the region, it surprised many to learn that it never fired a shot at the transgressing 
warplanes. The question of how this came to pass lingered in the wake of the irradiated ruins of the 
facility. Five years later, in September 2012, the New Yorker published a lengthy investigative piece on 
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the attack in which it was claimed that the Israelis were “…using standard electronic scrambling 
tools…” to effectively blind Syria’s anti-air radars151.   
Conventional jamming against such a sprawling network is risky. Syrian forces operate a wide 
range of anti-air assets, ranging from older SA-2 and SA-6 batteries that are susceptible to older forms 
of jamming, to more modern SA-17 Buk and SA-22 Pantsyr-M1 batteries purportedly sporting 
significant jamming resistance152.  A larger, “hotter” strike could have included aircraft carrying high-
speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) designed to physically eliminate radar-emitting anti-air 
threats, or the use of Israeli home-grown standoff cruise missiles such as the Popeye or Delilah. High-
profile kinetic attacks would have undoubtedly raised the calculus of brinksmanship, risking cornering 
Syrian President Bashar Assad to an otherwise undesirable escalatory reaction. Israeli decision-
makers acknowledged the significance of maintaining low attack profile, opting for the limited “Thin 
Shkedi” operational package (so named after then air force commander Eliezer Shkedi) rather than 
the wider, more comprehensive “Fat Shkedi153”. 
A network attack against the Syrian air defense grid has been widely suggested as a crucial enabler 
of the overwhelming Israeli success. While this is as of yet unconfirmed by official sources, the 
arguments for the use of offensive network capabilities are sound. A non-lethal network attack is 
advantageous as it results in a low-profile, deniable disruption to adversary systems, thus carving out 
a window of operations for incoming aircraft while avoiding meaningful collateral damage. While 
Israeli capabilities in this field are largely unproven, US reporting has previously covered the 
suspected existence of an airborne anti-platform cyber-warfare platform dubbed Suter, allegedly 
developed by British security company BAE Systems154. If a network attack was indeed employed, it is 
one of the only publicly discussed combined-arms military use of offensive network capabilities. The 
attack embodies the significance of software-based strike vectors as key enablers and supporters of 
physical follow up attacks. A joint-warfare doctrine which incorporates network attack elements can 
in turn expose critical vulnerabilities in an otherwise potent adversary, lending key advantages to an 
enterprising attacker. 
The United States armed forces have over the last 20 years increasingly identified the importance 
of information systems to modern warfare.  In 1998, Cebrowski and Garstka of the US Navy notably 
penned a piece in which they claimed that the U.S was “…in the midst of a revolution in military 
affairs (RMA)155”. They were referring to the importance of the “fundamental shift from… platform-
centric warfare to… network-centric warfare156”. By that time, the revolutionary perspective on cyber-
warfare has been long time in the making within the US Department of Defence. The speed and 
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quality of wartime decision making could be markedly improved by harmonizing different platforms 
and sensors to seamlessly work together. The contributory power of the network far exceeded the sum 
of its nodes.  
The rise of network-centric warfare and cyber-warfare are tightly correlated. As US forces 
increased their reliance on sensory networks and complex command and control grids, they realised 
the potential to weaponise the very same phenomenon against potential adversaries. The command 
and control network became the digital embodiment of the Clausewitzian centre of gravity; “[it] is 
always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a 
blow157”. Rather than classically delivering a crippling blow to an enemy’s force concentration the 
aggressor could instead target the nerve hub of its operations, thereby fulfilling Clausewitz’s intended 
goal of unsettling the enemy’s balance158. If battlefield awareness and the capacity to operate swiftly, 
accurately and jointly now predicated on the unrestricted flow of data, a blow against the nerve centre 
that oversees this process could be pivotal for strategically influencing the entire war effort.  
Further building upon its importance, the United States gradually adopted an approach framing 
digital attacks as an independent domain of warfare. The conversation in the US military and 
government over the role of cyber-warfare has been an evolutionary one; from a minimal 
acknowledgement of information operations to a fully-budgeted Cyber Command, standalone 
doctrine159 and dedicated exercises. As defined in 2005 by then Air Force Secretary Michael W. 
Wynne, the new role of the air force would henceforth be to “…to fly, and fight in Air, Space and 
Cyberspace160”. The US perspective codified cyber-warfare as a distinct field, with its own set of rules 
and considerations.  
The distinct domain approach is gaining traction in the West. After attributing several Russian-
attributed network attacks against Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008 respectively, an alarmed 
NATO scrambled to come to grips with the vulnerability of its member nations’ networks and its own 
incapacity to conduct effective wartime operations in cyberspace. Most immediately, NATO’s 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) solicited a group of experts led by Michael 
Schmitt to identify the circumstances under which network attacks constitute jus ad bellum, thereby 
qualifying above the threshold of warfare161. In 2014, NATO expanded its defensive ethos to 
incorporate a network attack as a legitimising catalyst for invoking Article 5, which covers NATO 
protocol in the case of an attack against a member state162. Eventually in July 2016, NATO 
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conventional wisdom coalesced around a declaration mimicking their US member state doctrine; 
cyber was announced to be a distinct domain of warfare alongside air, sea and land163.   
Different nations adopt disparate approaches to cyber-warfare. Some choices more thoroughly 
adhere to the distinctions that make the intangible software space unique; the United States visibly 
fences operating within and against networks militarily, more naturally adhering to the five-step 
model. Conversely, Russia recognizes the added value of cyberspace, but does not necessarily expose 
the seams between those who fight within the domain and those who fight without. Networks are thus 
a virtual medium through which existing doctrine and operating procedures are channelled and 
reflected. The more integrative approach to MONOs means that they often purposefully fly below the 
model threshold, in a bid to avoid countermeasures. China views network operations as an equaliser, 
an opportunity to shatter existing symmetries and turn the advantages embodied in modern 
networked warfare into vulnerabilities. Lastly, countries such as Israel retain ambiguity over the 
actual doctrine surrounding cyber-warfare, but appear to be employing it nonetheless as a combined 
arms package in support of kinetic operations.  
Approaches to digital warfare may vary, yet they crucially intersect where operations meet wartime 
necessity. It is the need forcefully erode the will of the enemy (conjuring Clausewitz once more)164, or 
alternatively seek to complement ongoing war efforts. A scope for cyber-warfare must encompass this 
reality, as has been shown throughout this chapter. While the major wielders of offensive network 
capabilities vary in their perception of their utility and the terminology used to describe them, they 
intersect on doctrine and deployment more than it initially seemed. 
To conclude, cyber-warfare is commonly viewed as designed to contribute to joint efforts to affect 
information for military-strategic goals. The above analysis is complemented by several high-level 
observations. The first is that offensive network capabilities cannot single-handedly achieve strategic 
objectives; such capabilities are best used when complemented by others. For some such as the United 
States it may entail incorporation into kinetic strikes, while others – namely Russia – place more 
significant weight on large-scale information operations that include psychological warfare. As a 
corollary, offensive network capabilities are consensually viewed as integrated into the spectrum of 
information operations. Finally, MONOs are a natural evolution of warfare and doctrine, as they 
gradually formed out of a modern-day dichotomy; the need to offset the strategic advantages of a 
highly-networked force, while simultaneously capitalising on the strategic vulnerabilities of the 
highly-networked nation which it defends.  
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2. CHARTING INTANGIBLE WARFARE 
OVERVIEW 
A century has passed since warfighting first engaged with the electromagnetic spectrum. While the 
study of war often focuses on the kinetic, it is the imperceptible mediums that have contributed some 
of the greatest leaps to the modern battlefield. From the advent of radar in the years leading up to the 
Second World War to vying for digital information superiority today, war waged through invisible 
means has enmeshed itself in every nation’s doctrine. Cyber is the first aspect of intangible warfare to 
be widely recognized as sufficiently distinct as to merit its own domain of war. But how truly different 
is it from its predecessors? How unique are its characteristics, associated challenges and operational 
parameters? 
This chapter argues that numerous attributes uniquely attributed to cyber-warfare have been 
previously associated with warfighting in the electromagnetic spectrum. As a corollary, examining 
similar concepts such as electronic warfare, electromagnetic warfare, command and control warfare, 
information operations and cyber operations, will be shown to be sufficiently related in their 
characteristics as to be bundled together under the term intangible warfare. The chapter is therefore 
not intended to be a literature review, but rather a deconstruction of MONOs that demonstrates their 
unbreakable familial relation to electronic warfare. Efforts to separate them entirely are therefore 
often artificial, as are some observations on cyber as the first man-made domain of war. 
Offensive cyber capabilities are therefore an evolutionary concept representing seven decades of 
cumulative experience and development in other forms of intangible warfare. The fundamental 
necessity to be intimately familiar with the particular equipment being targeted dates to radar 
jamming efforts in the Second World War, as is the notion that employing such capabilities may lead 
to their loss due to detection. The Cold War saw strategy evolve from deceiving operators to directly 
impacting the functionality of devices and equipment. Perhaps most importantly, the idea that 
situational awareness on all levels – tactical, operational and strategic – can be critically manipulated 
by non-kinetic capabilities has coalesced over the span of the last five decades.  
Whereas bullets, shells and missiles function as intended against a wide range of possible targets, 
intangible warfare is unique in such that it may require the development of tools designed to defeat a 
particular enemy’s specific technology. From the Second World War era of British attempts to jam 
German flight guidance radar to intricate network operations against military platforms done today, 
both share the undeniably crucial need for intelligence and familiarization with the adversary. Aspects 
of intangible warfare both historic and modern represent the desire to increasingly weaponize the 
adversary against itself and erode the fundamental trust a battlefield commander places in their 
technological toolset.   
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In some respects, cyber-warfare is not a distinct domain of warfare. Much like electronic warfare, 
battlefield cyber-capabilities may separately affect targets but are almost always wielded by operators 
in the classic domains of war – land, sea and air. Understanding this integrative notion analytically 
then provides researchers and practitioners the ability to implement lessons learned from previous 
iterations of intangible warfare – in doctrine, strategy, operations and incorporation of new 
technologies and capabilities.  
Already in 2001, then US Air Force officer Gregory Rattray railed against the supposed novelty of 
so-called cyber warfare. Particularly, Rattray rejected “…the assumption that strategic information 
warfare should be treated as a completely new phenomenon because of the ‘virtual’ or nonphysical 
nature of operating in the cyberspace environment165”. While this chapter shares that premise at its 
core, Rattray then proceeded to assess offensive network capabilities against as an evolution of 
strategic air warfare166. Indeed, the analogy to the early days of air warfare is apt when discussing how 
network operations are described but it does little to explain how they differ from traditional warfare. 
So instead, this chapter will establish the claim that it is an evolution of other forms of intangible 
warfare.   
The chapter unfolds by reviewing a century of literature and warfighting, dating to the inception of 
combat electromagnetic means. The analysis is ordered chronologically, examining in sequence the 
two World Wars, the Cold War period, the dawn of network-centric warfare in the 1990s, and the 
subsequent global rise of information operations. With each such iteration, intangible warfare 
matured and accrued more of its modern characteristics. As the analysis will show; cyber-warfare 
today did not materialize suddenly with the onset of the internet. Offensive network operations are 
reflective of a century of doctrinal and strategic bricklaying.   
While the rapid cycle of innovation and counter-innovation will gradually be demonstrated to be a 
core commonality of all aspects of intangible warfare, it did not originate with it. The requirement for 
technological advancement in order to remediate adversary advantages has always played some role 
on the battlefield. Personal armour was introduced to reduce the kinetic impact of blows and arrows 
but was later rendered less effective with the advent of gunpowder. Stone fortifications were 
countered by increasingly sophisticated siege equipment from trebuchets to catapults, mechanisms 
designed to return the offense-defence balance to an acceptable equilibrium. For centuries, 
development cycles were glacially paced167; the scientific method and overall prevalence of battlefield 
technologies had limited significance to warfare. This is not a novel observation, as Clausewitz once 
remarked in his writings: “Fighting has determined everything appertaining to arms and equipment, 
and these in turn modify the mode of fighting; there is, therefore, a reciprocity of action between the 
two168”. Yet at the time, strategy, manpower and logistics were vastly more important.  
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It was chiefly in the First World War when technology became a significant strategic element. 
While some of the war’s belligerents - such as the British military - adopted key elements of 
technology-laden warfare even prior to the war169, it was only tested at scale when open combat 
erupted. Uniquely at the time, the incorporation of technological advancement heavily influenced 
doctrine. The oft-recited perception of the First World War as one of trenches and attrition was in part 
due to the then-conventional wisdom that the introduction of machine guns meant open warfare 
doctrine was rendered obsolete; technology has now lent to its wielders an unstoppable killing power 
that could not be directly countered. Commanders and strategists suddenly had to become 
innovators170. Although some Allied commanders such as the American Expeditionary Forces 
commander in chief John Pershing held to their refusal to alter doctrine to compensate for new 
threats171, the field of war inexorably changed.   
So dawned the first cycle of modern military counter-innovation. As military historian Shimshoni 
aptly observed of the First World War’s evolutionary doctrine; “…technology (doctrine) and 
applications (war plans) interact in a cyclical manner, in the quest for integration172”. The necessity to 
counter asymmetry-inducing technologies meant that both existing tools had to be wielded better, and 
new tools developed. The lagging in adjusting to new battlefield realities is in part the reason for the 
war’s drawn out campaigns, with battles ending in unfathomable death counts on all sides173. Doctrine 
gradually adjusted with the first large-scale use of joint operations combining infantry, creeping 
barrages of artillery and to a degree – tanks. These new inventions – ushered by British forces in 1916 
late into the war – were seen as a stalemate-shattering technological advancement capable of once 
again upsetting the offence-defence balance174.   
FIRST CYCLE – THE SECOND WORLD WAR   
In 1939, British intelligence officers in Oslo received an anonymous tip. They were instructed to 
adjust the daily BBC World Service German-language news broadcast slightly to signal the 
presumably German turncoat to provide the information he offered. They did, and after calling out 
“Hello, hier ist London”, they subsequently received a staggeringly comprehensive report on cutting 
edge German technological developments. These included details of large military radars being 
developed and deployed, of large-scale rockets and even unmanned aerial vehicles175. Successfully co-
opting the use of radar had seemingly allowed the Germans to circumvent one of the greatest 
challenges that plagued both the German Luftwaffe and its allied counterparts –conducting precision 
night-time aerial bombing runs, when anti-aircraft guns were blind176. 
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As Reginald Larson - one of the fathers of modern Western intelligence – recounts, British agents 
soon confirmed the existence of a German blind-bombing radar-based system known as Knickebein 
(“Crooked Leg”), codenamed “Headache” by British forces177. The radar was an ingenious invention in 
which two radio beams were transmitted in slightly different patterns from two locations in occupied 
France’s coast, the beams calculated to intersect roughly over targets in the United Kingdom. 
Luftwaffe bombers would then fly along one beam until their receivers indicated they reached the 
transmission intersection and released their payloads. British intelligence launched an exploratory 
sortie in June 1940 intent on intercepting these German radar transmissions178. Their efforts bore 
fruit and resulted in the development of a crude jammer with the humorously appropriate codename; 
Aspirin179.  
The British countermeasure did not spell the end of what later came to be colloquially called “The 
Battle of the Beams”. Aside for waging actual warfare, both parties were now thoroughly engaged for 
the first time in history in a brief but fast-paced battle of technological wit. The Germans had not yet 
given up on electronically transmitted guidance systems, deploying the successful X-Gerät (X-
Device)180 radar in late 1940 with improved jamming resistance181. This in turn was countered again 
by the British, which led to the far less successful Y-Gerät – or Wotan II - in 1941. By that time and 
aided by Enigma-decoded information, British intelligence had anticipated the deployment of Y-
Gerät, rendering it entirely ineffectual182. Soon after, the Germans were forced to recall their efforts as 
attention was redirected towards the build-up on the Eastern front, where an invasion into Soviet 
territory was imminent.  
The contest over radar dominance in the Second World War was the first large-scale instance of 
what shall henceforth be called intangible warfare; the adoption of intangible means of warfighting 
such as electromagnetic transmissions and later attacks against digital networks. Much like the data-
based attacks often discussed today within the remit of cyber-warfare, even the earliest forms of 
intangible warfare included much of the same characteristics, ranging from often imperceptible effects 
to the caution in employing measures as to avoid exposing their existence to the adversary. The 
Second World War - in this regard – would be the dawn of modern intangible warfare. 
In the years leading up to the Second World War it became increasingly clear that technology now 
played a pivotal role in developing modern strategy. The Great War saw an entire generation 
decimated due to previously unseen firepower. In the war’s aftermath, it soon grew apparent that new 
capabilities and techniques were needed to increase combatant survivability and once again produce a 
favourable flow of combat. Thus, the interfering years between the two World Wars saw an explosion 
of new technology. Major developments included the formalization of air as a strategically pivotal 
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domain of combat, wide adoptions of armour corps, initial forms of rocketry and indeed, the dawn of 
computing and electromagnetic transmissions for communications, navigation, and remote object 
detection. The groundwork was thus laid to graduate beyond the initial cycle of counter-innovation to 
one to including intangible warfare; the advent of radar.  
The necessity to develop means for increasingly technologically-assisted warfare meant that the 
reliance on these capabilities similarly increased. When war again erupted in Europe in 1939, all 
major belligerents had already identified both the potential of the new unseen mediums of war, while 
similarly identifying the possibilities afforded in disrupting them. Radio communication had become 
standard issue for armour, infantry, navy and air forces seeking to operate massive forces jointly in 
relative harmony. Electronic navigational aids became crucial towards effectively directing large-scale 
assaults beyond enemy lines and prevent miscalculations. For the first time, impacting the adversary’s 
freedom to operate in the electromagnetic spectrum became a priority.  
The Second World War was a prolific exercise in counter-innovation embodied by constant 
attempts to jam adversary systems; it was the dawn of what would later be known as electronic 
countermeasures (ECM). As one of the pioneers of Western radar technology Robert Watson-Watt 
recounted, such secrecy shrouded this new set of capabilities that they often simply failed; operators 
were not aware of the value of their own missions and could barely practice in advance183.  
This caution to avoid unnecessarily publicising capabilities was not singularly exercised by British 
forces. Jammers operated by German forces were muted until absolutely necessary to assist a kinetic 
operation184. In 1942, a German naval battle group spearheaded by the battleships Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau attempted to break the British blockade at Brest. Despite routine patrols by British aerial 
reconnaissance employing active radar measures, the battle group escaped initial detection. As an 
investigation would later reveal, The German ships enacted large-scale jamming operations once they 
set sail from port185. This in turn allowed the battle group to gain distance against its would-be 
pursuers, eventually allowing the ships to reach German ports. The jamming itself was not even 
particularly technically effective – it was by virtue of operational surprise that it achieved its results186. 
As Watson later recounted on the failure of British radar operators to discern German jamming from 
equipment failure: 
"If I am held to my reiterated statement that radar is not merely an equipment or a group of 
equipments, but a system, then the radar system did fail but the electronics held out; the men 
behind the electronics were lamentably far behind187." 
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As critically discovered, there is a trust relationship between machines and the humans that 
operate them; operators must trust that the equipment functions as intended, and machines require 
that the operators use them correctly and appropriately act on their output. On one hand, operators of 
electronic countermeasures realised that they had little to assure them of their mission’s success. 
Unlike the bullet or the bomb, getting confidence in measures that have no physical manifestation was 
a counter-intuitive process. The scientific research and development processes have indeed flourished 
and resulted in many potent and novel platforms188. However, operators of electronic equipment 
would at times lose faith in their capability to assess that it is indeed functioning as intended. 
Rudimentary radars and communications equipment frequently failed due to a host of operator and 
mechanical reasons. Adding jamming and adversary interference to the list of failures often meant a 
core loss of confidence in the capability itself189. It was often difficult to tell when a system was 
misbehaving, and if it was – why.   
Improvements in communications were similarly pivotal to the war effort, both for the attacking 
and defending parties. Whereas wireless communications were gradually introduced in the First 
World War, by 1939 they have become pivotal for joint force operation, artillery targeting and range 
finding, and coordination of strategic effort.  Reliance on radio signalling increased explosively. It was 
so meaningful that British research and development efforts resulted in an airborne communication 
jamming platform named Jostle II, that was subsequently used extensively in the Middle Eastern 
campaign. Jostle II was designed to disrupt communication networks employed by German tanks and 
armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), which in turn affected their ability to operate in unison 
effectively190.  
Another key aspect of intangible warfare would emerge around the same time; it is highly 
dependent on intimate familiarity with the adversary’s equipment, systems and operational 
techniques. Put simply, a great deal of high-quality intelligence collection was required in order to 
successfully fashion jamming or disruptive electronic countermeasures191. Each adversary device 
functioned and transmitted differently. Consequently, technology seeking to degrade the performance 
of these devices had to accommodate their idiosyncrasies and unique characteristics.  Intelligence 
operations to detect, investigate and map equipment characteristics and vulnerabilities were key 
towards supporting the research and development processes of countermeasures and counter-
countermeasures. It was a subtle and risky endeavour. 
As a dangerous corollary, battlefield commanders and strategists realised that the dependency on 
jammers was a double-edged sword; to use an electronic countermeasure risked losing it192 . In some 
cases, even limited recalibration, frequency changes or transmission modifications could thwart the 
effectiveness of jamming. This created a palpable tension between operational commanders who 
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sought to increasingly wield these powerful new capabilities towards fulfilling their objectives and 
senior command, who had understandable concerns over compromising key intelligence sources. 
There was no easy solution to this issue and the uneasy balance remains to date. The Second World 
War thus marked the first conflict in which the considerations of intangible warfare grew dominant in 
the battlefield. 
Finally, that an adversary’s hardware could be remotely manipulated for effect proved to be the 
first indication of an underlying theme for all intangible warfare: it is at its core an exercise at 
deceptively weaponising the adversary against itself. Rather than seeking to directly impact the 
enemy, initial forms of jamming, spoofing and decoys sought to actively disrupt the operational 
decision-making process, in turn causing the adversary to act against its own stated goals. Borrowing 
from military strategist John Boyd’s OODA Loop193, intangible warfare graduated from disrupting the 
first observation phase to impacting the subsequent orientation, decision and actioning phases. While 
disruptive attempts were tactically possible prior to improvements in technology, influencing 
electronics has made the exercise possible at scale. Causing the myriad devices used in the battlefield 
to betray their operators quickly became a viable operational goal, a necessity to defeat the modern 
war effort. Thus, the Second World War had affirmed the need to invest heavily in technology for 
future conflicts rather than rely primarily on manpower and strategy. Indeed, an entire scientific field 
gradually emerged from the integration of new capabilities and the mathematical understanding of 
the battlefield – operations research194.   
SECOND CYCLE – COLD WAR & ELECTRONIC WARFARE 
In 1973 and in spite of concrete intelligence prompting preparedness, Arab forces led by Egypt and 
Syria successfully attained strategic surprise by concurrently launching attacks against Israel in what 
would later be known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the first several days of combat, Israeli forces 
were beaten back from their strongholds in the Sinai desert and the Golan heights. Existing Israeli 
Defense Forces deployments met with freshly furnished Soviet technology in great numbers. Even as 
they encountered numerous difficulties on the ground and in the air, the Israeli military had within 
several hours proactively launched naval forays intent on engaging Soviet-made missile boats in use 
by the Syrian Navy. While seemingly a marginal series of battles, they would prove to be deeply 
prescient of a larger trend. The naval skirmishes included the first ever engagement to ever include 
guided ship-to-ship missiles, and the first engagement to effectively use ECM (Electronic Counter-
Measures) to subvert guided missiles195.   
On paper, the odds were stacked in Syria’s favour. The Soviet SS-N-2 Styx missiles used by the 
Syrian and Egyptian navies had twice the range of their 20-mile indigenous Israeli counterpart, the 
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Gabriel196. The Styx had been previously used even in the same theatre of war, when a volley fired 
from an Egyptian vessel sank the INS Eilat in late 1967, marking one of the Israeli Navy’s greatest 
disasters197. This previous painful experience prompted Israeli missile boat captains to engage all 
forms of countermeasures upon establishing hostile contact, which included flares, anti-air gunfire 
and electronic radar spoofing. The aggressive posture when coupled with capably operated ECM and 
accurate guided missile fire proved decidedly effective. The Israeli Sa’ar 4 missile corvettes evaded or 
otherwise destroyed all incoming threats, while commensurately sinking five Syrian ships198. The 
strategic effect was significant even for a war with minimal naval aspects; Syrian ships were thereafter 
confined to their ports, and Israeli corvettes continued to harass coastal targets with impunity. The so-
called Battle of Latakia had demonstrated that cautiously integrated intangible warfare can 
measurably augment operational efforts.  
While the naval theatre proved a success for the Israelis, the airspace was not as easily dominated. 
Indeed, a presumption of superiority by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has resulted in sorties against some 
of the world’s densest anti-aircraft defensive spheres. In the first phases of the war, failure to employ 
ECM in order to contend with active surface-to-air platforms such as the stationary SA-6 Gainful or 
the mobile SA-7 Grail199 resulted in staggering losses as the IAF rushed to provide air support and 
suppress advancing Syrian and Egyptian ground forces200. A lack of electromagnetic superiority 
proved costly. While the war itself had many consequences and several aspects of significance for 
warfare analysts, one such key aspect stood out most prominently; it was a war in which a prevailing 
overreliance on technology was thoroughly probed for vulnerabilities, and it was the first war in which 
the electromagnetic spectrum affected the war on a strategic scale.  
 A further interesting characteristic stemmed from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and other Cold War 
era conflicts pitting US and Soviet technology; intangible warfare has evolved in earnest beyond 
deceiving human operators to include deceiving the weapons themselves. The increasing 
miniaturization of computers meant that greater automation could be relegated to the actual weapon 
platforms, thereby improving accuracy and response time while freeing operators to pursue mission-
critical tasks. Communication networks to facilitate large-scale defensive operations and coordinate 
operations by disparate assets were becoming increasingly commonplace. These networks served as 
both a potent advantage while similarly resulting in a sizeable increase in the vulnerable attack 
surface. By falsifying signals, disrupting sensory input and affecting communication between devices, 
weapons could be manipulated beyond their original intent. And by attacking centres of gravity where 
electromagnetic defensive measures were concentrated for effective and prompt allocation of 
resources, one could palpably reduce an adversary’s capabilities.  
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In 1968 and in light of dangerous liberalization of public sentiment201, forces from the Soviet-led 
Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia. The surprise invasion included large-scale suppression of anti-
air defences by way of electronic attacks, designed to prevent Czech command from obtaining 
situational awareness and scrambling whatever defensive measures were available202. The surprising 
and overwhelming show of electromagnetic force alongside the streaming of troops and armour into 
the country contributed to its relatively bloodless compulsion into submission, despite military 
resources being available to the Czech defensive. While largely non-violent widespread civilian unrest 
was pervasive203, Soviet forces encountered no organized military resistance, possibly deterred at least 
in part by the overwhelming electromagnetic superiority. Intangible warfare became an independently 
strategic component when wielded in a coordinated fashion as a part of a joint warfare campaign.  
The coalescing of doctrine around the electromagnetic spectrum soon gave birth to a precursor 
taxonomy to the one employed today in cyber-operations. In 1969, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued 
policy intended to clarify terminology around the use of electronic warfare. It was defined as: 
 “…military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, 
or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which retains friendly use of 
the electromagnetic spectrum.204” 
Most interesting perhaps is just how similar this nearly fifty-year-old definition – dating from the 
earliest days of computing – to the manner in which cyber-warfare is framed today. Otherwise put, 
replacing both electromagnetic spectrum (the domain) with cyberspace and electromagnetic energy 
(the medium) with computer network equivalents retains the accuracy of the above definition 
perfectly. The guiding principles of intangible warfare have thus been codified in the same manner for 
at least fifty years, chipping somewhat at its perceived novelty.  
Initially electronic warfare was divided into three key parts205. The first, electronic 
countermeasures (or ECM), was the prevailing term for measures designed to affect devices operating 
on the electromagnetic spectrum, mainly for communication and radar. As these measures 
proliferated, countries sought to defeat them by using the uninspired second term electronic counter-
countermeasures (or ECCM). These defensive measures included frequency hopping transmitters to 
defeat jamming, and techniques designed to identify actual targets within chaff clouds. Lastly, the 
third component is electronic support measures (or ESM), a term which encompasses all operations 
and capabilities that enable ECM and ECCM. Otherwise framed, these are intelligence efforts on 
enemy electronics and electronic warfare capabilities. As previously mentioned and much like its 
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modern cyber counterpart, electronic warfare is highly dependent on high quality intelligence. Both 
offensive and defensive capabilities must inherently be tailored to the adversary technology they’re 
designed to affect.   
The Cold War also saw the expansion of vernacular beyond countermeasures to proactive attacks. 
This initially included terms such as electronic attack (EA) and electronic warfare (EW). The increased 
integration of offensive electronic capabilities led to their recognition as not just reactive measures to 
attempt and defensively stymie an aggressor’s momentum, but as a key component of joint warfare. 
As early as 1975, Soviet documents discussing large-scale military exercises began including a separate 
section on electronic warfare206. By 1977’s Soviet Baltic Sea Exercise VAL-77, electronic warfare was 
identified as a key tenet of joint operations to be tested throughout combat trials207.  
As noted by Western observers, Soviet forces adopted an intangible warfare doctrine that rather 
closely mirrored its US counterpart, calling it Radioelectronic Combat (REC)208. Notably different, 
however, was the mathematical approach adopted towards its use. Recognising that it is far easier to 
recover and respond to REC efforts at degrading command and control, Soviet planners modelled 
adversary behaviour in order to identify its critical time windows. Those were reportedly defined as 
“the sum of times required to complete a sequence of steps in control209”, or alternatively as the 
decision-making window for operational command. The goal of REC, therefore, would be to attack 
directly in that critical time window, as to disrupt crucial decision making and attain maximum 
impact.   
THIRD CYCLE – COMMAND & CONTROL 
The strategic significance of computers and the networks they comprised increased at an explosive 
pace throughout the second half of the 20th century. The growth was largely commensurate with wider 
trends in computing; namely the increase in available computational power and storage volume, 
miniaturization, and declining hardware costs. Computers rapidly became more adept at handling 
additional aspects of the complex modern battlefield, and thus uniquely capable to facilitate large-
scale joint operations and precision targeting. Military networks for communication, logistics, 
command and control, targeting, and telemetry became ubiquitous and progressively more connected. 
In countries where the development of joint warfare lagged, military observers noted Western 
progress with concern. Such was the case of the Soviet Union, which in its final years correctly 
identified its increasing military capability discrepancy with the West as partly a result of a woefully 
underdeveloped computer hardware industry210. 
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Saddam Hussein’s refusal to vacate his forces from occupied Kuwait in 1991 had triggered one of 
the most prominent joint warfare campaigns to date. In Operation Desert Storm, accurate and 
concurrent firepower was brought to bear across all warfighting domains, all overseen and enabled by 
an expansive surveillance grid comprised of satellites, AWACS monitoring aircraft, ship-borne radars, 
allied facilities in the region and tactical equipment at the brigade level. The result was an 
overwhelming strategic success that reverberated globally, later hailed by some as a “revolution in 
military affairs211” (RMA). Global observers from militaries in Russia, China and others all noted the 
arrival of precision joint warfare on an unprecedented scale, crucially enabled by a sprawling 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence (or C4I) mechanism deeply woven 
into all operations212.  
This increasing reliance on networked warfare also signalled the deepening symbiosis between 
intelligence and combat operations. As former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper213 
wrote in 1994, Desert Storm revealed that the era of precision guided warfare created an insatiable 
need for intelligence214. In order for operations to proceed effectively, they now required additional 
coverage, available persistently before, during and after conflict, and it must be of higher quality. In 
this new world, adversary intelligence collection must be fully integrated across all domains of 
warfare215.  
In the 1990s, the United States– then the chief pioneer of intangible warfare under the new 
networked reality – evolved its military doctrine beyond the electromagnetic spectrum in its 
perception of intangible warfare. Namely, it now encapsulated its kinetic and non-kinetic efforts to 
influence the flow of information under a new umbrella term called command and control warfare 
(C2W). Initially, the term was in fact coined as command and control countermeasures, reflecting the 
innate tendency of intangible warfare in embodying counter-innovation 216. Almost immediately, the 
term was reinvented as employing warfare vernacular217. Most importantly, the concept represented a 
doctrine comprised of five interlocking components: 
“[Command and control warfare is] the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), 
military deception [(MILDEP)], psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and 
physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, 
degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against 
such action”218. 
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With C2W, Intangible warfare fully progressed beyond support capabilities weaved into the 
existing domains, instead becoming an operational goal of its own. C2W was a result of an 
increasingly ingrained understanding that modern command and control networks essentially formed 
new Clausewitzian centres of gravity. As US Army Field Manual 100-6, dated 1996, explains; “…C2W 
applies to all phases of operations, [and] offers the military commander lethal and non-lethal means 
to achieve the assigned mission…219”. The very technology that was used to enable modern warfare has 
finally become a primary target instrumental in facilitating battlefield success. All five key pillars of 
C2W embodied a continuation of previous efforts at intangible warfare and a prescient look at 
modern-day cyber operations. Technological military deception (MILDEP) efforts woven into 
operations in order to create adversary false situational awareness were in place since the earliest days 
of radar-based ECM220. 
It was perceived that non-kinetic capabilities supported, enabled and empowered their physical 
counterparts in a larger holistic doctrine. The perception of intangible operations as intertwined with 
their kinetic counterparts was instrumental in implementing C2W; of its five pillars, only one 
(physical destruction) was inherently kinetic, while the others (EW, MILDEP, PSYOP, and OPSEC) 
had both kinetic and non-kinetic possibilities. Offensive electronic capabilities, much like their 
subsequent cyber counterparts, were viewed as a means to an end, particularly potent when combined 
intelligently with other available assets. In some cases, such as the US Navy’s former Space and 
Electronic Warfare specialty area assessed to be analogous to C2W, intangible warfare was 
intrinsically pre-assumed to function alongside the traditional modus operandi221: 
“The constant improvement of C2 and C2W systems alike tend to create a see-saw affect. As 
C2 systems are created with "anti-C2" fixes, C2W systems are developed to counter them. The 
lethality of Counter-C2 assets such as HARM [High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles] and 
sophisticated jamming modulations must continue to stay ahead of C2 systems upgrades222.”  
The brief era of C2W was also accompanied by the realization that military intangible warfare is 
one component in a larger battle for information dominance. The notion of information warfare was 
gradually introduced as a contest for controlling the overall flow of facts and situational awareness 
before, during and after conflict. The concept later extended to operations conducted routinely even in 
neutral or allied territory, as part of the larger war of narratives. Intangible warfare had essentially 
spread beyond the military domain to aspects of grand-strategy. As stated in the US Joint Doctrine for 
Command and Control Warfare dated 1996, “Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is an application 
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of [Information Warfare] in military operations… to attack or protect a specific target set – command 
and control (C2)223”.  
Considering that the US itself viewed C2W as tactically and operationally subordinate to larger 
information warfare efforts224, it’s no surprise that other countries do not make the distinction even 
today. Instead nations such as Russia, China, Iran and Israel view information warfare holistically, as 
a paradigm that envelops all operational levels including what’s often called operations other than war 
(or OOTW). The holistic approach again indicates how artificial the distinction between cyber warfare 
and information warfare may be to some; one is contained within the other, the latter can often also 
be the former, and in many cases, they are implemented and operated by the same personnel. Thus, 
the notion of “cyber” as a distinct operational domain is similarly artificial, as cyberspace is merely the 
latest manifestation of the transfer and storage of information.  
As everything today is data-based, information warfare extends to far greater reaches than it has 
before. Electronic warfare elicits tactical-level effects in an attempt to influence remote adversary 
hardware by way of the electromagnetic spectrum. Command and Control warfare, now largely an 
abandoned construct, indicates an operational-level doctrine originally designed to guide targeting 
against critical nodes to where information flows, analysed and subsequently disseminated as 
necessary. Strategic information warfare is the attempt to impact the flow of information beyond the 
scope of military operations, as to influence decision makers and the population they are entrusted 
with securing.  
FOURTH CYCLE – CYBER WARFARE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
The rise of network centric warfare (NCW) in the 1990s was commensurate with the 
understanding that intangible warfare is difficult to accommodate as long as it is not practiced 
frequently and at scale. While the increased networking of military forces was already proceeding 
apace for several decades, doctrinal texts encompassing warfighting as a networked force reliant upon 
information technology were still lacking. As in many cases, NCW terminology was far ahead of its 
actual implementation. This was reaffirmed by US Department of Defense researchers in their 
surprisingly candid intro to the book Network Centric Warfare, dated 1999:  
“The truth is that we are not experts on NCW and far more importantly, in our opinion, no 
one is. In fact at the current time, NCW is far more a state of mind than a concrete reality225.” 
Secondly, network centric warfare further cemented the notion that the integration of information 
networks into warfighting did not constitute a radical departure from the underpinning tenets of 
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warfare itself. While digital networks and an increased reliance on computing presented both new 
opportunities and various challenges, the reality of combat remained roughly the same226. 
The introduction of network centric warfare – and its equivalents as observed by global US 
adversaries – is an intriguing mirror image of offensive cyber-capabilities. Where NCW recognized the 
exponentially increasing use of information gleaned from disparate sources as a potential pivotal asset 
used by commanders227, cyber-warfare commensurately recognized this new reality as an equally 
pivotal vulnerability. Noting the rise of network centric warfare, therefore, is critically important in 
mapping out new centres of gravity observed by its users.  
The trend of technology-dependent warfare was not unique to Western militaries. Through careful 
dissection of the coalition-based Desert Storm operation, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
soon diverted considerable efforts to attempt and both counter American NCW while also harnessing 
its advantages locally. This notion was one of the key contributors to the modern Chinese doctrine of 
local wars under conditions of informatisation. Informatisation was the modern philosophy that 
stated that information must be harnessed, fused and wielded at scale to enable pursuance of all 
national objectives, both military and otherwise228. While military analysts previously deemed the 
PLA far behind their American counterparts at the time of Desert Storm, by 2013 US Department of 
Defense analysts observed an overwhelming emphasis in PLA drills on joint networked warfare229. 
The 1990s also introduced one of the final key components; that intangible warfare 
fundamentally represents a contest for information superiority. Military doctrine - ever vigilant over 
the need to visibly achieve objectives –became increasingly broad in its references to the significance 
of information itself. Intangible warfare began affecting more than just individual systems and 
streams of data; it influenced the overall perception of conflict itself. The 1940s saw the introduction 
of electromagnetic capabilities to influence specific systems. The 1970s saw the maturation of these 
approaches towards influencing localized platforms working in unison. The 1980s led to the 
graduation into abstract regional and global data networks. The 1990s led to the critical evolutionary 
step into influencing psychological decision-making processes and global public perception. 
Intangible warfare now encompassed a wider range of activities than ever before.  
In November 1992, the US Department of Defense issued directive 3600.1 succinctly titled 
“Information Warfare”, detailing definitions and responsibilities for the US information order of 
battle. Notably, the doctrinal document underpinned its policy section with the following opening 
text:   
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“U.S. Armed Forces shall be organized, trained, equipped and supported in such a manner as 
to be able to achieve a distinct information advantage over potential adversaries in order to win 
quickly, decisively, and with minimum losses and collateral damage.230” 
The transition in vernacular from information warfare (IW) to information operations (IO) was so 
rapid as to almost be unnoticeable. Within four short years, warfare was swallowed up as a 
subordinate element of a far more ambitious scope for “information operations”231. In December 1996 
the Department of Defense reissued directive 3600.1 with a comprehensively altered opening policy 
statement suggesting a loftier agenda: 
“The Department of Defense must be prepared for missions from peace to war-to include 
military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as peace-keeping and humanitarian 
operations, opposed by a wide range of adversaries including State and non-State actors. To 
meet this challenge, DoD activities shall be organized, trained, equipped, and supported to plan 
and execute [Information Operations]. The goal of IO is to secure peacetime national security 
objectives, deter conflict, protect DoD information and information systems, and to shape the 
information environment. If deterrence fails, IO seek to achieve U.S. information superiority to 
attain specific objectives against potential adversaries in time of crisis and/or conflict. The goal 
of IO is to promote freedom of action for U.S. forces while hindering adversary efforts.232” 
While information operations were at least superficially far broader in scope, their core 
components bore a striking similarity to previous iterations of intangible warfare doctrine, namely 
Command & Control Warfare (C2W). To wit, numerous official US documents on IO enumerate its 
five core competencies as Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations, Military Deception, 
Operations Security and Computer Network Operations. These five elements are nearly identical to 
their predecessor C2W equivalents, with the exception of removing physical destruction and replacing 
it with computer network operations. Cyber had merely replaced the last kinetic crutch in the broader 
spectrum of intangible warfare. 
The latest iteration of intangible warfare marked the transition to a doctrine more reliant on 
achieving non-physical objectives. A dependency on data served as the recognition that control of 
information has generated a completely new set of strategic, operational and tactical goals. Each of the 
aforementioned five core competencies represented a conduit for shaping perception, situational 
awareness, and the decision-making process across all operational levels. Political scientist Joseph 
Nye weighed on the topic in 1996 when claiming that an “…information advantage can help deter or 
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defeat traditional military threats at relatively low cost233”. Otherwise put, information had finally 
outstripped in importance the equipment and networks through which it was carried. 
The transition to an information-led doctrine was not without its difficulties. The marrying of 
peacetime and wartime operations, the inclusion of computer network operations (CNO), the 
exclusion of physical destruction, and the inclusion of global perception management (PM) into scope 
all contributed to a marring of boundaries. For example, the US Information Operations Roadmap 
from 2003 proceeded to call for aggressive proactive psychological operations (PSYOPs), advocating 
for vast resources invested into offensive information capabilities both during conflict and 
peacetime234. At the same time, the document recognised that due to a potentially global reach of 
propaganda in the internet age, the quality and coherence of messaging must be improved 
significantly and coordinated with numerous agencies.  
The 1990s also saw the birth of “cyber” as acceptable terminology, gradually increasing in 
prominence alongside the other established terms. Cyber-everything had seemingly sprung into 
existence within a few short years launching a trend that would accompany military affairs well into 
the 21st century. But the etymology of the word dates back to the 1940s, thereby charting a similar – 
albeit distinct – course through modern history. In essence, cyber represented the ever-increasing 
interaction and dependence of man and machine235; an apt phenomenon accompanying the realities 
of intangible warfare. This new family of terms came to roughly encompass the notion of targeting 
computers, devices, and the software that powers them. As such, while it gained in popularity, “cyber” 
as a term did not contribute any lucidity or specificity. One of the earliest and oft cited articles on the 
topic remains Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s “Cyberwar is coming!”, dated 1993236. Interestingly, while it is 
often looked upon with derision as alarmist and overreaching, considering the nascent state of 
publicly acknowledged intangible warfare it was rather prescient. Namely, the authors distinguished 
between two key terms; netwar and cyberwar. The former bears a striking resemblance to ongoing 
influence campaigns waged against Western governments, often attributed to Russia: 
“Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations or societies. It 
means trying to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population “knows” or thinks it knows 
about itself and the world around it237.”  
Cyberwar, now an oft-misused term, was similarly defined fairly well by the authors and mimics 
somewhat the modern Chinese approach: 
“Cyberwar refers to conducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations according to 
information-related principles. It means disrupting if not destroying the information and 
                                                             
233 Joseph S. Nye, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs, March 1996, 20, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/1996-03-01/americas-information-edge. 
234 U.S. Department of Defense, “Information Operations Roadmap,” 5–8. 
235 Thomas Rid, Rise of the Machines: The Lost History of Cybernetics (Scribe Publications, 2016). 
236 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (1993): 141–65. 
237 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 28. 
60 
 
  Daniel Moore 
communications systems… It means turning the “balance of information and knowledge” in one’s 
favor, especially if the balance of forces is not238.” 
Cyber-capabilities therefore epitomise the cyclical nature of intangible warfare. It is the counter-
narrative to network centric warfare, a direct assault on the new centres of gravity created by the 
increased dependence of the modern combatant on complex networks of sensors and data streams. As 
information became pivotal to waging warfare, it almost immediately spawned a targeting reaction. 
This did not go unnoticed by the United States, which in 1998 formed a miniscule force tasked with 
defensive cyber-operations – the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND). The task 
force increased in size and importance over several years, evolving to encompass additional 
responsibilities. In 2003, offensive cyber-capabilities became more widely acknowledged239. By 2005, 
the US military established the Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare (JFCC-
NW), tasked with coordinating offensive network operations240. The significance of targeting and 
defending information networks has grown so rapidly that by 2007, then National Security Agency 
head General Keith Alexander claimed – “USSTRATCOM [United States Strategic Command] has also 
begun to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures and other concepts into cross-mission strike 
plans241.” Network operations, both defensive and offensive, have increased in visibility and 
perception as to eventually merit the establishment of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2009 
to “…conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all 
domains…242” The two decades beginning with the 1990s saw an incredibly dynamic growth process 
for network capabilities within the United States military243. 
Cyber capabilities and information operations were codified into NATO and US doctrine as distinct 
but overlapping terms. “Cyber” was recognised as a catch-all term for the protection and manipulation 
of data and the digital systems that handled it. Separately, information operations encapsulated a far 
broader range of concepts and operational procedures, from wartime tactical operations to grand-
strategy attempts at shaping adversary perception. Not all experts uniformly agree to this delineation. 
To wit, Dorothy Denning - a leading US information security researcher - published her seminal 1999 
book titled “Information Warfare and Security” in which she essentially equated the crux of 
information warfare to hacking operations244. By doing so – and in congruence with Russian 
information operations doctrine – Denning supported the notion that all operations against digital 
data are a part of the same spectrum.   
A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS? 
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Military cyber capabilities are neither new nor revolutionary. They are the latest incarnation of 
intangible warfare, the discipline of achieving objectives by targeting the technologies that enable 
modern warfare. Since the dawn of the twentieth century, societies have embraced computer 
technology and as such it became a viable target. Cycles of counter-innovation necessitated 
increasingly complex solutions, so machinery and equipment became both an asset and a crutch. 
When said crutch is successfully impaired, the warfighter stumbles and is rendered ineffectual.  
Cyber-warfare is thus merely the latest method of targeting military vulnerabilities.  
The supposedly unique circumstances around attacking computer networks are as shown, not all 
that unique. The secrecy around capabilities and their use dates to the very genesis of electromagnetic 
warfare in the Second World War. The voracious dependency of computer attacks on high-quality, 
high-quantity intelligence can easily be rooted in the Cold War contest of ECM and ECCM. That 
intangible warfare is a contest for information dominance as an independent objective can be traced 
to the 1990s doctrine on command and control warfare.  
Attacking networks is a combination and escalation of all known parameters of intangible warfare. 
As time passed and connectivity increased, both the circumstances and potential impact intensified. 
Where once jamming radar could generate a localised tactical effect, network attacks now potentially 
enable an adversary to completely thwart a theatre defence grid. Where transmission proximity was 
once needed, attacks can now potentially be carried out by distant troops from the comfort of their 
remote facility. But in order to generate this magnitude of effect, the need for omniscient, ever-
present, and extensive intelligence resources has sky-rocketed.  
With the exponentially increased levels of complexity of modern communication networks, the 
challenges of intangible warfare have similarly scaled. Such abilities are more brittle than ever, and 
guarded with fervour. Where once their discovery would mean eventual countermeasures of uncertain 
value, discovering modern deployed offensive capabilities can potentially ruin both years-long 
operations and the potency of the very weapons themselves. The defensive task has similarly become 
seemingly insurmountable and includes defending everything from civilian critical infrastructure to 
tactical battlefield satellite uplinks. Each such piece of equipment incorporates numerous hardware 
and software components developed internationally by a convoluted and largely opaque supply chain, 
making it a daunting task to certify that a system is truly uncompromised.  
Cyber has finally pushed intangible warfare over the brink of domainhood because all the existing 
parameters have been intensified to the point where they can deeply impact warfare itself. Attacking 
devices and the data they communicate can have dramatic impact on achieving battlefield objectives. 
Where once they were peripheral, computers have now permeated through every facet of warfare. So, 
while cyber is an independent domain, it has only become so because of the unprecedented 
dependence of all other domains on data.   
Offensive cyber capabilities are only the digital network aspect of the larger spectrum of 
information operations. Even as NATO members scramble to assemble fresh doctrine and strategy to 
combat within this supposedly new space, other nations have already recognised that a wider 
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approach is preferable. The insistence on differentiating cyber from both the other domains and other 
forms of information operations is intriguing; as shown, the United States itself had by now officially 
recognised the role of CNO (Computer Network Operations) as a component in the grander strategic 
literature on information operations. The role that network attack capabilities play in MOOTW far 
outstrips their utility in combat.  
This historical analysis is by no means an exhaustive look at all military attempts at shaping the 
information battlespace; it was intended as a sobering look at the evolutionary nature of intangible 
warfare. Similarly, this analysis is limited in scope as network-attack capabilities are still in their 
operational infancy. As Russia, China, the United States, North Korea, Iran, Israel and others rush to 
signal their willingness to operate militarily in networks, the efficacy of these operations remains to be 
gauged. The relative dearth of real-life, war-time military network attacks does not however prevent 
critically examining the historical processes that led to modern doctrine. 
Cyber-warfare is the latest incarnation of the counter-innovation cycles characterising the modern 
battlefield. Countering radio with jamming has evolved into countering digital command and control 
with network attacks. Remediating the advantages of radar has advanced to compromising theatre-
wide sensory awareness by targeting the network-centric mindset. The underlying logic is the same, 
but the modern reliance on networking has enabled its application on an ever-greater scale. The 
historical lessons of cyber-warfare are therefore that its true uniqueness stems from its unprecedented 
reach, sophistication and scope, not from it truly being a new domain of warfare. 
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3. OFFENSIVE NETWORK OPERATIONS245 
OVERVIEW 
Offensive network operations epitomise the desire for cleaner, less violent conflict. If strategic 
coercion can be achieved by targeting the digital infrastructure used for both national security needs 
and daily life, enemy resolve should theoretically decrease to the point of surrender. This perception 
of conflict is understandably appealing, were it accurate. The notion of precluding violence by 
achieving digital supremacy is promising but has thus far yet to materialize. Instead, MONOs can 
assist both tactical and strategic combat efforts, if all their particular advantages and disadvantages 
are accounted for. While nations occasionally advertise slivers of information of how they conduct 
MONOs, doctrine and strategy remain understandably murky on how operational success is achieved 
in cyberspace. Having examined what constitutes cyber-warfare (see Chapter 1), and how intangible 
warfare evolved into modern offensive network operations (see Chapter 2), a third component can 
now be addressed; what are the unique characteristics of offensive network operations carried out by 
military forces?  
At the core of this chapter is the argument that MONOs can mostly be grouped into two classes; 
presence-based and event-based. Presence-based operations encompass any offensive network 
activities which include a lengthy intrusion component meant to establish a persistent foothold inside 
adversary assets, traverse networks and locate objectives. Event-based operations primarily include 
direct attacks intended to cause immediate effect against a targeted platform, by compromising its 
integrity or available resources. Most publicly acknowledged network intrusions would fall into the 
former category, while many direct attacks against military hardware in the battlefield would fit the 
latter. 
A typology for network warfare matters. By identifying the two primary categories in which it 
applies to warfare, each category can be separately examined. When researched together, the results 
often seem muddled and difficult to translate to military doctrine. Examined separately, presence and 
event-based operations are shown to have distinctive characteristics embodying unique advantages 
and disadvantages. They require different manpower, resources, operational approaches, and can be 
applied against different targets for varying effects. Some may be more easily relegated to battlefield 
use, while others are best kept for strategic manoeuvres.   
Event-based operations are roughly analogous to firing a weapon. When such an attack is launched 
a digital payload – a stream of data - traverses one or more networks where it meets or bypasses 
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adversary defences. Impact on the target, if successful, is immediate or near-immediate. Such 
capabilities are meant to be reusable. An event-based attack may be launched by a local fire team (e.g. 
infantry), a warfighting platform (e.g. aircraft or surface ship), or altogether from remote territory 
(e.g. by a combatant command centre). These types of attacks – like their kinetic counterparts – often 
have localised impact meant to augment or support kinetic strikes. As a corollary, such tactical 
network warfare works well in a combined arms package, jointly deployed alongside kinetic 
capabilities.  
Presence-based operations are roughly analogous to clandestine sabotage operations. A 
prerequisite lengthy intelligence operation results in access to the adversary’s networks. From that 
point, the attacker’s assets are manoeuvred to enumerate enemy servers and endpoints, gathering 
information and identifying weak points that may subsequently be attacked for effect, all the while 
evading defences. Specialized implants are fielded where needed, with the intent to activate when the 
order to do so arrives. The potential risk to friendly weapons and capabilities from discovery is far 
greater due to the extended presence “behind enemy lines”, as is the chance of failure. But the 
potential benefit is commensurately immense, possibly resulting in an advantage of strategic 
proportions. These operations may serve as the surprise prelude to an offensive campaign, a one-shot 
capacity to degrade an adversary, or as a supporting means of exerting pressure on enemy 
governments in conflict.  
Military network operations are discussed often but vaguely. On the defensive, many of the 
techniques employed by military forces are a product of publicly available information security best 
practices and industry standards. However as some of the characteristics of military networks deviate 
markedly from their civilian counterparts, defensive doctrine also differs.  Despite these 
circumstances, a decade of widely publicised coverage on nation-state hacking operations, when 
coupled with leaked documents from the US intelligence community afford a partial yet meaningful 
glimpse into how offensive units can and do operate in cyberspace. 
This chapter offers a deconstruction of MONOs for both event-based and presence-based attacks. 
The opening includes a review of existing approaches on the processes that define nation-state 
network operations, particularly focusing on public-sector and private-sector models used to assess 
network intrusions.  The model chosen as the theoretical scaffolding for the chapter is the US 
Department of Defense’s “Common Cyber Threat Framework246”, which capably aggregates different 
industry and public-sector models to provide a useful approach for assessing wider network 
campaigns rather than focusing on individual intrusions.  
The four primary phases presented in the Common Cyber Threat Framework – preparation, 
engagement, presence and effect – are assessed in order for both presence and event-based 
operations.  Preparation includes all efforts to craft offensive capabilities, research enemy defences, 
and gather targeting intelligence. Engagement refers to the first contact with the adversary networks, 
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the original point of intrusion and compromise. Presence refers to all actions carried out while 
malicious software is present on enemy networks, primarily to facilitate further compromise of assets, 
gather intelligence on the target and position implants for attack. Finally, effect entails the activation 
of the intended payload, which would then disrupt, degrade, destroy or otherwise adversely impact the 
targeted enemy asset. Not all network operations fall neatly into these four categories nor is the model 
fully representative of all activities associated with such operations. It does however offer a useful 
standard mechanism through which to analyse and compare the primary components of a broad 
range of different network attacks.  
Responsibility for counter-intelligence traditionally lies with domestic law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies. Classically, there was little that the average citizen could or would do. Private 
intelligence firms more commonly restricted their spheres of influence to corporate espionage or 
criminal cases. Wary of retribution and unaware of political context, unaffiliated citizens would most 
often avoid wilfully involving themselves with the clandestine affairs of nations. In the internet age, 
that is demonstrably no longer the case. Private individuals and organisations frequently interact or 
even disrupt intelligence gathering efforts. Daily friction between private entities and nation-state 
adversaries has never been higher.  
In early 2013, American cybersecurity company Mandiant published an extensive analysis of a 
perceived nation-state cyber-espionage campaign247. They had dubbed the phenomenon of a lengthy, 
targeted network intrusion by a capable adversary an “advanced persistent threat” (APT). Unusually 
for the time, the private company conducted complete adversary attribution for the operation. 
Mandiant called the group “APT1” and pointed the attribution finger at China. Incredibly, they went 
further and identified the responsible party to be the People’s Liberation Army 3rd General Staff 
Department (3PLA), and even provided the specific unit indicator, 61398 – and the building in which 
it allegedly resided248. Several individuals were also directly revealed.  
Mandiant understandably felt compelled to explain the unusual decision to meddle in the affairs of 
nations. In their APT1 report, the company authors exclaimed that “It is time to acknowledge the 
threat is originating in China, and we wanted to do our part to arm and prepare security professionals 
to combat that threat effectively249”. While many other security companies have since shied from 
outwardly attributing intrusions to specific nations and organisations, detecting similar nation-state 
operations has become a wildly successful and largely consensual practice250. In some cases, 
companies such as the Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab have even taken to publicly outing malicious 
network activity undertaken by their host countries251, thereby exposing themselves to possible 
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government retribution. For the first time in history, interfering in intelligence operations had become 
a viable business model. 
The information security industry’s new predilection towards tampering with network operations 
affords unprecedented transparency to how these now play out. The tempo of state-affiliated 
intrusions has increased, and private security companies have been remarkably successful at 
repeatedly unmasking them. As private companies assisted victims in mitigating and defeating 
network incursions by military units and intelligence agencies, the models, methodologies and 
techniques they have for doing so correspondingly improved. Thus, the information security industry 
and community expertise have become the best sources of publicly-available knowledge for analysis of 
state network operations.  
Several industry models provide fragments of insight into assessing MONOs. In 2011, American 
security contractor Lockheed Martin published a paper outlining a model for assessing, mitigating and 
defending against network intrusions252. Borrowing from military vernacular, they originally labelled 
the new model the Intrusion Kill Chain253, later colloquially renaming it to the Cyber Kill Chain254. The 
model provided a systematic, simplified process in which intrusions were deconstructed to seven 
chronological phases. A second popular network-intrusion analysis model is the Diamond Model255. 
Developed by veteran information security researchers, the model’s four vertices (hence the diamond 
namesake) are adversary, capability, infrastructure, and victim. The wider notion behind the model 
is to assess intrusions by understanding the intruder rather than focusing on the victim. While these 
models – and others256 – are frequently used by both private and public entities, they focus only on 
the technical and operational efforts in network operations. As such, they lend themselves more 
naturally to their intended technical audience rather than a strategic analysis of overall MONO 
capability. 
The inherently secretive nature of cyberspace operations does not mean that there are no official 
publications on the topic. Predominantly, numerous sanctioned United States Department of Defense 
documents are immensely helpful in understanding official perspectives on how offensive network 
operations are conducted. The reports run the gamut from tactical accounts on how units operate on 
the field257, joint publications on doctrine258, strategic guidelines259, oversight reports260, and even 
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operational integration roadmaps261. While parts of the content remain redacted within these 
publications, when carefully amalgamated they become incredibly helpful.  
By some estimates, over thirty countries are actively pursuing offensive cyber capabilities as a 
strategic goal262. Some nations – such as Israel – are notoriously tight-lipped when it comes to their 
integration plans. Others, such as Russia, China, and most so the United States discuss their strategies 
more liberally. Deterring nations in cyberspace is difficult; whatever nations can do to signal one 
another that they too can strike through this supposedly new medium may thereby prove useful. So, 
publicly acknowledging at least some form of offensive network operations may be a viable deterrence 
play.  
MILITARY OFFENSIVE NETWORK OPERATIONS 
The history of intangible warfare shows that investing time and resources into a weapon that may 
strike a single target once could still be a cost-effective decision. Others may be developed strategically 
to be made routinely available to battlefield units. How would these processes look? What forces, 
procedures, and relationships would that entail from inception to deployment? These are questions 
that are mostly left unhandled by existing industry models - which while useful - focus on assisting 
defenders in understanding and foiling targeted attacks. Expanding on these existing models allows 
accounting for additional processes undertaken in a military context. Among these research and 
development cycles, support intelligence gathering, tasking, and infrastructure management. 
Employing effective cyber operations is a grand undertaking; models assessing these processes should 
reflect that reality.   
For the purpose of this thesis, the term military offensive network operations (MONOs) is used as 
the conceptual anchor. The term was previously defined as any means of digitally affecting 
adversary systems and networks for a military goal or objective. Military denotes a focus on non-
civilian or law enforcement use of activities. Offensive limits the aperture to hostile engagements 
rather than information operations or intelligence collection. Network specifically focuses the scope 
on attacking software and hardware rather than information in a broader sense. Operations signifies a 
purposeful employment of capability in the scope of organised military activity. 
When approaching the issue from a broad perspective, all network operations can be reduced to 
four critical parts: intelligence, capabilities, operators, and infrastructure. Intelligence represents all 
information gathering and assessment required to conduct effective operations against a given target. 
This includes prioritising adversary networks for targeting, analysis of used technologies and 
identification of exploitable vulnerabilities. Capabilities include all software and hardware 
components employed by the attacker to breach the target and influence targeted systems. The 
operators are the actual individuals deploying the tools and manipulating them as necessary. The 
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infrastructure is the amalgamation of virtual logistics necessary to effectively communicate with the 
target, maintain operational security, exfiltrate information, and control the tools being used. While 
some simple, limited operations can be carried out without one of the above components, any 
meaningful offensive manoeuvre will almost certainly have all.   
MONOs do not exist in a vacuum. In contrast to some existing models, operations do not begin 
with reconnaissance against the target and do not end after acting on the objectives263. While the Kill 
Chain model reconciles the existence of multiple intrusion efforts that may run parallel against 
different targets within a given campaign264, additional considerations are not within the scope of the 
model. There are several strategic and tactical phases preceding the operation itself, and several that 
follow it. Similarly, there are processes that run concurrently to a network intrusion, interacting with 
work carried out by network operators to facilitate their success and feed off of it. These additional 
components are not peripheral; they are instrumental to an operation’s success and are an integral 
part of understanding offensive military capabilities in cyberspace.   
The model used in this chapter expands on the Department of Defense’s Cyber Threat Framework 
model to include all processes and stakeholders associated with a network operation’s success. The 
goal is to reflect all requisite efforts by broadening the aperture to include intelligence providers, 
strategists, research and development, software engineers, and kinetic warfighters. Additional 
stakeholders and phases are assessed in each one of the model’s four consecutive steps; preparation, 
engagement, presence, and effect.  
The preparation step entails all prerequisite processes necessary to generate viable operational 
capacity. This includes oft ignored but substantial investments in research, development, initial 
targeting and strategic intelligence gathering. It is impossible to generate an effective attack without 
knowing what to attack, how to attack it, and have the integrated capabilities to carry out the attack. 
The engagement phase is the initial contact with the adversary networks, in which forward defences 
are subverted and initial compromise established. This original intrusion vector serves as the anchor 
for all subsequent malicious activity against the target. The third phase – presence – includes 
incremental infections of other subsystems within adversary networks, hunting for the objective while 
collecting pertinent intelligence.  This step’s duration ranges from possibly months or even years to a 
matter of seconds for event-based attacks. In the fourth and final effects phase, offensive payloads are 
activated against the target, hopefully resulting in the intended effect. This phase includes all post-
attack procedures, such as folding back the attacker’s infrastructure, covering up forensic evidence 
and conducting attack damage assessments.   
In 2010, Iranian engineers submitted a request to the Belarusian information security company 
VirusBlokAda to assist them in investigating an incident265. It had seemed that malicious software had 
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infected some of the computers and servers at the Natanz nuclear facility, part of the illicit Uranium 
enrichment program then operated by the Iranian government. They were not aware at the time, but 
they had stumbled on a clandestine offensive network operation intent on causing physical damage to 
the plant’s centrifuges266. The malware was soon discovered to have specifically targeted the industrial 
control systems orchestrating the plant’s operations267, subtly masking its own activities as to fool 
local technicians into believing that physical centrifuge failures caused by the malware were 
accidental268. The offensive toolset, named Stuxnet by the researchers who discovered it, soon became 
the analytical cornerstone for offensive operations269. For the first time, malicious software employed 
was used by one state to kinetically target another. Some hailed it as the dawn of cyberwarfare270.  
Stuxnet was unique. As researchers scrambled to dissect the malware and its many characteristics, 
it became evident that its uniqueness was both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, researchers were 
afforded unprecedented intimate access to a thoroughly engineered, complex, targeted instrument of 
offensive state network operations. On the other, it was one of a kind, which immediately begged the 
question of how representative was it as an attack with a physical outcome. Stuxnet was likely a result 
of a complex network operation, requiring extensive investment in research, development, adversary 
simulation and a sensitive targeting cycle. While not used for a military objective, it was perhaps used 
to preclude one. Therefore, it remains a highly instructive example of a large-scale presence-based 
operation.  
PREPARATION 
Preparation encompasses all efforts preceding contact with the enemy.  The Cyber Threat 
Framework defines preparation as all collective efforts to identify targets, develop capabilities, assess 
victim vulnerability, and define the scope of the operation271. Each of these processes reflects months 
and perhaps even years of investment in resources both material and operational. Thus, while it is the 
least discussed, the preparation phase of any offensive network operation may often be its longest. 
Before operators ever interact with adversary networks, planners must first initiate a targeting 
cycle. This may seem deceptively trivial; an actor seeking to target an adversary will simply pursue its 
networks. In reality, locating, identifying and enumerating relevant networks for attack can be 
difficult 272. Modern militaries employ dozens of disparate networks even within a single 
organizational entity273. Identifying which one to attack is no negligible feat. It requires in-depth 
intelligence and an understanding of the adversary order of battle. In many cases, sensitive or 
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operational networks do not interface directly with the public internet or perhaps even with any other 
networks274. This makes the notion of identifying them and attaining access that much harder. The 
force commander will choose to pursue a target through networks only if it is deemed to be the most 
effective means of attaining the objective275. 
Targeting has an instrumental role that does not begin in cyberspace. Rather, targeting is “the 
process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, 
considering operational requirements and capabilities276.” But whereas in kinetic targeting it may be 
sufficient to simply know the location of the target, it is not the case for targeting virtual capabilities. 
The process entails both enumerating all relevant networks, identifying those which would potentially 
be prudent to target, and subsequently prioritising between those.  
Targeting cycles are decidedly different for presence and event-based operations. Targeting for 
presence-based operations is most commonly conducted by the strategic intelligence entities that hold 
network intrusion capabilities. Traditionally, it is within the remit of signal intelligence (SIGINT) 
organizations, which in varying jurisdictions are either civilian or military entities277. As such, it is 
often a derivative component of those entities’ prioritized intelligence requirements (PIRs). PIRs form 
a fundamental national security agenda against which the agency is expected to action, whether by 
collecting intelligence or preparing for eventual network attacks278. Targeting is therefore a long-term 
process in which intelligence on the adversary is accumulated, increasingly providing information 
required to properly prioritize between networks which are a balance of compromise feasibility and 
relevance to the objectives at hand. The result is a highly curated list of specific targets.  
Strategic targeting cycles may require expert external assistance. In NSA documents leaked by 
Edward Snowden in 2013, cooperation efforts from 2004 between the NSA and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) are described279. The DIA’s Joint Warfare Support Office assisted in 
mapping and analysing materials about an alleged Russian military base buried deep in the Yamantau 
Mountain. As indicated in the document, the US intelligence community remained in the dark despite 
information on the facility first surfacing over a decade earlier280. The DIA asset helped targeting 
efforts to identify Russian entities associated with the project, marking them for subsequent signals 
intelligence collection281 – and potentially network operation – efforts. Prioritisation and 
identification of the operational target was thus jointly determined by the two agencies.   
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Targeting for event-based operations would reasonably take place in proximity to the attack 
itself282. As a result, this cycle could commonly be conducted by the theatre force commander, or 
perhaps even a tactical unit lead against a limited objective. This alongside the employment of pre-
packaged network capabilities entails that the decision-making process is both faster and conducted 
with far less available resources. In order to identify which networks should be selected for 
subsequent engagement, the commander must identify local adversary centers of gravity, which if 
compromised would reduce enemy effectiveness. To accomplish this, local reconnaissance assets 
conducting spectrum analysis and automated network mapping procedures may identify adversary 
networks operating in the region, possibly even auto-assigning possible ordnance to activate against 
them.  
Some targets may be chosen for both event and presence-based operations, reflecting varying goals 
and opportunities. Over the last two decades, the United States has gradually modernized battlefield 
connectivity for its deployed forces. A part of this process, titled Warfighter Information Network – 
Tactical, or WIN-T, is a prime example of how saturated the network landscape can be. A combination 
of dedicated line-of-sight radios and satellite-communication terminals283 services a host of networks 
including the general-purpose NIPRnet, SIPRnet284 and local compartmentalized data and voice 
networks285. Many of these networks enable unclassified, ancillary functions that are not mission 
critical. Others carry sensitive targeting information, communication, or intelligence data. Some of 
these networks may be inaccessible as they are transmitted over a medium for which the attacker has 
little hope of gaining access. Others rely on commercial satellites and even the public internet as the 
transmission medium of choice. Completing the targeting process by successfully classifying which 
networks both matter and are pragmatically reachable is therefore a challenging commitment. In 
some cases, these networks may be subjected to a long-term compromise in the form of a presence-
based operation. In other cases, locally accessible datalinks such as a regional network cell might be 
the target of an event-based attack. Interestingly, the WIN-T project has now been officially 
terminated by the U.S. military, citing concerns that the project’s architecture is indeed too vulnerable 
to a determined, well-resourced adversary286.  
One crucial pre-operation process often overlooked is capability acquisition and development. 
Capabilities in network warfare include all hardware and software used to intrude, exploit, and affect 
enemy platforms. There is some limited merit in downplaying the complexities of this process; unlike 
actual weapons, network intrusion tools can ostensibly be developed by anyone. Similarly, the 
development cycle for a potent offensive network capability is also classically deemed to be much 
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shorter287, easier, and cheaper288. Again, there is some reason to this assertion. However, the unique 
circumstances of developing weaponry to attack networks are well worth examining. Network 
weapons are often frail, specific, and difficult to reliably test. 
Presence-based attack tools must be stealthy, agile, and modular. They must be stealthy as the 
majority of their life-cycle will be spent clandestinely embedded in adversary networks. They must be 
agile as to enable operators to creatively use them to traverse adversary networks, collect intelligence, 
and weaponize valuable targets. Finally, they often must be modular as to allow operators to only 
deploy necessary capabilities at any given moment, thereby reducing the footprint of the tool – a 
further operational security mechanism289. Each deployment of a highly engineered network attack 
tool must be carefully managed as to only include the components currently needed to facilitate 
success. The expectation that presence-based operational tools be stealthy introduces a significant 
weakness; these tools become quite brittle to use. The pervasive notion that offensive network tools 
are single-use stems from this very issue290. The defensive cycle for a network adversary is 
demonstrably shorter, as detected malware can result in detection signature within days of its 
discovery by a capable defender. It is not just the particular deployment that is threatened, detection 
of an offensive platform risks its compromise against all targets against which it is currently 
employed. That is a momentous risk of capabilities, which explains in part why intelligence agencies 
often guard them so emphatically.  
The McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle aircraft first entered service in the United States in 1976291. 
Originally designed to counter the Soviet Mig-25 Foxbat, its role exponentially grew with its 
exemplary service record to include additional missions. Despite significant Soviet developments in 
fielding newer aircraft and air defences, the F-15 continued to receive upgrades to its avionics, 
weapons, radars and targeting subsystems292. Adaptations and newer models such as the F-15 Strike 
Eagle meant that the same platform could retain its utility even against modern threats. As a result, it 
remains a highly active warfighting platform both domestically and internationally, and is expected to 
continue its active service at least until 2025293. This means that that the F-15 will have a total of at 
least fifty years of active service.  
It is almost inconceivable to envision network attack tools enjoying the same operational longevity 
as their kinetic counterparts. One of the longest known offensive network operations platforms - 
codenamed Regin by its private-sector discoverers - was ostensibly operating since at least 2003294 
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and widely attributed to the NSA295. At the time of its discovery in 2014, security company Kaspersky 
claimed that it was “…one of the most sophisticated attack platforms we have ever analyzed296”. Once 
publicized and with its various mechanisms for communication and stealth thoroughly mapped and 
defended against, NSA operators would have had to immediately cease all intrusion activity until 
sufficient changes could be made and new evasion mechanisms deployed. Such an event is both an 
enormous investment in time and resources and also a potentially major operational compromise. It 
would be as if one successful loss of an F-15 to an S-300 air defence battery would cause the 
immediate grounding of all F-15 aircraft globally – even against other adversaries - until such a time 
as countermeasures could be developed, tested and deployed for the entire fleet. It is clearly not the 
case.  
Conversely, event-based attack tools must be robust, aggressive, fool-proof and intuitive to 
operate. As they would likely be deployed by frontline units, no expertise must be needed to wield 
them effectively. They must be able to operate against a wide range of targets in a slew of 
contingencies, while generating similarly predictable effects. Battlefield operators will not have time to 
dynamically redeploy modules or carefully orchestrate network traversal. The weapon must therefore 
be capable of autonomously completing its objectives without further assistance. As a result, resource 
exhaustion attacks such as the commonly seen denial of service or generic destructive payloads are apt 
examples of preparing event-based capabilities.  
Both presence and event-based capabilities require investment in vulnerability research. This 
entails all efforts to locate exploitable flaws in software and hardware used by the adversary, flaws that 
can be subverted for compromising the target and getting it to either behave unexpectedly or 
preferably run arbitrary code. Vulnerability research runs the gamut from generic-use software such 
as Microsoft Windows to dedicated software use by military hardware and other niche platforms. It is 
a crucial component in most network attack tools. 
Some vulnerabilities are more useful than others. In August 2016, an entity calling itself the 
Shadow Brokers began releasing information seemingly pilfered from the NSA’s then network 
intrusion unit, Tailored Access Operations (TAO)297. Assessing the potential fallout from the 
significant compromise of some of their most compartmentalised capabilities, the NSA decided to 
attempt and pre-empt any damages that may occur from having their most sensitive attack tools 
repurposed against others. They disclosed to Microsoft that they have previously discovered a critical 
vulnerability affecting multiple versions of their Windows operating system298. The vulnerability was 
the holy grail of intruders; it allowed remote code execution (RCE), and it was “wormable”. Thus, it 
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could surreptitiously infect additional vulnerable computers with ease. Quite simply, it was a virulent 
vulnerability.  
Duly alarmed, Microsoft quickly released a patch for the vulnerability. Coding it MS17-010, the 
company strongly advised all its customers to quickly patch their systems or risk extreme vulnerability 
to external compromise299. Many did so, and many more did not. Two months later, a tidal wave of 
ransomware infections swept across the world severely impacting users both large and small. 
Interestingly, it appeared that the malware - dubbed WannaCry by researchers - weaponised the 
MS17-010 vulnerability by way of the Shadow Brokers leak300. Among other fragments of information, 
the Shadow Brokers leak provided the internal NSA name for MS17-010 – EternalBlue. The effects of 
the malware were staggering; some organisations such as the UK’s National Health Service suffered 
greatly from the malware, resulting in temporary loss in operational capacity301. Seemingly it could 
have all been prevented had they patched their aging internal systems.  
WannaCry was later attributed both officially by the US and the UK government and unofficially by 
private sector researchers to the North Korean government. It was a stark reminder that even 
disclosed vulnerabilities may retain their potency, particularly against targets that are difficult to 
routinely patch and defend. Even WannaCry itself was insufficiently severe to encourage all Windows 
users to inoculate against EternalBlue. Less than six months later, a second wave of infections from 
the Petya malware once again weaponised the same vulnerability to a surprising degree of success302.  
Are WannaCry and Petya representative of the modern networked battlefield? Likely not - most 
military networks are segmented from the internet and are comparatively more resilient. Yet 
WannaCry and its brethren are instructive in one key area; effective vulnerability research is 
paramount to the success of a reliable network attack platform. This requires the expert attention of 
vulnerability researchers who comb through the source code of products used in adversary networks 
and systems. If a weapon is detected and made public, losing a powerful vulnerability can be a 
crippling loss as inoculation becomes near imminent for many modern networks and devices. 
Similarly, public disclosure of a vulnerability used in weapons means it cannot reliably be used in 
sensitive operations again, even with different tools being deployed. The risk of discovery becomes too 
great.  
Software vulnerabilities are difficult to find both for attackers and defenders. From the offensive 
perspective, effectively exploiting critical software in a manner conducive to intrusions is increasingly 
difficult303. At the same time, there is no shortage of vulnerabilities, as data indicates that publicly 
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disclosed, high severity submissions have nearly doubled in 2017304. From the defender’s perspective - 
as a RAND report indicated in 2017 - unless the tool weaponizing them is somehow discovered, 
vulnerabilities last an average of almost seven years without being exposed305. Thus, maintaining an 
expert workforce entrusted with continuously hunting for new useful vulnerabilities is paramount.  
For event-based operations, the final component of preparation is integrating capabilities for use 
with forward-deployed warfighting platforms. Presence-based operations are often handled by remote 
operators, much like drones. However, in many cases, especially those involving segregated networks 
used to communicate sensitive data, proximity or line-of-sight access is required. In these cases, 
military forces may find themselves delivering fires directly in the field, be it by aircraft, naval vessel, 
ground vehicle or actual boots on the ground. 
There are recent examples of event-based attacks in which network capabilities were supposedly 
integrated into battlefield platforms. The United States military operates infantry cyber teams to work 
alongside electronic warfare assets to map out enemy networks and identify targets306. The Russian 
military has allegedly disrupted Royal Air Force sorties over Syria by way of a network attack launched 
from a deployed electronic warfare vehicle307. Developing a reliable, robust, battlefield-deployable 
offensive cyber capability is increasingly becoming viable – albeit expensive. Thus, while attacking 
networks may seem to be low-cost, attaining battlefield readiness and conducting event-based 
offensive operations may include hefty development, targeting, and intelligence cycles. 
ENGAGEMENT  
Network operations are not carried out solely by operators. Even once attack capabilities are fully 
developed, vulnerabilities weaponised, and targets identified, extensive support from other functions 
is essential in order for an operation to succeed. Therein lies a difficulty in applying the cyber kill 
chain model directly to military operations; much of the work is not carried out by the operators 
themselves. Those who facilitate the attack will likely need subject-matter assistance from intelligence 
analysts, reverse engineers, software developers, and decision makers.  
The Cyber Threat Framework defines the initial engagement phase as “Threat actor activities taken 
prior to gaining access but with the intent to gain unauthorized access to the intended victim's 
physical or virtual computer or information system(s), network(s), and/or data stores308”. Put simply, 
this phase embodies the attempts to intrude upon the enemy; it is the first active contact with its 
networks, intent on establishing a digital beach-head. What the framework obfuscates is the 
characteristics of this phase. As adopted from the operational typology used by Buchanan, the 
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engagement phase may occur months in advance for presence-based operations or in adjacency to the 
desired effect, as for event-based attacks309. Not all cases are created equal, but all share one notable 
commonality - the engagement phase starts the operational clock. 
For presence-based operations, network operators in the engagement phase are mainly 
conductors, overseeing the weaving of other orchestra members’ capabilities into the operation. They 
are thus reliant upon external assistance for success. Intelligence analysts are most familiar with the 
target and would likely be best positioned to pair an intrusion approach to it. Technical staff may be 
required to assist in selecting the appropriate payload to defeat enemy defences and evade detection. 
Senior staff may be necessary to prioritise goals as the operation proceeds.  
A ubiquitous approach to network intrusion is compromising an internet-facing server or device. 
Identifying and compromising these may be easier than directly penetrating segregated networks, but 
not all such targets are inherently useful. Operations may also commence by interacting with an 
individual rather than a machine. Strategic network operations intent on gaining entry to sensitive 
networks may first need to compromise those who routinely use them and hold trusted access to their 
assets. The reason for this is two-fold; first, there may not be a viable technological intrusion vector, as 
many sensitive networks are cut off from external inputs. Second, the users are often the most 
vulnerable element in an otherwise secure network310. They are prime targets for social engineering as 
an intrusion vector, but that does not mean it is always a trivial endeavour. Successfully getting 
individuals to usefully compromise their own security without arousing suspicion often requires 
expertise, preferably provided by dedicated personnel.  
Even defence contractors can be compromised by social engineering. In march 2011, the RSA 
security division of US company EMC reported a breach of its networks311. RSA soon admitted that the 
intrusion vector consisted of a phishing email containing a weaponised spreadsheet. As per the 
company’s then head of security, “the email was crafted well enough to trick one of the 
employees…312”, thus admitting the attackers into the network. Yet the effects had a far wider reach, as 
RSA was also the producer of the SecurID tokens used for authenticating access in many government 
contractors and agencies. Indeed, it was revealed two months later that defence giant Lockheed 
Martin – prolific designer and manufacturer of US military equipment – was targeted in part by 
counterfeit SecurID tokens created as a result of the RSA breach313. Securing presence on both RSA 
and Lockheed Martin networks was therefore a fairly long and involved process.  
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In event-based operations, the engagement phase can occur in seconds. As the targeting cycle is 
similarly shortened, there is no time to craft phishing emails tailored to human targets or set up 
elaborate honeypots. Instead, the engagement phase will focus on compromising accessible targets by 
exploiting remote software and hardware vulnerabilities. Particularly when using automated 
capabilities to target warfighters or other connected devices, it is sometimes possible to directly attack 
the software to gain entry. The engagement phase for event-based operations may not always result in 
full access to the target. Depending on what the desired effect is, it simply may not be necessary. For 
example, simply attempting to exhaust available resources or corrupt a target’s means of 
communication may be possible without ever being able to execute code directly on the target. If the 
goal is to prevent the target from functioning as intended, that may be sufficient. Such scenarios are 
more easily placed within a military context; see for example denial of service attacks, which bear 
some similarities to conventional electromagnetic jamming314.  
The potential perpetrators for event-based operations are far more varied than their presence-
based counterparts. In many cases, these could be forward deployed offensive cyber units, as both the 
U.S. and the U.K. are increasingly using315. In other instances, field staff such as human intelligence 
assets or specific warfighters may be required to facilitate the actual engagement. As Edward Snowden 
revealed in a leaked top-secret document in 2013, the NSA’s GENIE program to facilitate semi-
automated network operations would at times rely on such assets. When necessary, field operators 
would physically infect adversary devices, plant hardware, or conduct short-range offensive 
SIGINT316. SIGINT agencies with global or regional reach could also deliver payloads from remote 
facilities.  
PRESENCE 
The presence phase is where most of the friction occurs between intruder and target. It is where 
persistent malicious software is continuously employed to understand, dissect and establish a hold 
within the targeted network or networks, gradually extending the intruder’s access until such a time 
where it locates servers or devices fitting to attain the task at hand 317. It is therefore the process of 
extending and cementing the reach into the adversary’s networks, two processes called lateral 
movement and persistence, respectively. As defined by the Cyber Threat Framework:  
 “[The presence phase includes] actions taken by the threat actor once unauthorized access to 
victim(s)' physical or virtual computer or information system has been achieved that establishes 
and maintains conditions or allows the threat actor to perform intended actions or operate at 
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will against the host physical or virtual computer or information system, network and/or data 
stores318.”  
The presence phase embodies the biggest discrepancy between the two operational categories - 
time spent in target. Where presence-based operations unsurprisingly spend most of their lifecycle in 
the presence phase, event-based operations may either have an inconsequential or perhaps even non-
existent presence phase. When nation-state intrusion campaigns are analysed and reported to take 
months prior to detection, it primarily refers to the presence phase. The key difference in timespan 
reflects applicability to two wholly different operational tempos. For presence-based operations, the 
presence phase is essentially a cyclical process of expanding micro-intrusions in which additional 
nodes in the network are scanned, breached and subsequently assessed for mission relevance. This is 
represented well in the Kill Chain model, which threads multiple compromises on targeted networks 
into a single campaign with shared features319.  Each intrusion must be handled with care as to avoid 
tripping any alarms or informing network defenders of an active intrusion against them.  
Networks are comprised of multiple servers, computers, and other devices. It is usually unfeasible 
for an attacker to attain its objective via the first node breached on the network. As a corollary, upon 
gaining entry, the intruder would then proceed to perform what is often called “lateral movement”.  
Such procedures are meant to establish presence on the network, infect additional nodes, and try to 
locate targets of worth for further assessment. While operating the software to facilitate these 
endeavours is squarely within the purview of the operators, they require tremendous amount of 
support from intelligence staff320 to assess content pulled from devices and servers, while research and 
development resources may be required to create dedicated modules to subvert specific technologies 
encountered.  
Presence-based offensive operations are first intelligence operations. Until such a time as a more 
active measure is needed, malicious software is tasked with either remaining dormant or collecting 
information, identical to its behaviour in an intelligence mission321. As a corollary, operators at the 
presence phase must rely extensively on the assistance of intelligence analysts to assist in further 
targeting and dissection of materials exfiltrated from the target322. In some cases, the offensive is 
carried out wholly by the intelligence agency323. The presence phase is thus both assessing the 
independent intelligence value of the target, while simultaneously gathering information needed to 
help steer the operators towards the server or servers where attacking would result in achieving the 
desired objective.  
When Russian operators initially infiltrated the Ukrainian power grid in 2015, they did not 
immediately wreak havoc on all they encountered. Instead, earlier intrusion efforts cleverly used the 
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specialized protocols unique to these industrial networks to traverse the network, map its layout and 
glean information required to develop robust offensive capabilities324. In a subsequent operation, the 
presence phase included pivoting from the power company’s corporate network onto its industrial 
network, leveraging an attack against both to simultaneously cripple the grid and prevent operators 
from fixing it325. Finally, advancements eventually allowed the operators to “…de-energize a 
transmission substation on December 17, 2016326” by way of the CRASHOVERRIDE malware tailored 
to impact even relatively well defended energy grids. The Russians had achieved a malware-induced 
blackout, but they have done so after a considerable amount of time from the initial engagement 
phase. Success would not have been possible without topical expertise and accrued experience.  
Success would not have been possible without topical specialty. As reported, the operation revealed 
a command of the industrial communication protocols at use, a rapidly evolving sophisticated 
malware platform with dedicated modules, and politically relevant targeting all the while dodging 
detection by wary defenders. These circumstances embody the intricacy and difficulties of successfully 
traversing the presence phrase. It would not have been possible without technical expertise in 
industrial control systems, developers to generate the unique modules, and intelligence support to 
guide the efforts.  
Regardless of how secure the target is, the physical consequences of failure are hardly comparable 
to a botched kinetic attack. Much like the motivations behind operating drones over contested 
airspace, this is a key advantage of offensive network operations. Indeed, even at the absolute worst 
scenario in which the offensive measure both fails and results in a catastrophic compromise of the 
attacker’s capabilities, the actual operators are certainly to remain free from physical harm. They are 
distant, often operating from the safety of their homeland, and as such will be untethered to physical 
harm concerns. They will be able to rebuild and attack another day327.  
For event-based offensive operations, the presence phase is nearly imperceptible. This is intrinsic 
to the attack vector; capabilities employed in an event-based attack are meant to impact the target 
directly and then disappear, leaving as few lingering artefacts as possible.  Were tell-tale indicators to 
remain such as residual code left running or files persisted to the target’s file system, it would simplify 
subsequent efforts by the adversary to develop future countermeasures. Thus, it is significant for an 
event-based capability to be only minimally present on enemy assets. 
A cascading effect – intentional or otherwise - may result in an event-based attack having a limited 
period of network presence. For example, an automated network attack tool designed to propagate 
through networks and rapidly destroy all infected endpoints and servers would require a limited 
presence as to ensure subsequent infections to additional targets. A good example of such an attack is 
the NotPetya destructive malware, which in 2017 heavily affected Ukrainian networks before 
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cascading beyond its scope to adversely impact various other entities globally328. The attack, which 
resulted in extensive damage to victims worldwide, was unusually publicly attributed by numerous 
Western intelligence agencies to the Russian military329. 
The potential cost incurred in discovery is arguably the most meaningful deterrent to attacking via 
cyberspace. In recent years, a growing trend amongst large vendors in the information security market 
has been to uncover massive nation-state surveillance efforts, those often facilitated by highly 
sophisticated malicious software. The immediate result of this compromise is an attempted rollback of 
all deployed assets both by the original offender attempting to effect damage control and the victims 
who enjoy updated configurations for their defensive products. The product of this is both a partial 
collapse of the aggressor’s intrusion infrastructure but more importantly – the defender’s near-
immediate inoculation from future attempts to use the same tool in an offensive capacity. The 
presence phase is thus the most sensitive component in many offensive network operations. The 
continuous friction with different adversary networks and the need to collect intelligence means that 
discovery and eventual inoculation are a big risk to attackers. Presence operators therefore must 
continuously work to conceal their moves, clean up forensic evidence, and establish stable, covert 
communication channels that would reliably enable decision-makers to activate positioned offensive 
payloads once these become necessary330.  
EFFECT  
The final effect phase is where triggers are pulled. Ordnance is activated, disabling, disrupting or 
manipulating targets. Effects either translate into objectives, fizzle uselessly, or have unintended and 
potentially disastrous collateral impact. For presence-based operations, the effect phase is the 
culmination of possibly months of planning, targeting, intelligence collection, infection attempts and 
dedicated development331. For event-based operations, the effect phase represents the primary thrust 
of the attack.  When Richard Clarke declared in 2009 that “strikes in cyber war move at a rate 
approaching the speed of light332”, he referenced not the entire span of an operation but rather the 
span of time between the activation of the ordnance to its actual detonation against the target; the 
manifestation of the effect phase. Even so, ordnance may be instantly triggered but may still take time 
to achieve its intended impact. 
Distilling various official definitions, there are three “attack” types when targeting networks – 
disruptive, manipulative, and destructive333. Disruptive - or suppressing - attacks incur “temporary or 
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transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of a weapon system below the level 
needed to fulfil its mission objectives334”. Their utility increased with the rise of electronic warfare, 
where electromagnetic transmissions could be jammed to produce a temporary but potent effect335. 
Disruptive attacks have made a natural transition to cyberspace, where temporarily degrading the 
capacity of military resources can adversely impact the efficacy of an adversary force336.  
Disruptive network attacks are commonplace even outside military scenarios. So-called denial-of-
service attacks capable of levying massive throughput of network traffic routinely disrupt the 
functionality of online services big and small. The targets range from global gaming communities such 
as Sony PlayStation Network337 to major banks338. Typically, these attacks either exploit an 
implementation flaw in the targeted technology or simply attempt to overwhelm its available 
resources. By doing so, no legitimate connections can interact with the platform as intended, 
rendering it temporarily disabled for its original purpose. Similar approaches may be applied to 
military technology, platforms, and protocols. 
Manipulation effects attempt to alter information or functionality in the adversary networks, 
thereby deceiving operators or preventing intended system functionality. Such attacks attempt to alter 
perception, preventing an adversary from acting properly to further its own objectives. A scenario 
could include introducing a nearly imperceptible deviation to a weapon’s targeting process, causing 
strikes to miss by what could appear to be a technical glitch. Kinetically, this is hard to accomplish but 
could be roughly analogized to physically tampering with a missile’s warhead to secretly render it 
inert. When the missile fires, it seemingly behaves as normal until impact, during which the warhead 
does not detonate. During the heat of conflict and until it happens repeatedly and consistently, it 
would be difficult to identify the fault as an attack. By the time it is discovered, it would likely already 
be too late. As the Stuxnet campaign demonstrated339, masking a manipulative effect to increase its 
longevity can cause an effect to be repeatedly successful over time. Hiding an effect does, however, 
require incrementally introducing it; an immediate and blunt change of circumstance markedly 
increases the probability of detection. 
Masking an effect may be more applicable to presence-based operations than to event-based 
attacks. As previously discussed, event-based tools tend to be more geared towards instantaneous 
effects and are thereby less compatible with the subtle machinations of a presence-based effect. 
Conversely, as event-based capabilities are designed to be more resilient to detection, it is perhaps less 
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paramount for an effect to be so hidden. It would be surely preferable, but not a requirement per se of 
the attack. 
Destructive attacks are aimed at inflicting damage on adversary networks, either on hardware, 
software, or both. These types of attacks are firmly rooted in conventional warfare, where destruction 
of enemy assets and personnel is often seen as the primary method of reducing its coercive combat 
effectiveness340. When applied to network operations, a destructive attack could cause permanent 
software damage – such as in the case of malware which completely erases all critical files on target 
servers341, or even permanent hardware damage, such as the previously mentioned Stuxnet worm 
targeting the Iranian nuclear project342. 
One of the key challenges in the effects phase of a presence-based operation is that the attackers do 
not hold the trigger. A presence-based operation is about painstakingly wiring ordnance into enemy 
assets, infecting endpoints and servers as relevant networks are identified and penetrated. However, 
when the time comes to activate the payload, there is no confidence that the attack will be correctly 
registered and actioned upon by the infected machine slotted to do so. Unlike kinetic or even event-
based attacks, the weapon is effectively embedded behind enemy lines when it is fired. The offensive 
payload is already pre-placed within adversary networks, increasing the chance that the triggering 
itself would fail due to some extrinsic circumstance outside of the attacker’s control.  
The other side of the reliability issue is conducting effective battle damage assessment (BDA), the 
process of estimating the effects of an attack. This difficulty applies to both categories of operations, 
with some key delineation. Primarily, issues stem from a lack in visible confirmation. Excluding rare 
cases, intangible warfare normally has no physical aspects in its effects phase. Software is 
manipulated, hardware may be fooled or tampered with, but physical safeguards designed to protect 
equipment and operators from faults may often prohibit such drastic effects. This is of course not 
always the case. Presence-based incidents such as the centrifuge-crashing Stuxnet343, the generator-
rupturing Aurora experiment344, and the German steel mill attack345 remain among the few instances 
of significant physical damage to equipment directly caused by a software attack. Physical impact is 
immensely hard to accomplish.   
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A destructive event-based attack with no discernible BDA means that it is often challenging to 
assess whether the target has in fact been degraded, either permanently or temporarily. As with other 
characteristics, this outcome ambiguity is similar to electronic warfare. Thus, if as previously 
suggested the goal of the network attack was to facilitate a subsequent kinetic manoeuvre, operators 
may be forced to make a leap of faith that the attack has indeed been successful. In some cases, this 
leap may entail risking lives. Gambling on whether a software attack successfully degraded an anti-
aircraft targeting radar’s sensors to the point where manned fighters are safe to engage is a high-
stakes endeavour.  
Network attacks are intrinsically detrimental to their own BDA efforts. Kinetic attacks are often 
accompanied by sensors. These provide crucial telemetry as to the success of an attack, and can 
include manned solutions such as special forces, submarines, or aircraft, or unmanned solutions such 
as drones or satellites. For presence-based operations, the attack tools are often their own sensors. 
Indication as to the status of the targeted system or network may singularly come from that very 
system or network. Take down the network and crucial observation channels similarly disappear. For 
networks, it is usually only possible to conduct effective surveillance by observing the data coming in, 
out, and through the network. The activation of an earnestly crafted presence-based destructive attack 
may cut off all such communication, taking with it the ability to observe whether the desired effect had 
actually been accomplished.  
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Delineating between event-based and presence-based operations allows having a discussion on 
how militaries are integrating these capabilities into doctrine and strategy. Both are markedly 
different in characteristics, duration, challenges, and opportunities and thus must not be lumped 
together. Fundamental similarities exist between the two categories and are certainly helpful towards 
understanding networks as a medium for warfare; but useful observation of military capabilities will 
remain limited unless we recognize that not all capabilities must be treated the same. 
Event-based operations represent the instances in which network attacks are somewhat analogous 
to the kinetic. Like firing a weapon, an event-based operation entails sending a payload from attacker 
to target in the hope of immediately reducing its integrity or capacity to operate. As a result, these 
capabilities are often more tactical in nature, easier to integrate with existing military OODA loops346, 
and are promising candidates for joint warfare.  They are however limited in scope, may require 
extensive research and development, and could be limited to a specific subset of adversary equipment. 
A weapon suitable for disabling a U.S. Navy destroyer may exploit hardware-specific vulnerabilities347 
rendering it unsuitable against other targets. Consequently, battlefield operators deploying such 
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weapons must have immaculate understanding of their adversary and a firm control of their own 
options.  
Presence-based operations are intelligence missions with an offensive finisher; a form of digital 
sabotage. They may initially appear indistinguishable as operators infect networks and gather 
information necessary to craft an attack. In these phases, even if the target detects the malware 
present in its assets, it is immensely difficult to assess motive and intent. Only once offensive modules 
are deployed can confidence in hostile intent increase. This adds an unfortunate layer of political 
nuance, as overly successful network intrusions may be misconstrued by the target as unduly 
aggressive. The risk of potentially undesired escalation has been aptly covered by Buchanan when 
discussing the “cybersecurity dilemma”348, an application of the classic security dilemma to network 
intrusions between nations.  
Presence-based operations can potentially be high-risk, high-reward capabilities. Successfully pre-
positioning assets in military or otherwise critical networks may potentially have meaningful impact 
on the course of conflict if used to facilitate strategic surprise or large-scale reduction in enemy 
capacity to operate. At the same time, presence-based operations are notoriously brittle, and their 
discovery can undo years of focused labour. By nature, such operations require tight, intensive, 
unyielding support of friendly intelligence assets to map the threat, generate initial persistent access, 
and successfully manoeuvre through inscrutable tangles of military networks until the relevant targets 
are found. It is therefore understandable why these campaigns are often spearheaded by intelligence 
with core expertise on network intrusions rather than deployed military forces. 
The Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft is a fascinating example of a platform 
potentially vulnerable to both presence-based and event-based attacks. After two decades of 
development, the aircraft had started active deployment accompanied by a host of issues with its 
onboard software.  These included major in-flight failures of the radar system349, issues with its 
onboard avionics350, and “…276 deficiencies in combat performance [designated] as ‘critical to 
correct’…351”. Additionally, both the onboard systems and the logistical software used to manage the 
F-35 have demonstrated numerous vulnerabilities during security testing procedures, many yet to be 
addressed as of 2017352. While onboard systems are unlikely to be directly connected to the internet353, 
targeting one or more of the F-35’s prized array of sensory inputs and communication methods is 
viable by a knowledgeable adversary. To that end, evidence suggests that the F-35’s most recent 
software version still presents a sizeable attack surface.  
An event-based attack might try to overwhelm or otherwise compromise some of the F-35’s tactical 
data links, used to share data with allied assets in the air and on the ground. For compatibility 
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purposes, this communication commonly occurs via the Link-16 protocol, an encrypted legacy 
protocol used by NATO forces since 1975. While it has undoubtedly undergone improvements over its 
lifecycle, the limitations in encrypting reliable airborne tactical traffic and the vast array of 
opportunities for U.S. adversaries to intercept, analyse and exploit Link-16 protocol vulnerabilities 
raise the option that it may be compromised during an attack. Link-16 includes targeting information, 
location of friendly forces and directives from command forces354. Interestingly, even oversight 
reports have indicated some issues with the Link-16 data that forced pilots to revert to voice 
communication 355. Others have indicated intermittent problems with the Multifunction Advanced 
Data Link (MADL) system used to communicate between fifth generation stealth aircraft356, causing 
pilots to “…lose tactical battlefield awareness 357”. Successfully compromising the F-35’s data links is 
thus not unfeasible and may severely degrade aircraft battlefield performance.  
The effects phase in this particular instance could include one of several options. As an example, a 
manipulation attack could alter the pilot’s perception of the battlefield by adding, removing, or 
moving specific targeting points fed to the radar subsystem by external channels. A disruptive attack 
could alternatively try to overwhelm sensory input, or prevent the aircraft from awareness of being 
acquired by a ground-based air-defence battery. The effects would thus be nearly instantaneous, 
limited in scope to the targeted aircraft, and tactical in nature.  
A presence-based attack against the F-35 could take months to prepare, culminating in an 
elaborate effects phase saved for evoking strategic surprise or for a dire need. Rather than targeting a 
single aircraft or sortie, attackers would instead target the peripheral networks that interface with the 
F-35 during its operational life cycle. These could be on-base networks, maintenance forces, or third-
party software providers. By doing so, an adversary may temporarily degrade or otherwise completely 
disable a large number of aircraft.  
One supposed innovation in the F-35’s software is the Autonomic Logistic Information System, or 
ALIS. With one ALIS station present at each unit operating F-35s, it allows semi-automated fleet 
management, mission management, logistics and maintenance358. As with other parts of the Joint 
Strike Fighter program, ALIS has been plagued with critical faults. These faults do well to instruct on 
two relevant aspects; how ALIS might be vulnerable to presence-based operations, and how exploiting 
these vulnerabilities could lead to a strategic advantage when triggered in the effects phase.  
The issues in ALIS are varied. Attempts to deploy it in test environments forced support personnel 
to lower network security settings to allow users to log on359. Incorrectly handled maintenance data 
resulted in one instance in “…major damage to a weapons bay door… 360” from an incorrectly loaded 
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bomb that got loose and struck the aircraft. In June 2017, a software error in ALIS grounded an entire 
F-35 unit until the issue was addressed361. It would therefore seem that the system can both be a boon 
to aircraft operators and an attack vector for offensive network operators. A single warfighting 
platform now presents a diverse, varied attack surface that can potentially be exploited during 
wartime.   
Using the common cyber threat framework is useful to establish the key differences between the 
two high-level ontological categories. Event-based operations have a far lengthier preparation phase 
as offensive technology is researched, developed, deployed and integrated to warfighters. Conversely, 
presence-based operations obviously skew more heavily towards the intelligence-heavy presence 
phase. In each of the four phases – preparation, engagement, presence, and effect – circumstance and 
characteristics differ between the categories. But even a relative dearth in empirical evidence does not 
mean they are inscrutable to outsiders. Analysis of previous operations, industry practices, military 
doctrine, and vulnerability assessments creates a rich tapestry of possibilities and challenges for 
military network operations.   
  
                                                             




  Daniel Moore 
4. VIRTUAL VICTORY: APPLIED CYBER-STRATEGY 
OVERVIEW 
If developing military offensive cyber capabilities is a challenge, effectively weaving them into 
operations is a gargantuan undertaking. Across all planes of activity – strategic, operational, and 
tactical – militaries are now facing the inherent difficulty in accommodating a set of tools that offer 
unique possibilities while creating fresh issues. Contending with these difficulties is paramount to 
ensuring success, and failure to do so could result in a misapplication of force that may reduce 
operational efficacy and even risk loss of warfighting contingencies which took months or years to 
create. 
As MONOs appear uniquely novel, military forces may struggle at reconciling their use with 
existing strategies and operational art. Yet the chasm can be crossed; the existing literature on warfare 
is highly instructive but requires careful identification of where it converges and diverges from 
offensive network operations. Examining where MONOs interface with conventional warfare is not an 
insurmountable task and has been attempted before. Conti and Raymond - influential contributors to 
both military and civilian information security literature – published a 2017 book on bridging the gap 
between military and cyber operational art362. Greathouse conducted a survey of several classical 
strategists363, examining in turn how key terms from each may become applicable to cyber warfare. 
Numerous other examples abound. 
This chapter contends that presence-based and event-based operations exhibit different strategic 
principles. Each sphere has different operational parameters, is often carried out by separate types of 
practitioners, and results in varying fires and effects. By analysing them as such, contributions by 
classic strategists and commentators on operational art ranging from Clausewitz to Fuller become 
eminently more useful to modern intangible warfare. Application of principles such as indirect 
warfare and battlefield fog of war have natural extensions into cyberspace that should not be 
discounted by those seeking to operate militarily within it.  
Furthermore, an argument will be made that presence-based operations naturally lend themselves 
to the strategic-operational planes, while event-based operations are more suitable when viewed as 
adhering to the operational-tactical planes (see figure 1). This differentiation can profoundly impact 
the expectation of results from network attacks, as more localised effects are likely from operational 
and tactical offenses. Simultaneously, this distinction supports the difficult process of identifying 
which offensive capabilities should be relegated to battlefield commanders and which should remain 
within the remit of intelligence agencies or other rear-active forces.  While presence-based attacks can 
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have grand-strategy significance364, these introduce a host of legal, political and normative 
considerations that are outside the scope of this work but should certainly be considered. 
 
FIGURE 1 - DIVISON OF NETWORK OPERATIONS TO MILITARY SPHERES 
The previous chapter addressed the question of who carries out MONOs. This chapter builds on 
that by answering the remaining questions needed to flesh out such use. First, the why will be 
answered by examining the historic contribution of technology to the character and conduct of war. As 
war historian Michael Howard once claimed, “…whatever changes brought about by social and 
technological transformation, the essence of ‘war’ remains.365” What follows is an examination of 
when and where force should be applied to networks in order to do so most effectively and in 
harmony with other capabilities. Finally, what these operations may actually look like and how they 
are carried out will round out the analysis. 
It is natural to try and assess offensive network capabilities with existing strategies. As Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt pithily wrote, “People try to fit the new technology into established ways of doing 
things366.” Analogies employed by strategists and historians equating elements of cyber-warfare to 
electronic warfare, strategic air power, or even Cold-War era nuclear standoffs are useful. Some of 
these analogies have been carried out within this work as part of the conceptual framework. But as 
shown in previous chapters, these analogies do not produce a holistic grasp of what role offensive 
network operations holds in military thought. The threads binding historical and strategic analysis 
must be more tightly woven. 
While analogies between cyber and kinetic warfare often leave a lot to be desired, integrative 
conventional strategy is fundamental to success. Simply put, without interleaving MONOs into 
conventional strategy and doctrine, they may be used incorrectly, or at best used sub-optimally. In 
order to assure that attacking networks is properly integrated, we must first recognise that elements of 
existing strategy already incorporate the prerequisite building blocks. In some cases, historic 
strategists commented on warfare in a fashion inherently hostile to the basic characteristics of cyber 
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operations. In other cases, history represents a powerful foundation upon which modern network 
strategy can construct. 
There are other valuable taxonomies for offensive network activities. Buchanan has similarly 
identified two different primary types of operations. The first category is similar to presence-based 
operations, as it includes time-consuming highly-targeted network intrusions initially similar to 
intelligence operations367. The second category offered by Buchanan is markedly different to include 
indiscriminate wide-scale operations that are not necessarily targeted beyond their original point of 
entry368. These cascading operations often begin with a single point of infection and continue to 
spread and infect additional endpoints within the targets, causing widespread damage. The first 
difficulty in this taxonomy is that it excludes most event-based operations viable in a military context, 
such as attacking specific warfighting platforms with a reusable but ultimately tailored capability. The 
second difficulty is that while less discriminating offensive capabilities are both easier to develop and 
likely to exist, they immeasurably raise the odds of incurring collateral damage, an often-dangerous 
proposition for any but the most total of conflicts.   
Healey and Rattray – both prominent contributors to the existing literature on military network 
operations – offered a more elaborate set of criteria towards categorising such offensives. Healey and 
Rattray acknowledge the strategic-tactical divide by stating that attacks “…could be in support of 
existing operations and used in conjunction with other capabilities…” while also “…be used as part of 
standalone engagements, operations and entire cyber campaign369.” However, subsequent 
explanations on their categorisation of cyber-attacks includes six mission types and twelve category 
parameters, making the distinction somewhat unwieldy as a doctrine-oriented taxonomy370.  
In his 2009 RAND-published research titled Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, Martin Libicki offers 
a distinction between strategic cyberwar and operational cyberwar. The allusion to the strategic and 
operational spheres may sound similar to the model offered within this thesis, but the intention is 
quite distinct. Libicki contrasts his typology by indicating that strategic cyberwar is often independent, 
but most importantly waged in the service of a wider political strategy371. Operational cyberwar is thus 
all network-warfare capabilities as applied against military or military-related targets372.   
Not all theorists uniformly agree that cyber-warfare is a discipline of consequence. In an 
impassioned call against the supposedly overzealous attention to MONOs, Libicki claimed that the 
very risk around network security is transient. As he claimed, cyber-warfare can only exist as long as 
human developers continue to introduce vulnerabilities into code373. As methods improve, these 
vulnerabilities are likely to decrease in quantity and significance, and with it so will the prevalence of 
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offensive network operations for strategic gain. More cautious voices such as that of strategist and 
historian Lawrence Freedman viewed cyber-warfare as an instrument of potential operational 
significance, if not strategic374. Considering that cyber-warfare has yet to prove its lethality, doubting 
its strategic contribution is understandable. Instead, by invoking well-known strategic elements, 
forward-thinking analysts can identify areas in which offensive network operations can meaningfully 
contribute in a multitude of ways.  
WHY - TECHNOLOGY AND WARFARE 
What are the key motivations in integrating offensive network capabilities into military 
operations? Examining history shows several possible explanations, some more compelling than 
others. Two key themes in particular are worth examining. The first is the relatively modern adoption 
of technology-first-doctrine-later as the solution to the challenges of warfare. The second is the 
fundamental human desire to coerce an adversary without shedding blood or undertaking any 
significant material risk.   
Western countries – and first among them the United States – have become increasingly 
enamoured with the promise of technology since the dawn of the 20th century. As former US National 
Security Advisor McMaster lamented in 2009, the United States had adopted “an obsession with 
technology as a defining element of warfare.”375 This premise yielded results against inferior 
conventional military forces such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi military in both Gulf Wars. Where 
technology failed to deliver on its strategic promise was against asymmetric adversaries such as 
insurgencies. The desire to solve complex military challenges with technology at the expense of the 
human element proved detrimental to modern US military campaigns376.  The approach is not 
inherently a 21st century issue. Already at the height of the cold war strategist Edward Luttwak 
commented on what he perceived to be an American obsession with acquiring weapons platforms 
instead of investing in needed strategy development377.  
The advent of precision-based weaponry, network-centric warfare and large-scale joint operations 
resulted in a widely adopted “capabilities-based” approach to warfare378. The belief behind the so-
called US revolution in military affairs (RMA) of the 1990s was that technology would usher 
“dominant battlespace knowledge” and the disproportionate effectiveness of smaller combat forces379. 
A vision of asymmetry-shattering offensive cyber-attacks appealed also to Chinese military thinkers, 
which in the 2013 issuance of the core doctrinal document Science of Military Strategy mused on how 
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targeting critical networks could assist in preventing escalation and unnecessary loss of life when 
conducting network operations380.  
Prior to the dawn of intangible warfare, strategists had already recognised that technology can 
upset an existing balance between adversaries. As increasingly effective firearms altered the course of 
warfare, Clausewitz noted that “violence arms itself with the inventions of art and science in order to 
contend against violence381”. Revolutions in logistics as a direct result of railway technology led to far 
more effective mobilisation of a nation’s military force, enabling a totality of war that was previously 
deemed impractical382.  Further improvements led to the crippling attrition of the First World War, 
which was in turn supplanted by the advent of manoeuvre-enabling technologies such as the 
combustion engine, radio communication, and the airplane383. The Second World War unravelled 
differently to its predecessor, in part as a result of modern technologies being widely adopted and 
integrated into doctrine.  
A comparison between the early days of air power and offensive cyber is meaningful. Both periods 
initially suffered from the same fundamental flaw; an immense potential was identified but practical 
uses remained vaguely contoured384. Gaps in understanding the nature of the toolset and its utility for 
warfare meant that hyperbolic scenarios were drawn, and resource investment was disproportionately 
encouraged towards exciting but untested possibilities. Reflecting the overzealous predictions, 
perhaps the greatest “silver bullet” analogy between offensive cyber and air power can be found in 
strategic air bombing.   
After the First World War air power strategist Douhet predicted that strategic aerial bombings 
could physically and psychologically shatter an enemy’s national fortitude, thereby eliciting swift 
capitulation385. Engrossed in the possibilities of an unpreventable assault, he proclaimed that 
command of the air would render other domains of warfare obsolete and that dominance in the 
domain meant assured victory386. Perhaps overly optimistic, Douhet declared it meant being “…in a 
position to wield offensive power so great it defies human imagination” 387. However, as historians 
such as Michael Howard acknowledged, while air power as a component of joint operations has 
greatly impacted the conduct of war, it had not changed the fundamental truths of it.  
Strategic bombing has not historically proven successful at single-handedly compelling victory. As 
Rattray explained; “…bombing campaigns against cities and general economic targets simply did not 
cause morale to crumble despite the vast resources invested, casualties inflicted, and damage 
wrought388.” The marshalling of the human spirit in light of repeated targeting of civilian 
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infrastructure and life resulted in an unyielding stoicism in face of adversity. If anything, examination 
of conflict may suggest that targeting civilians may solidify homefront unity, as an existential crisis 
promotes more stalwart civilian commitment to war.  
A combination of the persistent lethality consideration and historic evidence on strategic attacks 
supports the notion that political coercion should not be the primary goal for network operations. 
Even as cyber was barely considered as militarily viable at the time, Denning already noted in 1999 
that “there is no evidence to support the notion that a country’s infrastructure could be so disabled by 
hacking that a government would surrender to a foreign power or alter its policies389.”  That is not to 
say that limited coercion is never possible by such means; Nye does not altogether dismiss the 
coercive value of network operations, supporting the idea that they may indeed lead actors to locally 
alter their course of action390.  For air power, it took many decades to realise several harsh realities on 
its strategic limitations, with some arguing that military thought has thus far failed to internalise the 
lessons of air power391. It would therefore be prudent to heed the lessons of history and steer offensive 
network operations towards more practical goals. 
Strategic coercion through the application of intangible warfare is immensely difficult to 
orchestrate. Most fundamentally, as of 2018 no casualties have been recorded as a direct result of 
network attacks, so coercion by way of civilian attrition seems unlikely392. Additionally, generating 
collective sustainable impact against elements of national critical infrastructure is no small 
undertaking. The notion of a national electrical grid that could reasonably be disabled by eliminating a 
single focal point is in reality rather remote. Infrastructure is most commonly built piecemeal, over 
the span of decades, and layered with redundancies and fail-safes. When a Russian presence-based 
operation de-energized elements of the Ukrainian power grid in 2016 and 2017, the effect was limited 
and remediation took mere hours393. It is therefore difficult to generate persistent lethality – against 
equipment or persons - on a sufficient scale as to achieve significant coercion.  
At the same time, the opportunity to coerce with means beyond the physical is becoming 
increasingly attractive. In 1999, two Chinese colonels internally published a seminal book titled 
“Unrestricted Warfare”. While they are not considered authoritative sources, the book reflected at the 
time the jarring effects of the perceived American “Revolution in Military Affairs”; the coordinated 
war machine of the new era seemed world-changing394. Liang and Xiangsui’s philosophy suggested 
“…using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal 
and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interest395.” Strategic coercion was 
therefore to be accomplished by employing network warfare as a complementary yet significant 
component in a larger joint strategy.  
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WHEN AND WHERE – APPLYING FORCE TO NETWORKS  
Choosing the time and the place for a network attack extends beyond a simple targeting cycle. 
Should force be applied against deployed forces or command structure? When should sensitive, brittle 
presence-based assets be activated? What are the guidelines for pacing the use of recurring event-
based capabilities in a tactical scenario? These questions can adversely impact operational success. 
Misapplying force when it is neither necessary or useful may mean permanently losing a capability 
that could otherwise incur significant costs to an enemy. As before, these are not uniquely cyber-
related issues. Strategists have long concerned themselves with several relevant aspects including 
intelligent use of capabilities via the economy of force principle, as well as examining how force 
asymmetry and geography matter. Finally, classic terminology such as Clausewitz’s centres of gravity 
will also be examined in relation to MONOs.   
Commanders and strategists should aim to maximise the economy of force, a key element of 
modern joint operations. At the heart of the principle resides the understanding that available 
resources are limited and must be applied intelligently in order to achieve victory396. Seemingly trivial 
to understand but difficult to implement at scale, efficiency is at the heart of all good strategies397. 
Expending overwhelming resources where they are unnecessary means that they may not be 
subsequently available where the odds are less favourable. Similarly, it is the economy of force that 
had historically allowed numerically disadvantaged forces to prevail against unfavourable 
circumstances398. By judiciously employing available assets, even asymmetrically weaker adversaries 
can achieve objectives. Twentieth century strategist Fuller – well known for his unyielding 
pragmatism - succinctly defined the principle by commenting; “if two opponents face each other, and 
each possesses an identical supply of force, the one who can make his force persist the longest must 
win399.” In so Fuller aptly reflected the practicalities of determining how to strategically employ 
capabilities. Their usefulness is intrinsically tied to their contextual use.    
Some MONOs are difficult to intuitively reconcile with an economy of force. As previously 
discussed, presence-based capabilities often inflict limited visible effects, require immense 
prepositioning, and are immediately expended upon first use.  Consequently, network capabilities 
almost seem orthogonal to a commander seeking reliable resources that would be made available 
when required. Aircraft is reusable after refuelling; stand-off missile stores can be steadily 
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replenished; special forces detachments are flexible and redeployable400; these circumstance 
seemingly do not align with the characteristics of cyber-warfare.  
This perception is somewhat misleading. The economy of cyber-force is occluded by looking at it as 
a single mass of possibilities; event and presence-based capabilities have different considerations for 
the economy of their use. Researchers have previously alluded to the alternate considerations of 
network capabilities, indicating for example that due to their sensitivity, commanders are encouraged 
to first expend their least valuable capabilities first401. If force itself manifests differently in intangible 
warfare, it stands to reason that the economic distribution of force would similarly display in other 
ways. Presence-based operations can offer either sustained, low-yield deceptive force, or a single burst 
of visible strategic effect. Event-based attacks – similar to their kinetic counterparts – may offer 
recurring, gradually diminishing employments of force when deployed intelligently alongside other 
capabilities. Economic use can still be attained, but the considerations for achieving it are different 
between the two categories. 
Presence-based operations indeed do not conform to conventional perceptions of economy of 
force. With non-negligible odds of failure, they lack the visceral reliability of many kinetic capabilities. 
Premature detection of offensive intent prior to the effects phase could result in a complete loss of 
operational capability402. However, successfully activating an effect at an opportune moment can 
result in a high-yield effect that could alter the entire operational calculus. As such, presence-based 
capabilities should not be ignored; they simply must be properly accounted for403. Indeed, as 
previously suggested, the economic consideration is vastly different if deploying presence-based 
capabilities stealthily or overtly. 
A stealthy deployment of presence-based capabilities means a diffusion of the effect. A promising 
albeit non-military case study demonstrating a stealthy gradual effect is the Stuxnet malware deployed 
against the Iranian nuclear project. Rather than creating a single destructive effect against the 
centrifuge cascades within the Natanz facility, the malware deceptively influenced both software and 
hardware over an undisclosed but lengthy period of time404. The strategic effect was achieved by 
maintaining the presence phase over an extended timescale, dispensing an effect in a controlled, 
diffused fashion. It is a useful example of how operations can represent a highly economic use of 
limited force; comparable military scenarios could have significant utility.  
Alternatively, an overt effects phase for a presence-based operation can result in a single-shot, 
high-yield effect. Expending such a capability may represent the culmination of years of operational 
effort to pursue a single operational or strategic objective. One such plausible scenario would be a 
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wide-scale sudden disruption of military satellites servicing an operational theatre. Such an attack 
could impair navigation, targeting, and intelligence efforts, all crucial in combat operations. However, 
activating such a capability would nearly ensure its detection, thereby allowing defenders to eventually 
expunge the malicious presence out of their networks. Such an attack would therefore best be 
employed alongside a massive kinetic effort, preferably one that capitalises on the new weakness 
exposed as a result of the offensive.   
Maritime vessel collisions highlighted the fallibility of navy assets. In 2017 alone, several incidents 
involving US Navy destroyers resulted in severe damage and casualties. Issuing an investigation 
report, the Navy concluded that a series of human error and sub-par operating procedures resulted in 
the crashes405. Simply put, onboard staff failed to correctly operate systems according to established 
procedures. While this does not immediately indicate that network or software vulnerabilities are 
present, it alludes that tampering with shipboard systems may well go unnoticed, with human 
verification methods insufficient to prevent even catastrophic collisions with unrelated civilian 
vessels. Were a capability to tamper with shipboard telemetry and navigation exist, engaging it in the 
early phases of combat could result in a significant operational gain.   
An event-based capability should be able to repeatedly dispense its payload against different 
targets. For example, a protocol denial of service MONO targeting tactical communication networks 
by flooding them with superfluous control messages could degrade the operational capacity of local 
units406. While such a capability is inherently more robust and reusable, diminishing returns are 
expected as local forces eventually realign, adopt evasive procedures and attempt to mitigate the 
attack in various ways. Thus, while repeat uses are available, judicious dispensing of the capability is 
advised as to avoid the eventual inoculation by defending forces.  
The most straightforward answer to “where should force be applied to networks” is “where it 
counts”. While this might appear trivial, doing so effectively is subtly difficult. As previously 
discussed407, identifying and prioritising virtual targets can be a laborious affair requiring high-quality 
intelligence and intimate familiarity with the adversary. While networks and digital links may seem 
more abstract than their physical counterparts, the intelligent application of force to adversary weak 
points is not new. Much like other military principles, effective targeting that will result in substantive 
impact has long since been the desire of tacticians and strategists alike. One of the oldest yet most 
renowned conceptualisations of this desire is Clausewitz’s centres of gravity.  
A centre of gravity is merely where military forces are concentrated en masse so that a successful 
strike against would result in an effect permeating all enemy warfighting efforts408. Adopted by many 
subsequent strategists, each had either built upon the original definition or altered it to suit their 
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messaging409. As various balance-upsetting technologies emerged, theorists were inclined to believe 
that it could be used to directly strike at enemy centres of gravity, bypassing forces set to defend them 
and directly dealing a crushing blow. 
Intangible warfare gradually led to the emergence of new centres of gravity410. As modern military 
forces became reliant on continuous data feeds, situational awareness, and instantaneous 
communication, striking the operational core of these became an operational objective. While agility 
may allow well-trained forces to recover relatively quickly, within the course of an engagement 
blinding or confusing an enemy could now prove crucial. If the modern joint operations military is an 
organism, the command core is its heart and communication networks its arteries. A successful attack 
against the core could result in systemic failure across the entire organism. At the same time, analysis 
must be cautious not to misappropriate the significance of mass in Clausewitz’s centres of gravity. 
When Conti and Raymond listed their own “cyber centres gravity” – they included supply chains and 
telecom infrastructure411. While logistics and infrastructure represent high-value targets, they are not 
per se a concentration of mass.   
Centres of gravity are often conflated with Jomini’s decisive points. Where the former concept 
represents the concentration of warfighting mass, the latter relates to any location or target which – if 
attacked – would result in substantial effects412. Centres of gravity are often not directly targeted in 
warfare, as they are by definition hard targets and challenging to overwhelm, thus representing an 
unfavourable choice for direct attack413. Instead, decisive points could be logistics, communications, 
or border zones for which an attack could adversely affect the centre of gravity. Rather uniquely, 
cyber-warfare changes that calculus; centres of gravity and decisive points now frequently overlap and 
are attractive targets. New networked centres of gravity have now become viable decisive points, as a 
limited application of network force could result in highly substantive effects without committing to 
an unfavourable direct military clash.  
Targeting an enemy’s information centre of gravity with an offensive network operation could 
theoretically permit bypassing its fielded military forces altogether414 – at least initially. While 
Clausewitz initially considered such centres as mere amassments of enemy force, they can be viewed 
through a modern prism as targets which – if attacked – would cause a cascading effect extending well 
beyond the target. Attacking an informational centre of gravity can disrupt lines of communication 
and control and increase the debilitating significance of what Clausewitz called the “fog of war”415.  
Opposing forces are rarely at parity; asymmetry is nearly always assured. Even in a seemingly bi-
polar circumstance such as the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were never equal in 
their capabilities. Soviet technology proved immensely capable at ballistic missile technology, while 
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the United States was unparalleled in its adoption of computerisation. Adversarial asymmetry is 
fundamental to warfare both historically and in modern circumstances, and can manifest equally both 
in materiel, troop quantities and even will416. However – and as history instructs – conventional 
overall weakness does not necessarily mean defeat. Even staunch proponents of numerical superiority 
such as Clausewitz recognised that overall numbers may not be necessary. It is the ability to bring 
superior numbers to decisive engagements in conflict that epitomizes an effective strategy417. Other 
strategists recognised that numbers may not be necessary at all, as long as the capacity of the enemy 
to employ them is degraded.  
Strategists have focused heavily on nullifying adversary advantages and through that minimising 
asymmetries. What is strong could be made weak, perhaps even prior to conflict. As Sun Tzu put it; 
“Though the enemy may be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting418.” When 
Chinese officers reviewed the performance of American war efforts in the first Gulf War, they reacted 
with alarm to the gaping chasm that has opened between the US forces and all their would-be 
adversaries419. The only way to contest such a force would be through the adoption of innovative 
capabilities that would negate American network-centre warfare, thus reducing the effective ability of 
US forces to bring their forces to bear. Insurgencies such as in Afghanistan or Iraq and sub-state 
entities such as the Palestinian Hamas have tacitly embraced such an approach as a core tenet of 
conflict: In the absence of conventional might – innovate.  
Cyber-warfare draws heavily on asymmetries. Where there is parity between adversaries, cyber-
warfare can occasionally be used to tip the balance. Offensive network operations can be used by a 
conventionally weaker adversary to reduce technology-centric power discrepancies. They could also be 
used by an asymmetrically potent force to capitalise on technological superiority to shatter already 
weaker network defences. It could even be used to generate false asymmetries, by altering adversary 
perceptions of available forces. Quite simply and in contrary to some conventional wisdom, cyber-
warfare is not necessarily the toolset of the weak. It is simply a versatile toolset. 
One possible use for presence-based operations is by insurgents. Conventionally disadvantaged, 
insurgencies often rely on creative application of force to create disproportional effects against a 
stronger adversary. Instead of tangling directly with massed forces, gradually bleeding the enemy can 
eventually result in unacceptable costs. However, in order to do so, insurgent forces must successfully 
degrade or subvert technological advances held by the stronger party. Offensive network operations 
offer an interesting opportunity to do so. Perhaps this has yet to happen as most modern insurgencies 
have occurred in countries traditionally bereft of significant internet penetration. A lack of familiarity 
and expertise means that targeting valuable networks becomes unfeasible. Yet, circumstance would 
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differ were an insurgency to occur within a more technologically capable nation. This is not a purely 
theoretical scenario; the spectre of conflict against nations such as Estonia and Iran is not unrealistic.  
In 2014, 25-year-old British man Sean Caffrey successfully compromised a US Department of 
Defense satellite network used to communicate with global partners and personnel420. The Enhanced 
Mobile Satellite Services (EMSS) allowed dispersed assets to securely communicate using commercial 
infrastructure. At the time, Caffrey satiated his curiosity by publicly releasing a list of 30,000 phone 
numbers and the details of 800 network users. Were such a compromise to have taken place by a 
hostile threat actor – the result could range from assisting in gathering targeting intelligence on local 
personnel to compromising details on planned operations. In times of conflict, the network and its 
neighbours could have found themselves targeted by a MONO seeking to disable or influence them. It 
clearly did not require significant expertise or dedicated resources in order to successfully target the 
military network.   
Networks may transcend geography but they ultimately remain subordinate to it. While 
information is carried globally at tremendous speed and volume, traffic facilitated by a physical 
infrastructure421. Impair the infrastructure, and the virtual component would be similarly impaired. 
Thus, while the US and its NATO allies have deemed cyberspace as an independent domain of 
warfare, it is in fact the penultimate one which permeates through all others. Land, sea, air and space 
all facilitates the transit of networks, and consequently one can attack the latter through one of the 
former. US doctrinal documents themselves acknowledge this approach, with diagrams of the modern 
operational environment visualising cyberspace as interwoven into all physical domains422. 
It is difficult to wholly sever most nations’ connection to the global internet. Difficult, but not 
altogether impossible423. In many cases, nations rely on several high-volume fibre-optic cables to carry 
the bulk of their internet traffic beyond their borders. Consequently, severing these crucial data 
arteries could effectively cripple a nation’s access to the internet, as providers would be forced to fall 
back to limited-bandwidth, high-cost solutions such as satellite connections.  One such notable 
incident occurred in 2008, in which two distant undersea cables carrying much of the Middle East’s 
internet traffic were severed, supposedly by a combination of inclement weather and wayward ship 
anchors424. The result was staggering; Egypt reportedly lost 70 percent of its internet traffic, while 
other nations similarly suffered. A decade later, United States officials reported with alarm increased 
activity by Russian submarines as they prowl known undersea cable routes425. The risk to internet 
infrastructure remains substantial. 
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The geographic aspect of network warfare creates new complications. Beyond the general risk of 
collateral effect, attacks against networks risk unintended damage against third parties. This is a 
plausible prospect; militaries often rely on civilian telecommunications infrastructure. Public global 
infrastructure used for military purposes is often shared by multiple other countries for civilian use426. 
Attacking infrastructure or even information conduits such as local satellites or optical fibre trunks 
can cause significant damage that extends far beyond the parties at conflict.  
Intentionally co-opting third parties is also a significant risk. Stationing military equipment on 
foreign soil is both highly visible and nearly impossible to carry out at scale without overt permission 
from the hosting country. Conversely, offensive cyber capabilities could easily use third-party servers 
without the knowledge of these nations. It raises key issues of complicity when one party to a conflict 
is attacked through an unwitting intermediate427. It can be challenging for a victim to assess the 
willing co-operation of the intermediate, or even the degree of control that the attacker has over the 
third-party assets428. There is therefore a substantial risk of drawing additional participants into 
conflict, thereby intentionally or unintentionally increasing the scale of war. 
A small preview of the dangers of network geography can be seen in the 2008 Russo-Georgian 
War. The conflict offers a rudimentary example of offensive network operations due to the then-
nascence of Russian doctrine and the technological limitations of the Georgian network 
infrastructure429. Yet, one incident stands out. After a denial of service attack knocked out Georgian 
government websites, they were relocated to civilian US jurisdiction to avoid follow-up attacks. The 
websites however were not hosted by the US government, but rather by a small privately-held 
company named Tulip Systems430. By any kinetic equivalent, this could potentially then expose the 
company, its assets, and peripheral providers to attack by both the Russian government and its 
supposedly unaffiliated hacktivist supporters. Were subsequent attacks to occur with damage incurred 
to US infrastructure, it could indeed evoke undesired consequences.  
WHAT AND HOW – MANOEUVRES 
Absent physical assets, manoeuvring manifests different in network warfare. As the US officially 
defines it, a manoeuvre entails moving materiel and personnel to an advantageous position in respect 
to the adversary. This may or may not be in tandem with an actual effect431. Networks sidestep many 
physical constraints, but all notion of manoeuvring is not inherently rendered obsolete. Examining 
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how timeless concepts in operational manoeuvring such as surprise, deception, and destruction apply 
to network warfare reveals an organic fit with historic strategic thought. 
Many of the core characteristics of manoeuvring remain uniquely useful to network warfare. By 
electing to integrate observations on MONOs with classic terminology used to describe kinetic 
warfare, supporting joint operations and facilitating meaningful battlefield effects becomes more 
feasible. If senior military leadership can reflect on how surprise, deception, speed, destruction, and 
centres of gravity translate to network warfare, they will be far better positioned to incorporate such 
tools into their pursuit of objectives. Understanding how manoeuvres in cyber-warfare differ or not 
from kinetic warfare can promote their responsible use.   
Achieving surprise is an ambitious but worthy goal. Liddell-Hart had labelled attaining surprise as 
one of the most vital elements in war432, and Clausewitz placed it “at the foundation of all 
undertakings433.” It is a quintessentially timeless aspect of warfare, referring to the art of attacking an 
unsuspecting target at an unexpected time434. Tactical surprise entails forcing an adversary into a 
localised battle under suboptimal conditions to the enemy. Strategic surprise is achieved if the actual 
state of war has been unexpectedly forced upon an enemy, thereby causing disadvantageous resource 
allocation, disposition of forces, state of readiness, and overall capacity for defence.  
Attaining tactical surprise is commonplace whereas strategic surprise is a far more difficult ruse - 
yet potentially one of a far more significant payoff435. The practicality of strategic surprise has been 
called into question; how can sizeable troop movements and marshalling for war be performed 
without alerting the intended victim and triggering an escalatory cycle? Clausewitz himself wondered 
as much, as he wrote that “In idea [surprise] promises a great deal; in the execution its generation 
sticks fast by the friction of the whole machine. In tactics the surprise is much more at home… it rarely 
happens that one state surprises another by a war436.”  
Strategic surprise is not unheard of. In 1973 - still aloof from former victories and discarding 
numerous warning signs – Israel was simultaneously attacked on multiple fronts by Syrian and 
Egyptian forces. Despite intelligence to the contrary, massed forces were incorrectly assessed to be 
participating in large-scale drills. What came to be locally known in Israel as the Yom Kippur War was 
a resounding strategic surprise, which resulted in massive initial casualties. While the Israeli Defense 
Forces eventually recovered, memories of the successful ruse remain a painful national scar.  
In presence-based operations, surprise may manifest as a prelude to the opening salvo of conflict. 
To mask large-scale movement of forces or the intent to attack, MONOs may be used to disable or 
otherwise degrade early warning and situational awareness systems. Alternatively, targeting military 
equipment may reduce available adversary assets, while targeting infrastructure could sow useful 
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chaos. This would then allow attacking kinetic forces to operate with relative impunity, increasing the 
odds that a gambit at strategic surprise may succeed. As a result of their extensive clandestine pre-
positioning, presence-based operations are highly congruent with the strategic principle of surprise.  
In event-based operations, surprise may be limited to a tactical play. A MONO against local assets 
could be used to increase the fog of war, thereby facilitating manoeuvres that would otherwise result 
in direct engagement with an adversary[TKTK – include reference from class, session 10]. As MONOs 
do not necessarily generate visible effects, they could even avoid tipping victims off to having been 
attacked, thereby affording kinetic units to surprise an already-degraded enemy. By targeting 
networks, it now becomes viable to initiate hostile contact while one party remains unaware.   
Clever use of deception can help capitalise on advantages or reduce disadvantages. History and 
strategy are particularly instructive on the value of deception to strategy and operations. Strategic 
thought on deception includes Sun Tzu’s well-known mantra that “all warfare is based on 
deception437”, Machiavelli’s predilection to pragmatic deceit438, and Clausewitz’s remarks on 
attempting “…to lead the enemy to make a false conclusion439” as a key part of offense. Modern 
observers have correctly identified deception as particularly potent when applied to cyber-warfare440, 
as the potential impact on the trust between man and machine could be highly significant.  
Deception in cyber-warfare entails fooling both man and machine by targeting the latter. Barring 
future advancements in artificial intelligence, deceiving devices may be accomplished by tampering 
with sensory inputs, thus causing them to predictably to generate false output441. A machine 
inherently has no reason to doubt its trusted pipelines of information unless explicitly instructed to do 
so and may accept false input as real as long as it is constructed and authorised correctly. Much like 
deploying inflatable tanks to fool spotters, creating a digital equivalent of an optical or aural illusion 
can be useful. It is in recurring success where deception becomes difficult. As Libicki noted in his 
scepticism of its overall utility, if the deceptive component of a network attack is detected it becomes 
far less likely to be subsequently successful442. Much like with malware itself, detection of deception 
means inoculation. Where deployed tank dummies may continuously foil adversary reconnaissance 
efforts until sensory technology is improved, network deception is far more difficult to maintain.  
The tenuous recurring value of deception is not unique to intangible warfare. As Freedman notes, 
even as the ancient Greeks introduced strategists to “cunning” as an element of war, they similarly 
revealed that an overreliance on deception would offer diminishing returns443. As an adversary 
became gradually more aware of being manipulated, deception itself as an operational effect would 
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become less impactful. Much like other characteristics of network warfare this is still true today, if 
exasperated greatly.  Deception on its own will not result in victory444.   
Classic strategy as envisioned by Clausewitz enshrines the destruction of enemy forces as the only 
meaningful way of attaining strategic victory. All other pursuits in war are peripheral to the practice of 
taking lives and destroying materiel445. This notion may at first seem intrinsically hostile to network 
operations, where offensives may impair systems but rarely exact a physical cost. But even Clausewitz 
– a rather extreme figure in his adherence for force destruction – acknowledged that impairing the 
capacity and collective will to fight is similarly crucial to success, as “…nothing obliges us to confine 
this idea [of destruction] to the mere physical force; … the moral is necessarily implied as well446.” 
Whether destruction is a mandated part of all offensive capabilities is up to debate. While 
Clausewitz was famously focused on activities eventually coalescing around adversary force 
destruction, some historians such as Delbruck delineated well between a strategy of annihilation and a 
strategy of exhaustion447. Others such as British strategist Corbett recognised that even in Clausewitz’s 
writings, strategy did not singularly need to focus on decisive battlefield victories by way of destructive 
force448.   
Network attacks offer an interesting dichotomy of destruction; they are simultaneously capable of 
immense collateral damage and unprecedented pinpoint accuracy. Both considerations are worth 
separately unpacking, as they both must be considered when choosing to employ MONOs against a 
target. Applied correctly, modern intangible warfare can be the “ultimate precision weapon”, as 
labelled by Rattray449. Indeed, the gradual increase in precision targeting is a fulfilment of the 
underlying premise of technology-assisted warfare450; cyber is merely the continuation of this trend. 
As the previous chapter detailed, the elaborate targeting cycles of presence-based operations support 
this notion. Operations include extensive periods of lingering within adversary networks and 
conducting repeat micro-targeting cycles against specific servers.  Offensive payloads must be 
specifically crafted and configured to work against the target. As a result, the surgical fitting of 
payload to effect451 implies peerless specificity and control over the intended impact.  
Collateral damage exceeding the intended targets is a nearly unavoidable risk in network 
warfare452. Even a seemingly localised event-based effect can escape its operational boundaries and 
potentially wreak havoc on a wide scale if improperly developed and constrained453. As US doctrine 
acknowledges, “collateral damage from this type of attack is not always predictable454”’. For event-
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based attacks, a cascading destructive attack against a local network might permeate well beyond it if 
operators are not cautious. Considering the modern battlefield often relies on dual-use infrastructure 
shared between military forces and civilian population, the result can be a catastrophic loss of internet 
access or data that would be difficult to leash once activated. The 2017 NotPetya worm - originally 
targeting Ukrainian servers and computers – quickly led to a blaze of infections that resulted in digital 
damage to many thousands of devices worldwide455. For presence-based attacks, engaging destructive 
payload against an identified networked centre of gravity can similarly have unexpected 
consequences. In one example, an overly-successful attack against military aviation could have 
ramifications on civilian aviation, as a result of data-sharing conduits or collaborative air traffic 
monitoring services.   
Network attacks are often disregarded as they result in transient effects456, further compounding 
their effective use. Weapons seemingly have limited utility have if their effects are primarily 
ephemeral, making them potentially unreliable. Deconstructing this argument, we are left with three 
contestable claims; (1) that the effect is disruptive rather than overtly destructive; (2) that damage 
applied to software is easily recoverable; and (3) that the weapon viability itself is transient. All three 
are worth deconstructing in turn. 
Disruptive attacks may still have immense value, strategic or otherwise. On the campaign scale, a 
well-positioned presence-based attack can enable strategic surprise, as occluding adversary sensor 
grids can introduce sufficient delay into an adversary’s decision-making cycle can cause an incoming 
opening salvo to go unnoticed. A failure to scramble defenders due to disrupted intelligence can result 
in a hefty strategic cost, redistributing relative advantages and potentially knocking out assets that 
would otherwise come into play. Event-based attacks can similarly be used to create a temporary 
breakdown in command and control, thereby facilitating kinetic strikes. 
Overall damage from network-warfare is indeed often easier to recover from. Physical effects from 
such attacks are a rarity. Principles of network resilience, which include the use of redundancies, 
backups, and emergency procedures should in theory reduce the destructive value of software attacks. 
However, military conflict unfolds at a rapid pace. Once an attack has taken place, recovery would still 
take precious time, during which the impacted system will be inactive. In some cases, theatre-
deployed assets to do not have the means to completely restore their own software. Consider a navy 
destroyer that suffers from a catastrophic corruption of its shipboard systems. As shipboard-staff are 
merely operators of weapon platforms developed in the defence industry, special expert staff would be 
required to restore the ship to functionality. In such cases, this would require a costly trip back to a 
friendly port, where an extensive repair and readiness cycle would be undertaken to recover ship 
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functionality. By the time the ship is ready to re-enter the conflict, it may have already missed it 
entirely. 
The notion that offensive network capabilities are transitory stems from the idea that detection 
means inoculation. As previously discussed, this is true in some cases but not all. As Max Smeets 
notes, well-resourced forces can mitigate the perishability of their offensive capabilities by investing in 
robust, modular, and difficult to detect platforms457. This in turn can be applied to the typology used 
in this thesis. Event-based capabilities would rely on hard to patch or systemic vulnerabilities that are 
not easily mitigated. Presence-based operations would attempt to ensure operational security so that 
capabilities are not wholly compromised when used.   
Wars rarely occur on conveniently open battlefields. Where once rows of infantry and cavalry 
would bear down upon similarly ordered enemy hosts we now see urban warfare, standoff weapons 
and multi-domain combat theatres. Indeed, this is one of the most pervasive criticisms of Clausewitz’s 
classic tenets on applying maximum force to an adversary’s concentration of military power; it seems 
a distinctly inefficient way of conducting modern warfare. Clausewitz criticised the notion that victory 
could be attained “…by means of small but extremely well-directed blows to produce such paralysation 
of the enemy’s forces…458”.  But as technology created new asymmetries and the means to effectively 
manoeuvre around defences, it became less clear cut.   
Having more troops to field classically translates to an increased chance of strategic success459. 
However, it was always assumed that numerical superiority cannot always be assured. In some 
conflicts, especially those forced upon an enemy by a challenger of superior positioning, numerical 
superiority is simply unattainable. Yet one does not need to always have the numerical advantage; it 
may be sufficient to possess it at key operational moments within war460. Rather than amass numbers, 
the eventual goal became the “concentration of strength against weakness”, as Liddell-Hart aptly 
described it461.  
Cyber-warfare presents a key opportunity to conduct what Liddell-Hart famously called the 
indirect approach462. The concept is seemingly quite basic; avoid direct engagement with an enemy’s 
massed front, instead opting to subvert defences and advantages by locating weak points. Possibilities 
include attacking under-protected flanks and capitalising on elements such as surprise.  These options 
allow military planners to maximise force projection, prevent unnecessary casualties, and potentially 
even shorten the duration of conflict463. While often lauded for the term’s inception, Liddell-Hart 
certainly did not give birth to the overall strategy of avoiding direct conflict. Sun Tzu already favoured 
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a combination of direct and indirect manoeuvres, as he believed that the combination of both is 
paramount to ensuring overall victory464.   
Presence-based operations are intrinsically about bypassing defences. The process of clandestinely 
intruding upon enemy networks and prepositioning assets overtly indicates a desire to silently avoid 
network defences. The logic for this is quite simple; friction with defensive lines means detection, and 
detection is the bane of presence-based operations. Thus, such operations are best served to facilitate 
indirect advantages.   
Presence-based operations can also create altogether new flanks465. A successful compromise of a 
command and control centre can create situational blind spots by reducing the enemy’s capacity to 
react or by causing it to falsely redistribute its attention. Similarly, a successful compromise of 
logistics or maintenance infrastructure may affect the deployment of forces, thereby reducing the 
capacity of the force to act jointly. Network operations can therefore facilitate a weakening of massed 
forces, either by degrading the front or opening undefended pockets that could then be targeted for 
indirect attack by conventional forces. Thus - if integrated correctly - presence-based operations may 
be the quintessential enabler of Liddell-Hart’s indirect approach.  
A key element in manoeuvres is agility. In warfare, agility commonly pertains to the effectiveness 
in which a combatant can shift from one circumstance to another; it is a measure of dynamics466. 
Circumstances include both purposeful and unexpected changes between states. The former can occur 
simply when trying to adapt from one operational scenario to another, while the latter occurs when 
entities are forced to adapt to a change. Agility is thus a measure of speed, adaptability, and 
resilience467.  
Agility is heavily addressed in modern warfare doctrine as a prerequisite for conducting effective 
joint operations468. The rise of network-centric warfare emphasising the deep fusion of technology 
with the decision-making process means that the operational tempo has markedly increased, thereby 
requiring all participating forces to be increasingly agile to keep up469. Concurrent sensory input from 
dozens of sensors both local and remote can assist in engaging numerous targets in rapid succession 
or even simultaneously. Forces must be able to respond, redeploy, and in some cases switch payloads 
to be able to fulfil an entirely different mission package. Agility may also occur on a strategic scale; the 
sudden need to respond military to an escalating situation may require disparate forces to suddenly 
and wholly realign priorities.  
Agility is particularly fascinating as it is one of the key areas in which event and presence-based 
operations differ. Agility for event-based operations reflects one of the greatest difficulties in offensive 
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network operations; they have to be robust. No matter the circumstance, whenever an operator “fires” 
an event-based capability at an adversary, it must work. This is particularly difficult due to the 
inherent sensitivity of malicious software to minute changes in the adversary environment. If the 
vulnerability it exploits is no longer present, or if the attacked platform is configured differently than 
what the attack tool needs in order to function, it may cause an unexpected effect or altogether fail. 
Thus, even the most specific event-based attack capability has to be agile in order to foster 
commander trust and be properly integrated into operational planning. An unreliable capability is one 
that will not be chosen when the need arises.  
Presence-based operations initially appear almost antithetical to agility. Requiring extensive pre-
positioning, tailor-made attack tools, highly-focused intelligence, and almost no reusability, such 
capabilities seem intrinsically hostile to a high-paced operational environment, in which “...forces 
must be prepared to transition rapidly from one type of operation to another470”. This is indeed one of 
the key reasons why they are best suited for strategic or theatre-level effects rather than localised 
operations which experience more variable changes in circumstance. 
Albeit differently, agility can still manifest for presence-based operations. Rather than flexibility at 
the operational level, presence-based agility can manifest as robustness and modularity of the 
attacking infrastructure itself. Often, high-quality nation-state malware is modular in nature471, 
indicating a strategic understanding that a flexible, modular tool could be adapted to specific needs as 
an operation unfolds. The intrusion and lateral movement mechanisms may stay the same, with attack 
modules developed and deployed as required for specific target types. By strategically investing in 
such capabilities, military planners can shorten the time it takes to develop an operational solution 
against a high-value presence-based target once it is compromised. Agility remains relevant, but 
relates to an entirely different scale of time.   
CONCLUSIONS 
Novelty should not prevent utility. Accrued strategic thinking can contribute vastly towards 
understanding the opportunities and limitations of offensive cyber capabilities if applied in 
meaningful ways. The challenge resides in embracing the unusual circumstances of operating through 
and against networks. There is no denying that the lack of a kinetic component forces a substantial 
change in approach. Centres of gravity are different; the meaning of the manoeuvre thus changes as 
well. Military strategy can apply to these, it simply applies in other ways. 
This chapter is certainly not the first text to suggest that offensive network operations can be 
utilised across different planes of military thought – the strategic, the operational and the tactical. The 
meeting of two crucial axes – the event/presence-based approach and the application of historical 
military thinking – are what make this contribution unique. This chapter did not seek to contradict 
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previous findings but rather channel them further in meaningful ways. By further distinguishing 
between operational types using a helpful taxonomy, two decidedly different operational approaches 
emerge. Both approaches have their own set of circumstances distinct to them, both can and should be 
used by distinct operators for diverse purposes.  
Presence-based operations are naturally incongruent with a battlefield tempo. Their targeting 
phase is ponderous, and they require significant prepositioning. Establishing even a single presence-
based capability against a hardened target of military value can take many months. However, once 
established, high-level command staff must be aware of the potential strategic utility of such 
capabilities. If a deceptive element can be incorporated into the activation phase, its effects could 
possibly stretch on for the duration of the conflict. Subtle malicious manipulation of command and 
control telemetry, or minute disturbances in targeting latency could wreak havoc across an entire 
operational theatre. Conversely, if protracting the engagement is not feasible, a single activation burst 
could similarly prove lethal in the earlier stages of conflict. Fully blinding satellite communications as 
a result of a network attack could significantly degrade operational capacity until its restored, possibly 
even taking days to do so. Such a stretch of time is critical at the onset of combat operations. 
Event-based operations can and should be delivered to deployed units. Where offensive cyber cells 
operate, they should have pre-packaged, resilient tools for their use. Such capabilities could allow 
them to temporarily degrade tactical communication networks, wipe local adversary networks, or 
blind vehicle-borne systems used by aircraft, maritime vessels and ground forces. As adversaries 
become increasingly networked themselves, their cyber-attack surface commensurately grows. It is 
increasingly becoming possible to weaponise the adversary against itself; one only needs to target the 
systems that have become its operational crutches.  
The infatuation of modern militaries with technology resulted in capability-based strategies rather 
than strategy-contributing capabilities. Originally a twentieth century phenomenon, the desire to 
offset adversary advantages by winning technologically is untenable in network operations. 
Overreliance on air superiority arguably resulted in degradation of capacity to effectively hold 
territory. Adoption of drones and remote strikes similarly increased the distance between decision 
makers and the battlefield, resulting in protracted, gainless conflict. We must not repeat mistakes with 
network capabilities. 
Strategic coercion of an adversary will not likely occur as a result of overwhelming its networks. 
Instead, understanding the centrality of networks to modern life and combat operations means 
identifying how centres of gravity have now uniquely become targetable. Where forces shunned 
concentrations of military mass, network operators seek the convergence of command and control. 
These hubs of activity are prime targets, potentially presenting an enormous strategic benefit with 
relatively minimal risk to materiel. 
Cyber is also not the full answer to resolving conventional asymmetries. A substantially weaker 
nation is not substantially more likely to achieve victory by simply applying force against a stronger 
enemy’s networks. To effectively minimize adversary asymmetries by way of degrading their ability to 
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conduct joint warfare requires vast organizational efforts that are often beyond the reach of weaker 
nation. At the same time, traditionally potent actors such as the United States, Russia, and the 
People’s Republic of China are all thoroughly leading offensive cyber doctrine. Instead of decreasing 
asymmetries, powerful actors could use offensive network capabilities to increase them. Weaker 
parties to conflict also have less resources to spend on network defense and secure development of 
military resources. That means they must rely on commercially available solutions, imported military 
equipment, and aging hardware. As a result, such parties may find themselves on the receiving end of 
persistent network attacks rather than effectively delivering them. 
A trinity of traditional military concepts – surprise, deception, and destruction – is enlightening. 
Tracing their origins back to the earliest days of warfare, network operations are intrinsically geared 
towards surprise and deception. Extensive prepositioning of operational assets and the ability to 
subtly manipulate software and sensors are conducive to the same principles of subterfuge offered by 
Sun Tzu. As hardware destruction by way of software attacks is difficult, the metrics must simply be 
calibrated to account for digital destruction and physical disruption. These can be accomplished at 
unprecedented scale, yielding effects ranging from small tactical disturbances to widescale strategic 
disruption of capacity to operate. 
Offensive network operations are immensely useful to all manner of operations, to aggressors both 
disadvantaged and dominant. It is the discourse that counts; the involvement of intelligence, network 
operators, weapon developers, military command, battlefield staff, and policy makers is mandated to 
create effective doctrine. By separating the capabilities to event and presence based, it assists in 
overcoming several existing issues, yet others will remain. Overcoming challenges is a long and 
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5. AMERICAN CYBER SUPERIORITY 
OVERVIEW 
In the twentieth century the United States had led the charge in technology-enabled military 
strategy. It had culminated in the 1991 Gulf War, viewed with surprise and consternation by global 
adversaries who realised the discrepancy between US technological prowess and their own. Even as 
other global powers acquired increasingly advanced technologies, the capability to target information 
networks at scale seemed a distinctly US advantage. Information leaked from several high-profile 
incidents shone a crucial light at how developed the US technological capacity to wage network 
warfare truly is; developing offensive platforms, encroaching on adversary networks, researching 
equipment used by enemies, and creating subtle yet significant effects. Yet as before, the US has led by 
technology rather by strategy; the former continues to precede the latter, creating mismatched 
capabilities and a lack of coherence on how to achieve goals with MONOs.  
Documentation on the US approach to “cyber” as an operational space is vast. It includes policy 
directives, national strategy documents, doctrinal publications both general and service-specific, and 
significant coverage of various programs advancing MONOs as means to generate effects. Alongside 
publications, private-sector research has uncovered several network intrusion campaigns commonly 
associated with the US, including toolsets presumably employed by the NSA, CIA, and elements of the 
military. Overall, US coverage of all matters cyber offers a rare, unique glimpse into the evolution of a 
discipline within the US military. This affords a critical overview of both high and low points of the US 
approach to network operations. 
The US de-facto leads the school of thought envisioning “cyber” as an independent combatant 
domain. The domain approach entails observing all efforts to attack and defend networks as 
doctrinally and operationally distinct from the other – physical - domains. While US doctrine clearly 
and loudly identifies the interdependence between networks and the physical domains, it maintains 
that the former requires separate command from the latter. These efforts have resulted in an intricate 
amalgamation between cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations in which it is unclear 
where one begins and the other ends due to the numerous overlaps between the three disciplines. The 
American approach has both advantages and disadvantages, but could nevertheless benefit from the 
distinction between event and presence-based capabilities to provide commanders with options while 
retaining the strategic sensitivity of presence-based operations. 
A 2015 Defense Science Board (DSB) report highlighted the dangers of lumping all MONOs under 
the same framework. The report definitively stated that “…the United States must maintain – and be 
seen to maintain – an array of scalable offensive cyber capabilities – including high-impact strategic 
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cyber attack options – as an integral part of its cyber deterrence posture472.” The DSB conflated the 
robustness of a partly-visible event-based attack capability and strategic presence-based capabilities 
that must inherently remain covert. The report then claimed that “Unlike precision-guided munitions, 
cyber weapons cannot be bought and deployed on a delivery system… with confidence that they will 
work when needed. A highly talented cadre of cyber warriors must work together closely with 
intelligence specialists and technologists in a highly classified environment473.” This remark 
disregarded the potential of utility of deployable event-based capabilities which already exist within 
the US arsenal, while assuming that all MONOs must remain under the purview of remote operators 
within intelligence units.  
This chapter will present the argument that the US is technologically well-positioned to conduct 
MONOs, but a rigid approach to cyber as a domain limits effective integration.  The United States 
has both the operational experience, technical expertise, and high-quality intelligence required to be 
consistently successful in employing MONOs. Simultaneously, a reoccurring predilection for a 
technology-first strategy means that capabilities are often created as detached from considerations of 
need or the requirements of the forces who may eventually employ them. A well-developed, co-opted 
national defence industry is fully capable of crafting packaged event-based capabilities that could then 
be delivered to deployed forces. At the same time, The National Security Agency has provable 
experience both operationally in penetrating hard-to-reach network targets and developing advanced 
presence-based capabilities that could then create effects against them. Yet both have traditionally 
struggled in transparently delivering capabilities to the parties who need them based on a thorough 
understanding of the threats and opportunities. Bridging these challenges by shattering some of the 
existing boundaries between cyber and the other domains could position MONOs as contributing 
value across the spectrum of military operations. 
Even more so, the relatively advanced US approach to MONOs means that second-order 
integrations may be a viable reality. These include using MONOs to enable or deliver other network 
operations rather than just support kinetic forces and attacks. Event-based capabilities and their 
presence-based counterparts could work in tandem by having one facilitate the other, yet that requires 
an intimate familiarity with the characteristics of each, and an established trust between forces and 
their available capabilities.  
SEPARATION BY DOCTRINE 
The US approach to network warfare is one of the most publicly accessible. With experience in 
targeting digital communication that spans decades, US strategists have increasingly recognised the 
utility of pursuing networks to accomplish a broad spectrum of objectives ranging from limited 
tactical effects to broad strategic success. Mounting US attention to the operational significance of 
networks famously resulted in the 2009 creation of Cyber Command, and later in its mid-2018 
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elevation to a full “unified combatant command” thus recognising its importance towards US strategic 
success474. Even as the Pentagon dramatically reflected at the time of elevation that “the cyber domain 
will define the next century of warfare”, the specifics of how the US seeks to accomplish this are worth 
examining in depth.  
American thoroughness has resulted in laboriously crafted doctrinal maturity, enabling operating 
forces to potentially integrate a vast array of capabilities. The linchpin of US network warfare doctrine 
is Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations, a core document providing some of the standard 
definitions, objectives, and approaches all US forces are expected to implement and adhere to475. It is 
important however to note that a more complete reconstruction of US doctrine and strategy for 
MONOs can only be accomplished by reviewing other relevant documents, policy directives, 
committee hearings, technical specifications of capabilities, and leaked classified materials. 
Operating against networks is formulated in the broader context of a new US strategy for victory in 
modern conflict. This approach is perhaps most commonly presented as “Multi-Domain Battle”, an 
integrative strategy heavily favouring joint operations across multiple warfighting domains, 
incorporating asymmetric capabilities and eschewing traditional direct combat. Modern US doctrine 
has accepted that technological advancements uniquely allow adversaries to challenge US forces 
where they were traditionally perceived as vastly superior476.  Similarly, military strategy 
acknowledges the difficulties presented in overwhelming modern defences with directly applied force, 
a traditional strength of US forces in the last several decades. As written by the US Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC); “The cost of penetrating prepared enemy defenses is now too great 
for current conceptions of forward positioning and expeditionary maneuvers to effectively deter 
adversaries and prevail in armed conflict477.” This is precisely the type of challenge that MONOs may 
help ameliorate.  
US strategies consider offensive network capabilities to be key in achieving objectives in modern 
conflicts. Contributions may be direct by actioning against a target, or by otherwise enabling 
conventional forces to accomplish their missions. The Department of Defense’s previous 2015 Cyber 
Strategy already articulated this quite well as the aspiration to “build and maintain viable cyber 
options and plan to use those options to control conflict escalation and to shape the conflict 
environment at all levels478.”  This in turn supports the notion that MONOs can have measurable 
contributions to commanders in various circumstances. Within US Cyber Command’s mandate is 
                                                             
474 U.S. Department of Defense, “Cybercom to Elevate to Combatant Command,” accessed June 10, 2018, 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1511959/cybercom-to-elevate-to-combatant-command/. 
475 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations,” June 8, 2018. 
476 TRADOC, “Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040” (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, October 2017), 4–5. 
477 TRADOC, 3. 
478 U.S. Department of Defense, The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, 3. 
112 
 
  Daniel Moore 
similarly etched an understanding that they must “rapidly transfer technologies with military utility to 
scalable operational capabilities479.”  
The rich tapestry of US official documentation on MONOs indicates a comparatively firm grasp of 
the value that such capabilities may lend. Many of these were not originally intended to be publicly 
available. In 2013, NSA leaker Edward Snowden included several policy documents among the trove 
of materials released by him to media outlets. Principally relevant among those is Presidential Policy 
Directive 20 (PPD-20) on Cyberspace Operations. Cloaked in its intended classification, the document 
provided a candid view of some crucial aspects of operating in and against networks480. On the risk of 
uncontrollable cascading effects as a result of misusing MONOs, the document warns against “…cyber 
effects in locations other than the intended target, with potential unintended or collateral 
consequences that may affect US national interests in many locations481.” On the need to selectively 
employ MONOs to avoid unduly risking brittle capabilities, the policy claims that an effort must be 
made to “…identify potential targets of national importance where [Offensive Cyber Effects 
Operations] can offer a favourable balance of effectiveness and risk as compared with other 
instruments of national power482.” In respect to the possibility of attaining various levels of surprise 
and the spectrum of possibilities, the document provides a lucid articulation: 
“[Offensive Cyber Effects Operations] can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to 
advance U.S. national objectives around the world with little or no warning to the adversary or 
target and with potential effects ranging from the subtle to severely damaging.483” 
There is a substantial measure of strategic wisdom to unpack in PPD-20. Even absent of details on 
how concretely MONOs may be employed, the document directly articulates several of the strategic 
contributions that they may have, as reviewed in previous chapters. Within three pages of content, the 
directive refers to the unique economy of force consideration offered by MONOs alongside the 
dangers of detrimental collateral effects that may occur by incorrectly employing them. Similarly, the 
above quotes indicate a desire to subvert conventional centres of gravity that are increasingly proving 
resilient to US technological prowess, instead opting for an indirect approach that may carve a path 
towards coercing an adversary. Considering the seemingly limited battlefield use of MONOs by US 
forces to date and the decade-long focus of US forces on counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
these observations are remarkably apropos.  
US literature on doctrine and strategy is cascading. Documentation exists at the national level, 
which in turn leads to overarching integrated military doctrine, finally resulting in service-specific 
doctrine and strategy. Service-specific doctrine entails translating the broad criteria set at the higher 
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levels and extracting potential utility for service objectives. The Army would not operate under the 
same conditions as the Air Force, Navy, or Marines. Each have their existing concepts of operations 
(CONOPS), platforms, and procedures. It is in the service-specific doctrines where we observe the US 
at its best; the multiple layers of integrations are indicative of a comprehensive push towards having 
more MONOs be made available for combat missions.  
The aforementioned JP 3-12 doctrinal document exemplifies both the strengths and relative 
weaknesses of the US posture on MONOs. Chiefly hampering overall clarity is the odd relationship 
between “cyberspace”, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and information. As US capabilities 
deepen across the three categories, the lines between them appear increasingly blurry and the 
attempts at distinguishing between them laboured. While the document stipulates that “Cyberspace is 
wholly contained within the information environment484”, only the former is defined as a distinct 
domain while the latter is relegated to a separate publication485. Electronic warfare is shunted even 
further away as a sub-publication of information operations486.  This is particularly puzzling, as Joint 
Publication 3-13.1 on Electronic Warfare contains the following accurate qualification: 
“Since cyberspace requires both wires and wireless links to transport information, both 
offensive and defensive cyberspace operations may require use of the [electromagnetic spectrum] 
for the enabling of effects in cyberspace. Due to the complementary nature and potential 
synergistic effects of [electronic warfare] and computer network operations, they must be 
coordinated to ensure they are applied to maximize effectiveness487.” 
The dependency between the EMS, networks, and information is unbreakable. They are wholly 
dependent on one another as they merely represent different layers of the same communication 
model. In a positive indication of progress, US doctrine does indeed reflect the multi-layered approach 
to networking, though somewhat sub-optimally. Joint Publication 3-12 outlines the “cyberspace layer 
model” as comprised of three layers; a physical network layer encompassing physical hardware, 
terrain, and transmission medium; a logical network layer that refers to the links and networks that 
make up “cyberspace”; and the cyber-persona layer which reflects the actual use of information. This 
is useful to a degree, but may not serve to fully decouple networks, the EMS, and information488.  
Within the services, the Army’s implementation of network warfare is novel. Coalescing all under 
“Cyberspace electromagnetic activities”, or CEMA489, the Army has recognised the natural relationship 
between the electromagnetic spectrum as the medium, cyberspace as the networks, and information 
as the payload. The Army doctrine manual on the topic acknowledges both opportunity and risk, 
advantages and disadvantages, and how these broadly manifest, thereby offering a cautious but 
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optimistic vision as to what could be done with such capabilities both against US adversaries and 
against US assets490.  
The Navy found itself rapidly orienting to a new reality. In 2013, the service discovered a 
significant breach of their unclassified networks and immediately began investigation and 
remediation491. Under the operational moniker “Rolling Tide”, Navy network operation teams sought 
to cleanse Navy networks of foreign presence. Indicative of their perception of the intrusion, Fleet 
Cyber Commander Vice Admiral Tighe used combat vernacular to describe their experience; “we… 
fought through an adversary intrusion into Navy’s unclassified network492.” In essence, the Navy 
viewed Rolling Tide as countermeasures to a presence-based operation. Despite the intrusion focused 
on unclassified – and thereby largely non-operational – networks, the Navy consequently initiated 
deep internal reforms intended to better orient it towards cyber operations493 both defensive and 
offensive. In subsequent public content, the Navy presented its strategic plans to defend its own assets 
from network attacks, tacitly confirming both presence and event-based attack vectors that must be 
mitigated494. 
The Air Force doubled down on its framing of cyber as an independent domain and separated its 
activities into distinct commands within the service. Air Force Policy Directive 17-2 on Cyber 
Operations lists the requirements to “…execute Cyberspace Operations to support the joint warfighter 
requirements, increase effectiveness of its core missions, increase resiliency, survivability and 
cybersecurity of its information and systems, and realize efficiencies through innovative [Information 
Technology] solutions495.” This definition encompasses both offensive and defensive network 
operations, with limited language on how those could apply towards achieving these broad objectives. 
The 24th Air Force appears largely responsible for defending dedicated Air Force networks, but also 
training and preparation of “ready forces” in what ostensibly includes limited event-based capabilities. 
Conversely, Joint Force Headquarters – Cyber is responsible for execution of strategic offensive cyber 
capabilities authorised by the Secretary of Defence or the President, suggesting responsibility over 
presence-based capabilities496.  
The Department of Defense’s vision for cyberspace remains rigid and brittle. Envisioning 
“cyberspace” as a well-defined domain may initially appear promising as an approach towards lending 
clarity to an evolving doctrine. Yet, it results in a malleable reality incongruent with the department’s 
desires; cyberspace, electronic warfare and information operations all routinely bleed into one 
another within US doctrine. The result is inconsistent application and a distinct lack of transparency 
from warfighters on how to best operate within the new domain. Numerous parties share 
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responsibilities for ensuring operational success. Cyber Command has sweeping domain oversight; 
service cyber commands concentrate domain-specific integrations of network capabilities; geographic 
commands maintain ownership of joint operations within their theatres and the specific assets who 
carry them out; and the NSA retain the actual sources, technical and operational capabilities, and 
discipline required to generate adversary network effects. Activation of some MONOs requires 
presidential approval communicated by the secretary of defense497. While the requirement to do so is 
repeatedly mentioned in US doctrine498, It is immensely difficult to deconflict so many parties even in 
the best of circumstances499; it is doubly so for a domain almost wholly characterised by sensitive, 
compartmentalised offensive capabilities. 
An overly firm bureaucracy may stifle the agility required to optimise military value from 
MONOs500. Boundaries on network operations are concurrently too vague and too strict, with the 
Trump administration’s 2018 bid to loosen restrictions on MONOs currently having an unclear 
impact501. As a result, misunderstandings of their operational parameters may curtail a desire to use 
them or even the grasp of when they would contribute unique value. As McGhee articulated well in 
2016; “Ambiguous definitions that lead to a lack of understanding of cyber utility exacerbate the 
disconnect between offensive cyber operations and kinetic operations… We do not necessarily 
understand what those definitions mean, because they are not well defined502.”   
The adherence to cyber as a domain is perhaps the key element which separates the US from its 
near-peer adversaries. The distinction between electronic warfare, information operations and 
cyberspace is fuzzy beyond the point of usefulness. It is unclear when does an EW platform defeating 
an adversary system by transmitting a digital payload qualifies as a cyberattack. It is similarly unclear 
if a MONO manipulating adversary propaganda in a war zone qualifies as a cyber operation or an 
information operation. It is unclear because these distinctions are often artificial. All MONOs are 
dependent on the electromagnetic infrastructure carrying data. The network effects employed almost 
always directly impact information in some form – either by corrupting it, manipulating it, preventing 
access to it, or otherwise occluding its intended use. The three-way interplay between the 
electromagnetic spectrum, networks, and information must be a core aspect of the fundamental 
approach.  
EVENT-BASED CEMA 
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The US military holds all the pieces required to successfully use event-based operations. It trains 
and forward-deploys operators meant to augment kinetic capabilities with MONOs. It develops 
advanced platforms intended to both deliver network payloads and simplify their use. The US enjoys 
dominance of the technological landscape alongside a highly capable intelligence apparatus, thereby 
supporting the elaborate operational lifecycle required. It is likely that some high profile operations – 
particularly ones involving special forces – incorporate such capabilities to a degree. Yet, a systemic 
incorporation of MONOs across the spectrum of joint operations remain lacking.  
The divergent approach to MONO doctrine within the various US services means that 
implementation varies greatly. While the Navy and Marines publicly focus on primarily defensive 
measures, the Air Force demonstrates an evolved willingness to carry out strategic offensive network 
missions within its mandate. Yet, the one service currently indicating a desire to broadly incorporate 
event-based operations is the Army, as represented by the aforementioned CEMA doctrine503. Folding 
network activity into electromagnetic spectrum operations and electronic warfare strongly suggests a 
recognition that the practices bleed into one another and could therefore benefit from the synergy 
afforded by their combination. As a result, the US Army stands out as relatively mature in its doctrinal 
approach to event-based operations.  
The Army is currently exploring how to best extract operational value from network operations. 
Efforts have ratcheted up largely due to the realisation that after a year of counter-insurgency 
operations against poorly equipped adversaries, the US is woefully underprepared to tackle near-peer 
adversaries in electronic warfare and battlefield network operations504. Yet even as the Army searches 
for solutions, it remains hamstrung by the military-wide reality stating that “current authorities and 
policy on offensive cyber capabilities and effects are governed by the highest levels of government505.” 
This perception emanates from sensitive presence-based operations and lumps all MONOs together, 
limiting the Army’s capacity to own operational capabilities that could then be integrated. More 
nuance and distinction between event-based and presence-based capabilities at the doctrine level 
could afford the Army firmer boundaries to seek capabilities within, thereby generating opportunities 
that do not require top-echelon approvals. Even as they struggle to map out the various possibilities of 
MONOs, the Army identified networks as an adjacent and dependent space to the electromagnetic 
spectrum. At the deployed force level, this could mean event-based capabilities targeting adversary 
infrastructure, weapon platforms, and communication networks.   
Despite doctrinal difficulties, the multi-decade prominence of the NSA as a top provider of signals 
intelligence uniquely positioned US forces to both acquire a deep understanding of adversary systems 
and provide potential reach where it would otherwise be difficult to acquire. Persistent tapping of data 
arteries within the global internet grid and sensitive adversary networks means that event-based 
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operations may be carried out against these without ever introducing a presence component. Injection 
of traffic to block, manipulate or otherwise influence data streams could be a crucial vector towards 
impacting adversary networks. This may manifest in programs similar to the now-exposed NSA 
QUANTUMTHEORY project, which “…dynamically injects packets into a target’s network session to 
achieve CNE/CND/CNA network effects506.” Packet injection allows an adversary to externally splice 
data into networks that may otherwise be inaccessible, thereby manipulating or compromising them.   
These capabilities often have steep intelligence requirements. Crucially, the documentation for 
QUANTUMTHEORY specifically called out the incorporation of passive signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
in targeting507, thereby indicating the capacity to conduct high-resolution targeting as required for 
such capabilities to be employed judiciously. The need for tight support from operational intelligence 
for effective MONOs was also referenced in the NSA’s Sentry Eagle program, in which the NSA 
“…provides SIGINT that supports the planning, deployment/emplacement and employment of 
[Computer Network Attack] combat capabilities508.”  
Abilities may at times only be useful if their usage pipelines are heavily streamlined. 
Communication is key; battlefield commanders must be made aware that a capability exists and the 
circumstances around its optimal use. One such example may be in event-based capabilities such as 
QUANTUMSKY – which facilitated disruption of web access – or QUANTUMCHOPPER – which 
enabled disruption of file transfers509. Seemingly tactical capabilities, they could still prove 
advantageous to deployed forces in certain scenarios. Yet, the documentation around these belies their 
internal sensitivity, thereby suggesting that they were reserved for strategic operations or 
compartmentalised special activities. It is unclear if comparable capabilities were or are available to 
support regular deployed forces.  
Both 2016 and 2017 were painful years for the US intelligence community. A series of intrusions 
against institutions embodying national sovereignty such as the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) reflected the vulnerability of the United States to outside intervention by way of information 
operations. These breaches were accompanied by data stolen from the NSA, CIA, and other leading 
agencies, weighing down public trust in the institutions and inflicting damage on the US capacity to 
conduct MONOs effectively. The grand theft of NSA data presumably originated from a group calling 
itself “The Shadow Brokers”510, while the CIA content was leaked directly to Wikileaks where it 
received the codename “Vault 7”511.  An additional leak from the NSA – the contents of which not 
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publicly disclosed – was traced to NSA contractor Harold Martin512. The aggregate leaks shine a 
partial spotlight on many US presence and event-based capabilities.  
The capacity to remotely compromise systems is instrumental to all MONOs. Specifically, in event-
based operations where the attacker is presumed to not have the time nor the capacity to conduct a 
long, cautious targeting campaign, a solution is necessary that would rapidly succeed with a high 
probability rate. Within the Shadow Brokers leak, the EternalBlue tool was a coveted exploit enabling 
wormable remote code execution, thereby allowing cascading automated compromise of vulnerable 
Windows-based systems513. The exploit – one of several in the same family and numerous others of 
differing quality in the Shadow Brokers leak – soon became the lynchpin component in several high-
visibility malware campaigns such as WannaCry and NotPetya, notorious for their unusual virulence 
and destructive impact on affected systems and networks. While both self-identified as financially 
motivated ransomware, they were soon attributed to the North Korean514 and Russian515 governments 
respectively, thereby becoming de-facto cascading event-based capabilities.  
Incorporating MONOs into military hardware for battlefield use is an arduous process. It requires 
significant research and development resources, intimate collaboration with intelligence agencies 
providing required telemetry, a trust relationship with combatant forces resulting in coherent, 
realistic enumeration of requirements, and a deep understanding of the operational lifecycle into 
which these capabilities may eventually integrate. For this purpose, the US military-industrial 
complex is uniquely qualified. Companies such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and others enjoy close 
relationships with their in-service peers and the wherewithal required to develop platforms over 
numerous years. While the vast majority of technologies remain understandably classified, a glimpse 
into some publicly filed patents reveals just how prominently they feature throughout the MONO 
lifecycle for event-based capabilities. 
Perhaps the best-known instance of field-worthy event-based capabilities is the EC-130 Compass 
Call aircraft. Originally deployed in 1981, later evolutions of the aircraft have also demonstrated the 
capacity to directly target networks. As cheerfully explained by Major General Burke Wilson of the US 
24th Air Force in 2015; “Lo and behold! Yes, we’re able to touch a target and manipulate a target, [i.e.] 
a network, from an air[craft]516”. The Compass Call’s onboard equipment facilitating these new 
capabilities is provided by British defence contractor BAE. This is significant, as BAE is purportedly 
behind the Suter event-based platform previously referenced in this thesis. As such, this indicates a 
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long-term dedication from BAE towards providing the US and its allies with robust platforms to 
conduct battlefield MONOs.  
Autonomous platforms are likely to feature heavily in US event-based capabilities. One such 
example is a 2016 patent submitted by Selex Galileo, an offshoot of defence company Leonardo 
dedicated to providing solutions to the US Department of Defense517. The patent details a dedicated 
unmanned aerial system (UAS) small enough to evade detection by air defence systems and designed 
specifically to deliver electronic warfare and event-based attacks, reducing the risk to manned assets 
and paving the way for kinetic attacks. The drone documentation reveals the desire to deliver “…[radio 
frequency] based cyber effects518”. This is the quintessential manifestation of an event-based capability 
as an evolved electronic warfare attack vector, one that simply seeks to target a platform by attacking 
its software rather than its sensors.  
Other technologies encapsulate the spirit of event-based operations, even if they do not recognise it 
as such. Various elements within the US military have increasingly begun to adopt the use of Digital 
Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM)519. The technology allows the rapid recording, digitization, 
manipulation and retransmission of electromagnetic signals so that they could be weaponised against 
an adversary in a form of evolved jamming. The transmission itself can be modified on the digital 
level, potentially generating different effects. This form of jamming thoroughly blends electronic 
warfare with MONOs, as transmissions affect adversary platforms on the software level rather than on 
the sensory level. This natural escalation results in far more substantial flexibility and the ability to 
manipulate targeted systems at a high level of accuracy, creating effects previously impossible. 
Manipulation of the digital payload within a signal can result in the creation of altogether new 
information, increasing the range of options available to the commander using the ability.   
Raytheon predominantly features as a provider of MONO-related technologies. In one 2014 patent 
partially titled “Digital weapons factory520”, Raytheon claims to be able to dynamically match an 
offensive network payload by assessing the targeted adversary equipment521 in near-real time. This 
pairing is done transparently to the operator, thus saving them the otherwise steep requirement for 
familiarisation with MONO techniques normally denied to fielded forces. Presumably, the technology 
calculates a probability of success and only upon passing a threshold would an offensive tool be 
created for use. A similar yet more specific 2014 Raytheon patent attempts to tackle ballistic missile 
defence (BMD) by outlining a system that can assess the vulnerabilities of a launched missile and 
attempt to pair a viable event-based capability to defeat it522. This is mirrored by a subsequent 2017 
                                                             
517 Matthew Keegan and Stephen Leonard Engelson Wyatt, Method and system for a small unmanned aerial system for delivering 
electronic warfare and cyber effects, United States US20180009525A1, filed March 15, 2016, and issued January 11, 2018. 
518 Keegan and Wyatt. 
519 John Keller, “Navy and Air Force Choose DRFM Jammers from Mercury Systems to Help Spoof Enemy Radar,” Military & Aerospace 
Electronics, June 18, 2014, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2014/06/mercury-drfm-jammer.html. 
520 Paul C. Hershey, Robert E. Dehnert JR, and John J. Williams, Digital weapons factory and digital operations center for producing, 
deploying, assessing, and managing digital defects, United States US9544326B2, filed January 20, 2015, and issued January 10, 2017. 
521 The patent documentation specifically notes a missile or a tank as viable scenarios of use.  
522 Paul C. Hershey, Joseph O. Chapa, and Elizabeth Umberger, Methods and apparatuses for eliminating a missile threat, United 
States US20160070674A1, filed September 9, 2014, and issued March 10, 2016. 
120 
 
  Daniel Moore 
Raytheon patent detailing an integrated kinetic, electronic warfare and MONO-delivering system523. 
These technologies – if functional - can afford tactical agility which may then be realised in field 
scenarios. Bridging the gap between MONO subject matter expertise and combat forces could make 
event-based operations far more likely to be used routinely in the field.  
Other patents attempt to simplify the overall battlefield awareness and direction of MONOs. 
Recognising that it is often difficult to grasp aspects of intangible warfare and doubly so with 
battlefields becoming increasingly saturated with various networks, these technologies seek to 
streamline the process. In one patent from Boeing, a technology is offered to orchestrate both “cyber” 
and electronic warfare missions524. An older Raytheon patent tries to similarly assist by directly 
offering “command and control systems for cyber warfare525”. These technologies prove how an 
investment in the preparation phase of the operational lifecycle can then reduce overhead in the 
engagement, presence, and effects stages. By instrumenting all of those through a single unified 
platform, commanders can focus on how best to use the ability rather than the intricate characteristics 
of doing so. 
PRESENCE-BASED OPERATIONS 
The United States is arguably the best positioned entity to conduct high quality presence-based 
operations at scale. Supply-chain compromise, infiltration of third-party providers, cooperation from 
popular global service providers, and a range of zero-day exploits against widely used products enable 
access to a wide range of adversary networks. As before, available evidence points to a high capacity to 
conduct operations in service of an overall national security agenda, yet it remains unclear how 
thoroughly these capacities are made available to military planners. A review of leaked, disclosed, and 
publicly researched evidence is useful towards constructing the unusually rich tapestry of US offensive 
capabilities.  
The majority of available data pertaining to US network intrusion originates with the National 
Security Agency. In its historic role as the premier provider signals intelligence, it had since 
organically and gradually grown into its mandate as the primary caretaker of US computer network 
operations (CNO), which encapsulates defensive, intelligence, and offensive efforts against adversary 
networks. Under that mandate, it had been incredibly prolific at creating capabilities and 
compromising key US adversaries, ostensibly for the purposes of answering critical intelligence 
requirements within its area of responsibility. Unfortunately for the agency, its allies, and the US at 
large – a series of leaks and compromises of the infrastructure, tools, and documentation it uses to 
facilitate CNO resulted in an inordinate amount of public scrutiny. Rather uniquely, the world was 
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given a partial yet surprisingly deep look at how a clandestine intelligence agency sought to weaponise 
networks and information. 
It is crucial to note that the NSA does not operate solely under a direct military mandate and is 
primarily subordinate to its designation as an intelligence agency. As such, it is not tasked with 
directly accomplishing military goals, and is consequently often at odds when opportunities to 
conduct MONOs arise. As indicated by Ashton Carter in a previously mentioned text, despite the 
creation of Cyber Command – designed to remediate some of this tension and concentrate military 
network operation efforts – the NSA did relatively little to furnish the US military with MONOs at 
scale526. Instead, secrecy, bureaucracy and compartmentalisation mean that MONOs are heavily 
classified, known by relatively few, and deployable only for very specific pre-approved intentions 
approved by the highest tiers of US decision making. Yet irrespective of this and the limited signs of 
military offensive presence-based operations, previous network attacks carried out by the NSA are 
often an indication of overall US readiness to conduct them. Attacks that were carried out under the 
auspices of the NSA could theoretically be ported over to Cyber Command, where they would be 
employed according to military objectives and priorities. Perhaps the most well-discussed and visible 
of these sabotage operations is Stuxnet.  
The Stuxnet malware targeting the Iranian nuclear project has been thoroughly scrutinised since 
its 2012 discovery. Even its purported operational designation as “Olympic Games” has been revealed 
in a New York Times article527. While as previously assessed this operation does not fully qualify as an 
act of cyber-warfare, it is certainly revealing as a presence-based operation that could be mirrored for 
military purposes528. A stealthy, modular capability incorporating  dedicated attack components, and 
targeting a specific set of software and hardware used by an adversary wrapped in a self-replicating 
infection vector and several zero-day exploits, all indicate a tightly managed operational lifecycle. 
While a subsequent US capability in the vein of Stuxnet has not been publicly disclosed since, the tool 
remains a viable indication of US presence-based capabilities.  
As previously indicated, deception is crucial towards maintaining the viability of a presence-based 
operation. Detection means mitigation, and subsequent decommissioning or revision of the attack 
tools. Importantly, Stuxnet maintained its deception even after commencing its effects phase529, a 
decidedly unique feature enabling sustained – albeit reduced - impact against the target. 
Consequently, it was able to maintain continuous efficacy in a volatile environment, requiring a 
measure of operational nuance rarely found in other attack tools. Similarly, the self-propagation 
component of Stuxnet was coupled with code to detect specific hardware and software, thereby both 
identifying potential targets of interest while similarly avoiding harm against incidental infections 
[TKTK Richard Clarke: ““was that it very much had the feel to it of having been written by or governed 
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by a team of Washington lawyers”]. This attention towards limiting collateral effects is operationally 
significant both to defend the tool itself, but also prevent uncontrollable cascading effects that risk the 
overall mission or objectives. This manner of discipline is difficult to develop and doubly so to 
maintain, as evident in the eventual “break out” of Stuxnet which resulted in peripheral infections of 
ostensibly unrelated targets around the world530. 
Stuxnet was not enough. During the early years of the Obama administration – as Stuxnet was 
operating - the risk of a significant regional conflict in the Middle East peaked. Bolstered by 
conservative backing and a perceived sense of urgency, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu 
reportedly became increasingly nervous. The illicit Iranian nuclear program, long suspected to have a 
military dimension, was rapidly advancing. Concern was growing in the US that additional viable 
solutions were necessary to deal with the Iran’s nuclear aspirations that did not involve open warfare, 
in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of all-out war. A multi-target network attack seemed a 
potentially promising solution, one that could theoretically deliver success with minimal risk.  
The plan for comprehensive strategic MONOs against Iran was reportedly folded into a program 
called “Nitro Zeus”. In controversial coverage by New York Times journalist David Sanger, Nitro Zeus 
was described as essentially a series of presence-based operations against numerous critical targets, 
which Sanger claimed “…would have required piercing and maintaining a presence in a vast number 
of Iranian networks, including the country’s air defenses and its transportation and command and 
control centers531.” The operational plan behind Nitro Zeus suggested a schism in US thinking on 
network operations at the time; it was both ambitious enough to believe strategic coercion was 
singularly possible, while at the same time too narrow as to thoroughly integrate the capabilities into a 
broader military capacity. In this sense, presence-based MONOs were almost viewed as a strategic 
extension of special forces, one capable of surgical attacks on an unprecedented magnitude.  
An additional nascent MONO capability can be found in a network espionage campaign dubbed 
“Slingshot” by researchers from Russian security company Kaspersky, who unmasked it. With forensic 
evidence indicating operational activity since at least 2012, the malware predominantly targeted 
Middle-Eastern and North-African nations. Defined as a high-quality versatile platform by the 
researchers, its truly unique differentiator was in the engagement phase of its operational lifecycle; the 
malware appeared to spread in part by exploiting vulnerabilities in network routers. Once it had 
successfully done so, Slingshot’s operators appeared predominantly interested in harvesting 
intelligence from affected endpoints. Yet, having fully compromised its victims and with a capable, 
modular platform – a subsequent retasking could have turned Slingshot into a potent presence-based 
capability delivering a variety of offensive payloads.  
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Slingshot’s most significant aspect is not the infection vector or its targeting; it is the context. 
State-sponsored network operations routinely get exposed by private sector research companies. More 
commonly then not, private sector analysis focuses on three aspects; (1) technical analysis of the 
malware and its components; (2) operational analysis of the threat actor’s efforts; and (3), a 
victimology analysis of affected targets. Rather unusually, Slingshot’s early 2018 reveal was rapidly 
followed up by a Cyberscoop article indicating that Slingshot was “…an active, U.S.-led 
counterterrorism cyber-espionage operation… used to target ISIS and al-Qaeda members532.” The 
same article claimed the operation was under the purview of Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC), a subordinate part of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The access and 
intelligence afforded by Slingshot was reportedly used to facilitate accurate targeting for kinetic 
operations. If supporting targeting was indeed the goal, it bolsters the notion that network operations 
are treated as part of the unique toolset provided mostly to US special forces.   
On the technological side, Perhaps the quintessential case study is the NSA’s “ANT Catalog”. 
Leaked in 2013 by Edward Snowden, the catalogue purportedly originated from a subdivision of the 
NSA tasked with creating deployable hardware-software solutions for compromising networks533. 
Capabilities include access acquisition technology for firewalls, transmittable signals, mobile phones, 
servers, and personal computers. The now aging catalogue includes a highly classified bevy of 
solutions befitting different scenarios, thereby allowing the NSA’s customers and partners to directly 
request a capability for operational use. The comparatively high level of technical details and manner 
of explanations suggest that the target audience was not strategic planners, but rather operational 
planners familiar with the tactical details of the adversary. Despite the restrictive classification, the 
very existence of a formalised network capability catalogue in 2009 suggests an evolved approach to 
incorporating these capabilities across various branches of the US defence establishment. If an 
equivalent catalogue is available to strategic planners detailing only the opportunities lent by such 
capabilities by using familiar military vernacular, it would likely encourage the co-optation of 
presence-based MONOs into the military operational lifecycle.  
Evidence also points to the publicly analysed “Equation Group” threat group as being synonymous 
with the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) unit. In a 2015 report from Russian security 
company Kaspersky, the researchers discovering the group’s activity and tools claimed it was 
“…probably one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world534.” Within the same 
report, Kaspersky’s analysis indicated evidence directly tracing the group’s malware activity to 2001, 
with other anecdotal evidence suggesting some operational activity as early as 1996. If accurate, this 
positions the NSA as one of the most capable, persistent, and historically significant network 
operators in the world. The analysis similarly indicates that the malware in question employed several 
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unique device persistence mechanisms535, was remarkably stealthy, and sufficiently modular as to 
enable a wide array of payloads and capabilities. Some of the modules and exploits used by Equation 
Group were subsequently revealed in the aforementioned Shadow Brokers leaks, confirming the 
dazzling range of capabilities available to the NSA536. As such, the TAO’s malware family was uniquely 
suitable for presence-based operations against a broad spectrum of global targets.  
Occurrences of an integrated approach to cyber-warfare do exist. A relevant modern case for a joint 
kinetic-MONO strategy is versus the North Korean ballistic missile threat to the US. While volumes 
have been written on the threat itself, consensus broadly paints it as intricate and difficult to reliably 
overcome. Some of the parameters include wild fluctuations in the diplomatic relationship, a rapidly 
advancing ballistic missile program, and arguably nuclear payloads ready to be coupled onto 
warheads. The North Koreans have limited, tightly controlled internet access, reducing their online 
footprint and thus the available attack surface for MONOs. Conversely, a significant reliance on 
Chinese expertise, infrastructure and material support may also present opportunities. Increasing the 
likelihood of preventing a North Korean nuclear attack would require an integrated effort of all 
domains across the spectrum of operations. This entails a combination of kinetic ballistic interceptors, 
naval and air assets, electronic warfare, and presence-based operational capabilities. The layered 
approach can help ensure that even if multiple attempts fail, additional measures would be deployed 
in turn in a cascading fashion until they deplete or the threat has been mitigated. 
The ballistic missile threat may be mitigated prior to an actual attack in an approach labelled “left 
of launch”537.  The approach includes all efforts to defeat missiles by targeting the systems and 
components that make up their operational ecosystems. Rather than defeating the missile once 
launched, the goal is to prevent the launch or otherwise pre-emptively thwart its success. These efforts 
do not uniquely need to be MONO-based, as put forth by the Atlantic Council’s Herbert Kemp;  
“It is time to change the game from a purely defensive battle to one in which the fight is 
taken to the source – to attack the [Theatre Ballistic Missile] launch systems and their 
supporting infrastructures before missiles could be launched. All parts of the chain leading 
up to the launch event are potentially vulnerable to disruption or destruction, and the time is 
right to undertake a serious effort to engage the TBM threat ‘left of launch’538.” 
Left of launch operations presence a unique operation for a collaborative, full-spectrum US 
approach that incorporates pre-emptive attacks, supply chain sabotage, and presence-based MONOs. 
Indeed, each of these capabilities seems to exist separately and it is becoming increasingly clear that 
the US is determined to integrate these into a tiered defensive network. The Department of Defense 
outlined its approach in a 2017 declaratory memorandum; “The concept of operations for employing 
left-of-launch capabilities is set within the broader context of integrated offensive and defensive 
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operations for countering offensive missiles539.” The department envisioned joint efforts to defeat 
missile threats by relying on varying capabilities including both kinetic and non-kinetic options. 
Pursuing presence-based capabilities against the North Korean missile threat is compelling but 
challenging. While some reporters claim that such efforts have already manifested as an increased 
failure rate for North Korea’s missile tests540, proliferation researcher Jeffrey Lewis claims no credible 
evidence has been offered to support this notion541. Conversely, a 2015 panel of former US military 
staff officers on comprehensive missile defence542 - later iterated by Andrew Futter in 2016543 - offered 
that targeting ballistic capabilities with network operations risks undermining the certainty of classic 
nuclear deterrence models, thereby reducing overall security of all parties involved. The core 
characteristics of presence-based capabilities – that they are clandestine, difficult to track, and 
inconclusively effective mean that all involved actors cannot guarantee that either their defensive or 
offensive measures would be successful. This lack of transparency damages the clearly communicated 
notion of mutually assured destruction. Yet this lack of clarity similarly also means that nations may 
already be pursuing such presence-based capabilities, and arguably none are better poised to acquire 
them as the US.  
INTEGRATED WARFARE 
The US challenges in integrating “cyber” do not stem from a dearth of capabilities. A strategic 
investment in MONOs and network espionage tools over the last two decades have resulted in perhaps 
the broadest range of both presence and event-based capabilities globally. The possibilities are 
seemingly dazzling, including targeting critical infrastructure, dedicated military equipment, 
encrypted communications, industrial systems, and air-gapped networks. Targeting efforts span from 
entire countries to individuals in a collaborative effort that potentially includes thousands of staff 
across several agencies, units, and companies. The scope of US network operations is gargantuan.  
Rather, the US challenges stem from a lack of focused offensive strategy, and a disconnect between 
the available capabilities and those who may use them most effectively. Deployed forces have limited 
support from event-based capabilities that could augment their operational lifecycles, and therefore 
cannot incorporate them into planning or rely on their availability when needed. Similarly, strategic 
planners are often disconnected from the scale and specifics of US network penetrations and 
capabilities, leaving only the highest of echelons with visibility into presence-based opportunities to 
inflict harm and facilitate success. US operators and units are likely capable of succeeding in both 
presence and event-based MONOs; it is the scaling aspect that remains lacking. Where many nations 
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struggle to create capabilities, the US has them. It needs to do better at deploying them; it needs better 
doctrinal clarity. 
The cycle of capacity acquisition could to be reversed. A separation into event and presence-based 
operations can assist in facilitating some of this process. If strategic planners were clear on the scope 
and possibilities presence-based capabilities lend, they could then task relevant capacity creators such 
as Cyber Command to create and maintain them. Persistent network intrusions are primarily 
facilitated by agencies such as the NSA for intelligence objectives, and subsequently weaponised if the 
necessity to do so arises. Introducing a presence-based operational mentality into the calculus would 
mean initiating intrusions with an offensive intent already in mind, thereby perhaps changing the 
approach, intrusion vectors, or even the toolsets used. Doing so may then allow a smoother offloading 
of access from the intelligence agency that created the access to the operational agency that seeks to 
attack the underlying targets. In a similar vein, a coherent plan to create and integrate event-based 
capabilities across all existing operational domains could result in force multipliers that deployed 
forces could rely on. As these capabilities would vary based on the region due to differing technologies 
and networks, they would need to be prioritised. A concerted, strategy-oriented push from acquisition 
planners in the Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Army could then solicit the sprawling US industrial base 
for event-based capabilities that would suit their requirements, rather than being approached by these 
companies with technologies as they come up with them. Technological innovation is crucial to 
success in modern warfighting, but only if it is channelled to meet requirements.  
Beyond acquisition, the US is uniquely poised to use event and presence-based capabilities as force 
multipliers for each other, effectively creating hybrid MONO opportunities. While it is becoming 
increasingly clear that MONOs can enable kinetic operators, if the benefits of networks operations are 
sufficiently well developed and understood they could be used in support of each other. Opportunities 
in this space include using deployed event-based assets to breach networks and deliver presence-
based malware that would subsequently be handed off to remote operators. Alternatively, networks 
compromised for presence-based operations may allow remote access to “air-gapped” networks, 
thereby facilitating follow-up event-based attacks against them. This would require painstakingly 
crafted bureaucracies and deconfliction channels that can rapidly decide how to jointly exercise 
multiple types of MONOs in mutual support. While this direction is implied in the latest iteration of 
US doctrinal literature544, the reality is that such cooperation requires an intimate familiarity with the 
considerations on operating offensively in and against networks that still eludes the US military as a 
whole.  
The notion that “cyberspace” is a domain remains a significant hurdle for this. Rather than viewing 
it as a distinct set of opportunities and capabilities, US military planners could benefit from increased 
integration, transparency, and seamless co-optation of networks into all aspects of operations. 
Networks are already integral to all other domains and would increasingly become so as technology 
progress and automation increases. The staggering US dependency on technology-led strategy would 
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only deepen if cyber is siloed in its own domain, relegating innovation and creativity in using MONOs 
to Cyber Command and its subordinate force structures.  
Perhaps the greatest challenge that the US now faces is in amalgamating the progress achieved in 
implementing MONOs across its different services, agencies, and defence companies. Each 
contributes a crucial facet that arguably embodies desirable capabilities, were they to be integrated 
with one another. Both for event-based and presence-based capabilities, the US currently represents a 
reality where the whole is less than the sum of its parts, rather than the opposite. Even as the Army 
pursues CEMA it remains shackled to an overly broad doctrine that views all MONOs as a single 
sensitive operational approach. The Air Force does well to incorporate cyber as a notion but limits 
itself by relegating it to support roles as a domain of unique effects distinct from the airspace which it 
naturally commands545. The NSA has spent immense resources on developing both access and 
capabilities to action against critical targets that could prove strategic to future mission planning. And 
the US defence industry has proven innovative in fashioning event-based capabilities that could then 
be delivered from various platforms, integrated into the operational planning process, and translated 
to jargon and concepts familiar to military users.   
The combination of these disparate approaches could result in a strategic advantage that 
rebalances the US against an increasingly contested geopolitical climate. Where near-peer adversaries 
such as Russia and China pursue advances technologies and MONOs of their own, the US already 
possesses them in a disjointed ecosystem that may fail to deliver effects when needed. Recognising 
that the electromagnetic spectrum, networks, and information are all different layers of the same 
man-made construct could help the US in distinguishing which entities should “own” which part of 
the overall effort. Whether or not it will do so remains to be seen, though the efforts towards an 
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6. THE RUSSIAN SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT 
OVERVIEW 
What was old is new again. Observing Russia’s geopolitical disposition teases familiar themes 
reminiscent of Soviet thought. These include an increased belligerence characterised by friction with 
Western interests; diminishing cooperation with NATO and its contingent members; emphasis on 
austere national loyalty and an ever-present concern of NATO encroachment on its Western borders. 
Even as it is yet premature to claim a fully-fledged return to the dismal days of the Cold War where 
global stability seemed at a brink, global tensions between Russia and its historic rivals are on a 
notable incline.   
The Russian geopolitical mentality is that of continuous strategic contest. Rather than envisioning 
clearly defined bouts of warfare capped at both ends by periods of peace, armed conflict is viewed 
simply a deterioration of existing relationships, either due to a perceived imminent threat or the 
pragmatic realisation of potential value to gain.  This is a key notion within Russian strategic theory; 
envisioning warfare as a component part in a larger contest of will impacts their perception of conflict 
itself and the tools employed within it. Some tools that are deemed overly aggressive or even 
classically categorised as warfare by other nations may be designated as legitimate activities in 
Russian grand strategy.   
This holistic perception of conflict has exasperated in the twenty-first century and is well 
articulated in Russian military thought. As Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov claimed in his 
seminal 2013 article; “In the twenty-first century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines 
between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed 
according to an unfamiliar template546”. Russian theorists such as Chekinov and Bogdanov describe 
what they call “a new-generation war”, referring repeatedly to non-military actions before, during, and 
after armed hostilities ensue547. This conceptualisation of a new-generation war is echoed repeatedly 
both in Russian military theory and those who observe it, and offers some parallels to the 
controversial Western concept of “hybrid warfare”548. Adversarial actions bleed into the civilian 
sphere and draw on mass-media, psychological operations, academia, outreach, and diplomacy, 
months before armed conflict visibly erupts549. In this reality of diffused contest, discerning concrete 
elements of the Russian way of war may be challenging. 
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This chapter will argue that Russia has thoroughly integrated MONOs into a broader spectrum of 
information operations, but often fails to achieve objectives. Drawing on decades of established 
doctrine, Russia has recognised and enshrined the usefulness of affecting information as a means of 
limiting or avoiding conflict altogether. Yet, technical and operational limitations have caused many 
operations to be exposed, while others were sub-optimally used or prematurely executed. As such, 
Russia has enjoyed relatively limited advantages from the use of MONOs, though it is comparatively 
poised to gain significantly from a more thoughtful approach.  
There is a schism within Western analysis of modern Russian doctrine. While some evoke the 
notion of a new “Gerasimov Doctrine” which suggests a novel form of hybrid warfare, others are 
sceptical that these terms introduce meaningful value550. The label “hybrid warfare” is often used 
when describing the complexities of modern Russian strategy. Originally coined by Frank Hoffman in 
2009551, the underlying notion is that within the context of conflict Russia relies on a combination of 
multi-domain forces alongside non-military and irregular means of coercion. While this does indeed 
appear to be the case, there are noteworthy reservations preventing the term from being useful as a 
descriptor of Russian military behaviour. First, that the term is only applied to modern Russian 
doctrine implies novelty where it does not exist552. The observed “hybrid” approach to conflict is 
mostly a modern manifestation of the Soviet-era strategy for geopolitical competition. Second, it 
implies an intentional labelling from Russian military theory where there is no such effort. Much like 
when discussing cyber, the notion of hybrid warfare mostly exists within Russian literature when 
referencing Western commentary about it553.  
Russian grand-strategy often implements the idea of “reflexive control”. Harkening to Soviet-era 
military thought554, the concept calls for a gradual manipulation of an adversary’s perception so that it 
organically begins to act against its own stated objectives555. This approach is thereby a subtler stand-
in for classic coercive behaviour, which instead overtly seeks to compel an adversary to behave 
favourably. Reflexive control could manifest as either reshaping the information pipelines used by the 
adversary in the decision-making process, or manipulating actors of influence to generate more a 
more favourable setting556. The flexibility of the term embodied both the dynamic Russian approach to 
coercion but also their deep-set aversion to armed conflict where it was not necessary557. 
Reflexive control alludes to a grand strategy reliant on shaping truth to exert influence over a 
political adversary. While manipulating the flow of information has been an integral part of reflexive 
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control since the Soviet era, it has flourished in modern Russian grand-strategy. There are numerous 
similarities and overlapping areas between Russia’s modern information operations doctrine and 
Soviet reflexive control558, where both seek to manipulate perception and upset decision-making 
processes across all political and strategic levels. Thus, as previously examined with cyber-
operations559, there are well-established historical roots for the use of information campaigns to 
achieve objectives while pre-empting conflict.  
There are several key characteristics in the overarching Russian approach to information and its 
uses. The first is that the entire information space is viewed as a fundamental aspect of modern 
geostrategic competition; this in turn explains the scale and investment in capabilities that target 
information in various ways. Second, there is little distinction between information operations and 
actual computer network operations. As the latter is wholly subsumed by the former, network 
operations are often not discreetly analysed. Third, electronic warfare – a traditional strength of the 
Soviets, is often viewed as on the same spectrum as its information counterpart. As a result, at least 
the potential to integrate MONOs across all disciplines is well-present in the current Russian order of 
battle560. 
Due to the holistic approach, network operations are often an indistinct component within the 
larger Russian information operations doctrine. Where Western doctrine often makes a comparatively 
clearer distinction between cyber-operations directly targeting networks and information operations 
that primarily tackle human perception, Russian doctrine views the information space as a continuous 
spectrum of operational capabilities561. These capabilities in turn serve a wide variety of purposes, 
many exceeding the military-strategic.   
Russia does not just pursue reflexive control; it engages in reflective strategy. Many of its core 
principles stem from its own perception of threat, which in turn leads to adaptation of Western 
techniques and advantages562. Simply put, they often do to others as they fear will be done to them. 
Indeed, Russian theorists often view the Western and principally US agenda as bent on dismantling 
residual Russian influence. As colonel Maruyev claimed to this effect, “Obviously, the U.S. and its 
Atlantic allies are Russia’s principal geopolitical enemy…563”, later adding that “…as previously, the 
Americans will continue actively to foist their values on the rest of the world relying on all the force 
and assets available to them564.”  
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While often blamed for engaging in prolific sub-warfare behaviour, Russian strategy has 
implemented this approach in part due to concerns of the United States aggressively pursuing the 
same565. To a degree, the renewed vigour in targeting the information space stems from the 
identification of a relative US technological advantage in the wake of the Gulf War566, in which US 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) doctrine was fully on display. While some may argue that mirroring 
doctrine is a sign of strategic weakness567, it can perhaps also be construed as a rare case in which a 
country proactively realigned its strategy to account for asymmetries. Russian military thought 
adapted Soviet concepts of dominating enemy perception to a modern, data-driven technological 
environment568.  
The Russian aspiration for information superiority cannot be stressed enough. Both in and out of 
conflict, Russia views perception across all levels and the information that shapes it to be a core tenet 
of its strategy. In the warfighting space, the military acknowledged that it lags far behind its Western 
counterparts and has commensurately sought to revitalise its position. This gradual yet enthusiastic 
investment included both a commitment by the military to invest in networked information systems569 
while simultaneously committing to engaging in offensive and defensive operations in the information 
space570. As with other aspects of its strategy, information operations do not have a branch of their 
own, and instead incorporate various elements from across disciplines and units571. As Giles notes, 
Russian’s approach to information operations “…combines tried and tested tools of influence with a 
new embrace of modern technology and capabilities572.”  
The focus on information operations reflects an overall Russian aversion to overt armed conflict. 
As will be reviewed throughout the chapter, Russian grand-strategy aims to wield all available 
information tools to soften political adversaries, ideally to the point where conflict is altogether 
obviated. However, even if it remains necessary, such capabilities are meant to weaken resolve, sow 
discord, fragment alliances, and damage military readiness as to increase the chances of an offensive 
success and reduce its required duration. As Chekinov and Bogdanov colourfully write; “A new-
generation war will be dominated by information and psychological warfare that will seek to achieve 
superiority in troops and weapons control and depress the opponent’s armed forces personnel and 
population morally and psychologically573”. 
The result of the holistic, war-averse Russian approach is that most of their offensive activities in 
cyberspace do not separately meet the threshold of warfare. Russian activity may appear sporadic, 
low-intensity, half-baked or perhaps even crude when observed at the individual level. It is only when 
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they are viewed in aggregate across the spectrum of activities that grand-strategy emerges. 
Considering the Russian methodology and its Soviet precursor, this does not seem accidental; this is 
an application of reflexive control to strategic scale, and is possibly meant to appear non-malicious or 
incoherent on cursory inspection.  
Network operations are difficult to untangle from the wide breadth of information operations. 
Military officers Kuznetsov, Donskov and Nikitin directly tackled this distinction, by indicating that 
“…cyberspace is a component and tangible framework of another, and more extensive, space 
commonly known as information environment574”. As such, MONOs are subordinate to grand strategy 
and thoroughly woven into the larger power dynamic. This is similarly reflected in those who carry 
them out. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and Russian 
Military Intelligence (GRU) have all proven to be prolific network operators. Over the last decade, 
these agencies and others have engaged in a wide variety of international information activity to 
include benign reconnaissance, intelligence collection, political and personal active measures, and 
direct sabotage of information systems and even critical infrastructure.  
When examining specific event and presence-based activities, it becomes easier to chart the 
Russian potential for integrating offensive network operations into warfighting. As the following 
analysis will indicate, most of the building blocks required to achieve desired effects already exist, 
contributing invaluable operational experience. Were Russian military forces to similarly invest in 
permeating network operations through their order of battle as they have with electronic warfare, it 
would likely prove highly advantageous.  
APPLIED STRATEGY 
Modern Russia aggressively pursues its geopolitical agenda. Regionally and globally, it asserts its 
interests through means both overt and covert. Its presumptive subservience to a monopolar Western 
order is no longer applicable; Russia is eager to contend over resources, land, and strategic 
advantages. Yet this eagerness should not be immediately interpreted as an offensive slant. Russian 
military thought insists upon a clear and present geopolitical danger from an encircling NATO, bent 
on its eventual destruction575. The key motivation appears to therefore be fuelled by a highly 
developed – perhaps overdeveloped – threat perception.  
Geopolitical concern is accompanied by a realisation that the Russian armed forces cannot 
currently contend symmetrically with its NATO adversaries, at least not if those are fully committed to 
conflict576. As its conventional military still lags in capacity, Russia seeks to leverage all advantages 
available to it in order to either accomplish strategic objectives without conflict or at least limit it 
significantly. This includes – as their doctrine states – “the intensification of the role of information 
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warfare”, including pre-emptively “…in order to achieve political objective without the utilization of 
military force” 577.   
In 2008, separatist sentiment within Georgian South Ossetia and Abkhazia eventually resulted in 
an invasion by Russian military forces578. Lauding the supposed right of self-determination, the 
concern seemingly stemmed from the notion that pro-Western Georgia directly threatened the ethnic 
Russian population within the disputed territories579. Deeming it an unacceptable encroachment by 
the Western agenda, Russian forces proceeded to pummel the Georgian military into inevitable 
submission, both within the separatist territories and along Georgian cities. While there was never any 
serious doubt that Georgian forces could not withstand a determined Russian onslaught, the 
campaign exposed a slew of deficiencies in the Russian order of battle. Disorganised forces, 
mismatched capabilities, lack of joint operational cohesion and an overall strategic inefficiency led to 
some unnecessary losses – often due to negligence - before victory was achieved580.  
The Georgia campaign spurred substantial reforms within the Russian military581. These could 
broadly be abstracted to three primary approaches; investment in personnel, advancements of 
capabilities, and changes in doctrine. Between the three and over the span of the decade to follow, the 
Russian armed forces have made substantive steps towards improving their capacity to respond to 
threats and deploy offensively and defensively. While many issues still plague their military forces, 
subsequent campaigns indicate a rapid learning rate alongside a determination to improve. Whether 
this was motivated yet again by a perception of threat or expansionist desires does not matter within 
this context; the end results were the same. Russia acknowledged that it must revisit its strategic 
priorities and migrate away from its classic emphasis on enemy force destruction in favour of more 
irregular, non-kinetic means of coercion582. 
A key element within Russia’s military overhaul was the recognition that their use of information 
was lacking. While Soviet-era strategies continuously called for consistent pressure against adversary 
perception, Russian strategy was relatively slow to catch up in the implementation of these principles 
for the modern, internet era. As information operations continued, operations against the modern 
conduits of data - the very networks that became instrumental to modern life in the West – lagged 
noticeably. Indeed, up until the early 21st century, the internet itself was viewed by Russia with 
suspicion. Late adoption resulted in delayed adaptation583.  
Russia now extensively relies on several strategic approaches conducive to offensive network 
operations. Among these; a reliance on asymmetry, the indirect approach, and targeting of perceived 
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centres of gravity584. These previously discussed principles have not only retained their Soviet 
usefulness but saw new life breathed into them in the information era. Fuelled by wariness of NATO 
and emboldened by the lack of repercussions to aggressive campaigns against Estonia, Georgia and 
Ukraine, Russian strategists increasingly deployed more aggressive network attacks against their 
adversaries585. Repeat experiences in different environments globally allowed Russian network 
operators to accumulate priceless experience in both event and presence-based operations.  
The Russian approach to network conflict is the embodiment of the indirect approach. Far more so 
than its Western equivalents using such capabilities to operationally bypass defences, Russia seeks to 
employ network attacks across its entire spectrum of conflict to subvert and diminish an enemy586. 
Tactically, network attacks are used to support and augment kinetic effects. Operationally, they are 
employed to elicit reflexive control in various regions. Most importantly, network operations are 
strategically used to altogether obviate conventional conflict and coerce adversaries into 
acquiescence587.  
A relevant analogy can be found in the spread-spectrum communication technique. Its principle is 
straightforward; rather than transmit across a narrow frequency band, one chooses to transmit the 
same energy output across a wider range of frequencies. As a result, power output is more diffused, 
resulting in a transmission that is less observable to eavesdroppers, more resistant to interference, 
and more resilient overall. The recipient can then reconstruct the original communication by 
correlating the received transmissions across all frequencies. This technique is now a mainstay in 
numerous modern platforms. 
The Russian strategic approach to network operations is similar. Individual MONOs are not meant 
to be decisive. Instead, they rely on the indirect approach to target adversary centres of gravity in 
barrages of low-yield attrition attacks. Rather than attacking a single target with a high-impact effect, 
operations are carried out frequently and across a swathe of dispersed globally targets588. This is done 
in cognisance of the symmetric limitations of conventional conflict that yet plague their military 
forces, and the resulting aversion to direct confrontation. The spread-spectrum approach to offensive 
network activities presents a useful way to integrate such capabilities into military doctrine.  
This approach also emphasises the Russian perception that information is a crucial conduit 
towards attacking modern centres of gravity – the collective will of the people to resist. Considering 
the Soviet mentality viewing modern Western democracies as socially fractured and incapable of 
sustained resistance to strife, applying consistent, diffused coercive pressure against these weak points 
could erode the adversary’s capacity to put up a meaningful defence. Clausewitz once discussed 
applying destructive coercion up to where the enemy’s will shatters589; the Russian approach applies 
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much of this principle and upgrades it to eroding civilian will rather than that of the adversary’s 
military.  
Deception also plays a significant role in Russian network operations. Although its quality varies 
markedly between operations, there is a significant reliance on maskirovka – the Russian doctrinal 
equivalent of deception – in all information operations, offensive or otherwise590. Imperative to 
achieving reflexive control in which adversary actions are seemingly organic rather than coerced, it is 
understandable why deception plays a key role.  The spread-spectrum approach to stringing together a 
mass of network operations can appear as virtual chaff, making true intent and extent of effects. 
Occlusion of the operational magnitude leaves adversaries affected yet often not wholly aware of the 
true extent of Russian strategic intent, manoeuvres and wider political goals.  
It does not follow that the Russian approach is entirely optimal. Examining the strategic principles 
outlined in the previous chapter, several noticeably lack. Among those is the absence of surprise, a 
comparative dearth of agility, and unsustainably high collateral damage. When these deficiencies 
accrue, Russia’s apparent potency in cyberspace is somewhat diminished. The Russian approach to 
information operations may shine when unnoticed and against adversaries it has not engaged in active 
hostilities, but may prove lacklustre against a determined, defensively inclined, actively engaged 
enemy.  
 The use of surprise is not mandated for all forms of network warfare, but it can augment its 
effects. An adversary unaware of an intrusion against its critical networks may find itself the victim of 
a highly impactful presence-based attack. Instead, Russian threat groups and their corresponding 
offensive infrastructure are frequently exposed, both as a result of activation of effect and shoddy 
operational security leading to premature detection591. These premature detections reduce the 
available range of capabilities available to Russia if and when it chooses to commit to active hostilities 
with its adversaries.  Whether this sacrifice is intentional or not, it may impact Russia’s odds at being 
strategically successful in achieving its goals.    
Agility is integral towards achieving long-term success. Having the operational capacity to pivot to 
different challenges, adversaries and circumstances ensures that a force can respond appropriately 
and win across different theatres. While Russia has made vast strides in modernising its military 
forces, agility in its network forces remains lacking. Electronic warfare has been thoroughly integrated 
throughout the Russian order of battle in recognition of a Western reliance on networked command 
and control to facilitate joint warfare592; a similar process must occur for MONOs in order to achieve 
military success against dispersed enemy networks. Instead, most offensive military activities in 
cyberspace are still pursued independently by military intelligence (GRU), and intelligence agencies 
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such as the FSB593. These often operate under a wider doctrinal umbrella and pursue multiple 
concurrent goals, and are thus not always capable of agile responses to crises and combat.  
Finally, Russian network attacks often lack the prerequisite finesse. The NotPetya worm – widely 
attributed to Russian military intelligence594 - spread to thousands of endpoints worldwide in a blaze 
of destructive data corruption, yet it was not seemingly intended to do so. Instead, the attack vectors 
targeting a popular Ukrainian software provider595 and the geopolitical context suggest that a regional 
effect was intended. Ending up thoroughly shattering its original operational scope, NotPetya proved 
to be one of the costliest network attacks in history. Such a brazen attack unduly risks attracting the 
ire of previously uncommitted parties, either by increasing their support to Russian adversaries or 
perhaps even directly engaging in countermeasures. Tighter control over MONOs could have resulted 
in a more localised effect, that subsequently may have sent a more potent coercive signal to the 
Ukraine. Aggressive collateral impact resulting from poorly developed malicious software 
appropriating NSA-leaked exploits merely indicates that the Russian threat may not be as severe as 
they aim to reflect.  
Within the Russian spectrum of digital conflict, it is important to delineate between softer 
information operations and network attacks. While information operations can be crucial to war 
efforts, they are primarily intended to promote reflexive control rather than be overtly coercive. 
Similarly, Russian influence, misinformation, and propaganda operations often do not even meet the 
threshold of an attack. This means that discussing them on equal footing as network attacks risks 
muddling the crucial distinctions between them. 
Russian operations predominantly and consciously skirt the threshold of active warfare. 
Information operations which are largely non-kinetic are attractive towards such aims, allowing 
significant operational freedom with relatively little risk and high deniability. Such capabilities can be 
harnessed both in peace and wartime, and prey upon existing weak points within adversary societies. 
Russian information operations include fomenting anti-liberal sentiment and conservative 
nationalism, evoking sectarianism, and undermining the democratic institutions and the agencies set 
forth to defend them. There is no simple metric for success, as national sentiment and its results are 
difficult to measure. At the very least, however, it appears that Russian efforts are intended to weaken 
national resolve and shape the political landscape towards a more pro-Russian, favourable 
disposition.  
To describe Russian operational intensity, it may be useful to observe it as a diffusion gradient; the 
further out an adversary is from Russia’s territory, the more dispersed and less overt the measures 
tend to be. Near-border, former USSR-block nations often receive the brunt of aggressive Russian 
measures, while Western-European nations are primarily the subject of passive propaganda, 
disinformation campaigns and intervention in political processes. As such, Georgia, Estonia and 
                                                             
593 Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, “International Security and Estonia,” 2018, 36–39. 
594 U.S. Press Secretary, “Statement from the Press Secretary.” 
595 Maynor et al., “The MeDoc Connection.” 
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Ukraine found themselves on the receiving end of significant Russian offensive measures meant to 
support concrete strategic goals. Conversely, the United States, United Kingdom, and other Western 
nations were primarily targeted in measures meant to offset democratic resolve as a whole.   
It is mostly within the band of territorial conflict that many of Russia’s information operations can 
actually qualify as attacks, or MONOs. Many of Russia’s presence-based capabilities are alternatively 
used for intelligence collection that is then either weaponised in disinformation campaigns or leaked 
to damage adversary capabilities. When in early 2018 American researchers revealed a significant 
compromise of US critical national infrastructure by Russian intruders, they appeared to be within the 
presence phase of their operations; collecting intelligence and traversing networks to establish 
capabilities that could then be activated when needed.  While such activities are certainly meaningful 
in Russia’s grand-strategy, they are conducted solidly within the remit of peacetime activities against 
adversaries and therefore worth differentiating from attacks in conflict. 
As per the five-step warfare model presented in the first chapter, disinformation activities and 
aggressive leaks of classified intelligence do not meet the threshold of a warfare-level attack. Such 
operations often already fail to meet the impact criteria but are also primarily not conducted for 
military-strategic goals. As such, these are active tools of political coercion that ebb and flow even 
outside the context of conflict, though they may intensify as hostilities flare. Presence-based attacks 
against critical infrastructure such as the numerous MONOs against Ukraine are far murkier to assess 
and worth inspecting in full. Similarly, high-impact attacks such as NotPetya are important to explore, 
as they embody the dangers of using an event-based capability within a presence-based operation.  
EVENT-BASED CAPABILITIES 
Russia is arguably the most publicly prolific nation-state deployer of event-based capabilities. The 
sheer number of widely attributable offensive incidents between ostensibly Russian elements and 
adversary nations is unparalleled. Much like Russia’s wider predilection towards relying on mercenary 
and sub-national operators to achieve its military-strategic goals596, many of Russia’s event-based 
attacks rely on both knowing and unknowing intermediaries. This in turn exemplifies one of the core 
ideas of event-based capabilities as previously discussed – they must be robust, scalable, and intuitive 
to use by various threat actors and for different activity types.   
In mid-2007, NATO had yet to seriously address the threat from offensive network operations. 
With a relatively subdued Russian threat and major counterinsurgency operations in rural 
Afghanistan, the risk seemed comparatively low. For Estonia – a relatively fresh inductee into NATO – 
Russia has consistently been the primary adversary as the democratic Estonian government whittled 
                                                             
596 For example, this reliance on external operations has resulted in a 2018 mass-casualty incident in Syria, where U.S. forces opened 
fire and killed an estimated 200 Russian mercenaries deployed to assist Bash al-Assad’s forces. See Neil Hauer, “Russia’s Mercenary 




  Daniel Moore 
down Soviet symbology from its streets597. Yet when the government sought to relocate the Bronze 
Soldier, a statue erected to commemorate Soviet victory in the Second World War, it resulted in an 
unexpected surge of unrest within the small country. Starting late April 2007, physical protests were 
accompanied by an in increasingly determined and coordinated offensive cyber campaign against 
Estonian networks598.  
Attacks came in waves and were aimed at Estonian government websites and internet 
infrastructure, seeking to cripple the country’s global connectivity. Initially, targeting was sporadic 
and uncoordinated, with the attack vectors limited to basic traffic flooding tools meant to crudely 
overwhelm remote servers599. By May 9th, the campaign has attracted large international botnets 
capable of generating a far more significant and sustained traffic load. Numerous websites were 
temporarily inaccessible until the attack fizzled within a few days600. The attacks were treated by 
Estonia and its NATO allies as a serious incident and resulted in the near-immediate establishing of 
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense centre in Tallinn, accelerating a subsequent decade-long 
process to formulate strategic guidelines on operating in cyberspace601. Due to the widespread 
attribution to the Russian government, the 2007 attacks on Estonia are often controversially hailed as 
the first observable case of “cyberwar”. 
The Estonia attacks do not meet a reasonable threshold of warfare. Utilising the 5-step 
classification model, the attacks forego quality in favour of quantity, but do indeed seek to affect 
government targets. The impact of the attacks was relatively marginal and certainly transient, but it 
did briefly dent the internet-dependent Estonia’s access to online banking and commercial services. 
Attribution of the attackers is murky; while the attacks clearly started in a largely undirected fashion, 
efforts crystalized into a cohesive effort indicative of more meaningful resources. Yet, it is unclear on 
whether the Russian government’s reliance on fomenting public unrest and employing non-
government proxies to act on its behalf qualifies this fully as warfare. In the absence of a strong, direct 
link to government accountability, this incident cannot effectively be responded to under the guise of 
warfare. The deniability factor firmly underpinning the attacks fits Russian strategy of avoiding direct 
confrontation and maintain a sub-conflict relationship with its adversaries. 
Rather than an indication of Russian cyber-prowess, the 2007 Estonia campaign is endemic of 
Russia’s inability to use network attacks for tangible strategic gain. Observed at a distance, while 
Russia was operationally successful at marshalling offensive resources, it failed to affect political 
coercion on the Estonian government and alter their behaviour. The impact of the attacks themselves 
was minimal. Internationally, the attacks tightened the alliance between Estonia and its Western 
neighbours, with the political fallout resulting in a more determined NATO emphasis on cyber defence 
                                                             
597 Eneken Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations (Tallinn: Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 
2010), 15. 
598 Tikk et al., 16. 
599 Tikk et al., 18. 
600 Connell and Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare,” 13. 
601 This process had several key milestones, including the formation of the CCDCOE in Tallinn in 2008, the publishing of the Tallinn 
Manual in 2013, and the recognition by NATO of cyberspace as a distinct ‘domain of operations’ in 2016. 
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and the establishment of a dedicated cyber-defence centre in Tallinn itself. To its neighbours, the 
attacks cemented the perception of Russia as an increasingly proactive belligerent. As such, it can 
hardly be called a success.  
 The Estonia campaign and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war are often viewed in tandem. This is 
understandable, as both events happened in rapid succession, featured a presumed Russian aggressor, 
and heavily incorporated disruptive network attacks. At the time, even the Georgian government – in 
one of its post-war official reports – labelled the attacks levied against it as cyberwar602. As Georgia 
was markedly less advanced that Estonia in its internet infrastructure, a sustained barrage of 
disruptive attacks against it both had less and more impact, in varying respects.  
There is more evidence of a consolidated effort in the Georgian cyber offensive. Early on, the 
website “stopgeorgia.ru” was leveraged among others to offer attack tools and targeting instructions, 
meant to coordinate efforts603. Contributions to the campaign included the alleged operational 
support of the Russian Business Network604, a then-notorious Russian criminal group with 
indeterminate affiliation to government elements. Attack methodology included a host of low-yield 
event-based capabilities that were reportedly pre-positioned605, including denial of service botnets, 
various common injection techniques and website defacements606. The attacks seemed to target 
government entities, crippled temporarily crippled Georgian internet access, were at least supported 
by Russian government elements, geared towards supporting the warfighting efforts, and within the 
context of broader Russo-Georgian hostilities. As such, whether successful or not – the network 
component of the Georgian conflict does indeed pass the threshold of warfare.   
Examining the results, they too seem underwhelming. The information component of the Georgian 
military campaign was arguably effective at limiting the government’s capacity to communicate with 
its citizenry, perhaps even hampering some efforts at organising a defence607. Yet these attacks were 
peripheral at best to the overall war effort. Comparatively limited exposure to the internet and a 
minimal capacity for command and control enabled joint warfare meant that the potential for 
generating operational effects through network attacks was inherently limited. Much like Russia’s 
wider strategy towards Georgia, the cyber component proved lacking, under-considered and 
mismatching to the adversary. 
Arguably the most effective strategic element out of both the Georgian and Estonian campaigns 
was the vindication that Russia could aggressively operate in the information pace against its 
adversaries with no notable consequence. Despite determined attribution and regardless of the 
disproportionality of the attacks, relations between Russia and the West normalised rapidly after the 
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Georgian and Estonian campaigns608. In part, this was due to Russia’s aggressive dominance of the 
information space, allowing it to portray a relatively unchallenged narrative that contributed to the 
appearance of a “fair” intervention by Russia. As such, it was more a success of their wider 
information operations effort than any meaningful success the use of MONOs. 
The civil war crippling Syria since 2011 resulted in a vacuum of power that attracted numerous 
regional and global powers. Embattled Syrian president Bashar al-Assad narrowly avoided defeat 
thanks to direct military aid provided by Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia609. Increasingly fragmented 
rebel groups were propped by NATO powers, including Turkey and the United States. The Islamic 
State and several other jihadi groups sought dominance over wide swathes of territory. The 
combination of uncertainty and numerous entities fighting for conflicting agendas has resulted in 
numerous bouts of combat. To Russia, this was also an opportunity to field-test new equipment and 
offensive techniques developed during their modernisation programs610. These included several 
relevant cases of electronic- and perhaps network-warfare that signal Russia’s capacity to manoeuvre 
tactically.  
Russian doctrine relies heavily on the employment of electronic warfare to counterbalance 
conventional deficiencies in offensive armament611. This stems from an accurate estimate of Russian 
asymmetries in respect to their Western adversaries, along an attempt to deny these adversaries their 
reliance on network-enabled joint warfare. Such capabilities exemplify just how thin the differences 
may be between electronic warfare and cyber warfare. They both attempt to influence transmitted 
information on the electromagnetic and virtual levels, respectively.   
Reportedly, in early 2017 several British Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots reported encountering 
attacks against their onboard GPS from ground-based Russian systems612. These exploited 
vulnerabilities in GPS targeting that were designed to defeat the RAF capacity to guide munitions 
towards Islamic State targets. Yet due to a dearth of details, it is difficult to assess whether the Russian 
attacks are electromagnetic interference or an actual attack against the RAF aircrafts’ processing of 
GPS data. The former would constitute a well-established electronic-warfare attack vector, the latter is 
an indication of a mature event-based capability. In any other context, these capabilities could 
organically be folded into the remit of combat operations.   
Event-based attacks against aircraft GPS subsystems is an intuitive way to incorporate MONOs 
into military operations. It allows pre-packaging of a repeatable capability into a deployable system 
such as an anti-air battery or electronic warfare vehicle. It does not require any significant technical 
knowledge from the operators save the requirement that they know when to employ the capability for 
maximum effect. If the capability generically targets the GPS protocol rather than exploiting a specific 
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609 Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Aff. 93 (2014): 74–75. 
610 This is made eminent by the deployment of numerous state-of-the-art Russian warfighting platforms, including the Sukhoi Su-35 
fighter, The S-400 Triumf air defence system, and numerous variants of the T-90 main battle tank. 
611 Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” 20. 
612 Giannangeli, “Russians ‘Hacking into’ RAF Crews over Syria.” 
141 
 
  Daniel Moore 
vulnerability in the RAF Typhoon, it could also be conveniently employed against numerous other 
enemy vehicles and weapons. Tactically, it is a sound investment that may help offset the risk to 
friendly forces from smart munitions.  
A later case in early 2018 involved a coordinated attack against the Russian Hmeimim air base in 
Syria. Rather unusually, the reportedly jihadi-led attack involved thirteen drones seeking either to 
detonate kinetically against their targets or drop bombs overhead613. The technique itself was hardly 
unusual; jihadists have been employing makeshift drones in their attacks in the region for several 
years before the Hmeimim incident. Yet, the commitment of numerous assets and the coordination of 
the efforts were surprising. Russian air defence managed to successfully counter the attack. Pantsir-S1 
air defence batteries reportedly attained kills against seven drones, while the rest were forced to land 
as a result of a “cyber-attack” against the GPS guidance modules614. 
Commercial GPS modules for drones are widely available, as are various means to jam and 
misdirect them615. In a majority of cases, an actual attack against the module is not necessary. Instead, 
exploiting the fact that satellite-transmitted GPS signals are weak due to the distance, attackers would 
simply transmit a stronger competing signal that would then direct the drone to land. While this 
technically involves the transmission of data atop the analogue electromagnetic layer, it does not 
constitute an attack against the GPS component itself. Yet, because the compromise occurs due to 
misfed digital data rather than interference with the electromagnetic signal, it could still be construed 
as a tactical event-based capability. Alternatively, if the drones were disabled simply because the GPS 
signal was jammed, that would still count as classic electronic warfare.  
Finally, perhaps the most interesting Russian event-based capabilities are their destructive attack 
tools, with NotPetya in fulfilling an instructive role. In NotPetya, Russian military intelligence (GRU) 
had operated a joint presence and event-based campaign. A presence-based compromise of the 
Ukrainian accounting company MEDoc led to the backdoored software being used to launch event-
based destructive attacks against a multitude of Ukrainian entities. Both the capabilities and the 
operations are worth examining in depth. 
First, it is important to identify whether NotPetya qualifies as an act of warfare as per the five-step 
model. With Ukraine as the intended target and numerous global entities suffering significant 
collateral damage, it is useful to examine these separately. Starting within Ukraine itself, the targets 
were sufficiently varied and impactful as to qualify. The impact is straightforward, as the destructive 
payload wreaked havoc across numerous networks. As the attackers have been publicly identified with 
high confidence as the Russian GRU they certainly meet the appropriate threshold of 
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accountability616. Goals are difficult to assess, but a strategic agenda meant to weaken Ukrainian 
resolve to Russian advances is likely. Russia has invested considerably in operating asymmetrically 
and indirectly against Ukraine, inflicting a severe coercive cost while committing comparably limited 
kinetic resources. The NotPetya campaign can thus be attributed to the wider Russian strategic 
agenda. Finally, the relationship between Russia and Ukraine includes bouts of combat and a forceful 
occupation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. As such and when reviewing all five parameters, The 
NotPetya offensive network operation decidedly appears to be an element of cyber-warfare.  
It is less evident that Russia engaged in warfare against other nations affected collaterally by 
NotPetya. While the targets remain numerous, the impact highly significant, and perpetrators the 
same, neither the goals nor the contextual relationship between the affected parties and Russia merit 
observing these attacks as warfare. Irrespective of grievous financial harm caused, the adversarial yet 
non-hostile relationships between Russia and its fellow nations alongside the lack of strategic intent in 
harming them contributes to the assessment that NotPetya does not qualify as warfare against these 
countries and entities. Consequently, NotPetya manifests both as warfare and non-warfare depending 
on the affected party. The global nature of the internet and the ease in which collateral damage is 
affected mean that similar spillover is likely to recur in future conflict.  
Arguably, NotPetya was not strategically useful. While it was immensely impactful globally, sloppy 
implementation and operational discipline weakened the acuity of the coercive message. NotPetya 
featured cannibalised protocol exploits, open-source dual-purpose tools and legitimate modules in its 
arsenal, creating a crude but effective capacity for rapid network propagation617. From a targeting 
perspective, technical analysis suggests that significant effort has gone into limiting the potential 
propagation of the malware, only to have these limitations broken by lateral movement between 
organisational networks instead of just within them618. The deceptive attempt at labelling the 
destructive malware as ransomware almost immediately failed, as it was made apparent that the 
malware writers had no effective capacity to withdraw ransom money sent to them or subsequently 
unlock encrypted files. Across all operational and strategic parameters, the malware campaign failed 
to achieve a strategic coercive or deterrent effect.    
Russia appears intent on incorporating event-based capabilities into its strategy. Coinciding with 
major political strife, such attacks were wielded with increasing sophistication in order to increase 
coercive pressure and attempt to weaken public resolve. Some parameters indeed coincide well with 
the before-mentioned approach for utilising event-based capabilities; they were used to subvert 
existing asymmetries and target weaknesses seemingly endemic to liberal democracies with a Western 
lean. The capabilities were robust and sufficiently generic as to be effectively delegated for use by 
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mobilised external parties, thereby increasing plausible deniability. Yet, the overwhelming majority of 
event-based attacks failed to achieve their presumed goals. 
This is perhaps due to Russia wielding event-based capabilities under circumstances more befitting 
presence-based operations.  Offensive tools meant for limited scope tactical attacks were used en-
masse to attempt a strategic effect, falling short at doing so. Crude attempts at deception only 
hindered efforts at coordinating attacks and targeting, where these are crucial in event-based attacks. 
Where event-based attacks thrive at potentially having a localised effect, they were improperly 
deployed as to create cascading collateral damage at an unprecedented scale. The resulting media 
attention, scrutiny, public attribution, and international backlash proved antithetical to the limited 
operational goals originally desired. Rather than diffusing the use of event-based capabilities to 
external parties, tight operational control integrated into military doctrine could have assisted in 
augmenting the coercive effect of the attacks. A misunderstanding of how these capabilities could be 
useful severely attenuated their utility.   
PRESENCE-BASED CAPABILITIES 
The combined Russian effort to penetrate networks is pervasive and diverse. Spanning two 
decades, hundreds of targets and numerous evolving capabilities, several national agencies have 
committed extensive resources towards the compromise of adversary assets to promote its grand-
strategy. As such, ample evidence exists when examining how Russia engages in presence-based 
operations. Its aggressiveness and willingness to employ offensive network capabilities reveals both 
several advantages but also key weaknesses. Succeeding in intelligence operations is one matter, 
successfully weaponising adversary networks to a strategic benefit is markedly another.  
Early indications of Russian malicious network activities can be traced as far back as 1996. In those 
years, operators later traced back to Russian IP addresses were ransacking numerous US networks 
with abandon. The FBI-led investigation into what they called Moonlight Maze revealed that intruders 
were performing unabated lateral movements between universities, government institutions, and 
military networks619. The elaborate operation took years to purge and necessitated a large-scale 
counter-operation codenamed Buckshot Yankee by the US team that spawned it. The Agent.BTZ 
malware used to facilitate the elaborate intrusion campaign was fairly complex for its time, with 
artefacts from its code linking it to an evolutionary chain that persists even today with the Turla 
malware620. The operational practices, technical acumen, and the tools themselves used to facilitate 
the breach all have grown greatly since the early days of the campaign.  
Moonlight Maze was perhaps the first indication that Russia was willing and able to compromise 
adversary military networks. It reflected the alarming interconnectedness of US military networks at 
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the time, lack of awareness and best practices towards ensuring their safety, and the hold Russian 
intelligence persistently maintained over these networks. Even as network operations were in their 
infancy, several phases out of the operational lifecycle including the preparation, engagement, and the 
presence phases were already routinely being carried out by government operatives for a military-
strategic agenda. The logical leap separating Moonlight Maze from a presence-based attack was 
merely the employment of a destructive module that could wipe all infected endpoints, potentially 
crippling US joint operations capacity. 
Other valuable case studies bely the Russian proven record of supporting military operations with 
network compromise. In 2016, US security firm CrowdStrike reported that a popular Android 
application used by Ukrainian military personnel to optimise firing times for the Soviet-era D-30 
howitzer has been compromised by malware621. The application, which assisted in calculating 
targeting parameters for the artillery, had been bundled with a malicious tool called X-Agent since 
2014. The X-Agent malware has been frequently associated with Russian military intelligence (GRU). 
Public-domain analysis of the malware did not indicate that its operators sought to disrupt the actual 
calculations, instead gathering targeting intelligence to facilitate subsequent kinetic operations622. As 
before, only a lack of intent prevented the weaponization of the artillery app compromise; a decision 
to use the malware solely for an intelligence-gathering objective rather than an offensive one was the 
sole parameter denying it a role as an instrument of network warfare.  
Russia has similarly exhibited an evolved capability for operations against cyber-physical 
networks. Most notable of these perhaps is the sustained activity against the Ukrainian energy grid. As 
political strife continues and conflict ensues over disputed territory, Russian activity against critical 
infrastructure has both pervaded and improved in quality over time. The ostensibly Russian 
“Dragonfly”623 campaign exposed by security company Symantec in 2014 was a comprehensive 
espionage operation targeting industrial control system (ICS) networks, stopping short of operating 
offensively against them624. In 2015, a presence-based operation against the Ukrainian energy grid 
employing the BLACKENERGY 3 malware did not directly target the supervisory equipment itself but 
rather achieved its effects through an in-depth understanding of the associated networks and by 
leveraging destructive malware against the adjoining corporate network used to oversee the industrial 
equipment625.  Three years of operations by various threat groups within the Russian intelligence 
community have resulted in accrued expertise, technical capability, operational maturity, and 
intelligence on the Ukrainian energy grid.  
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All these culminated in the network attacks that temporarily crippled a Ukrainian power 
substation in December 2016. The CRASHOVERRIDE malware proved to be a modular framework 
leveraging previously gathered experience to facilitate targeting a variety of established ICS protocols 
and generate visible, high-impact effects. Among its modules, CRASHOVERRIDE contained a specific 
module designed to conduct data wipes on industrial control systems, thereby rendering them 
unusable626. It demonstrated the capacity of its Russian operates to successfully complete the four-
step lifecycle of a presence-based operation. CRASHOVERRIDE incorporated extensive preparation 
both in targeting and capability crafting, successful engagement with the target, an extensive presence 
phase with lateral movement towards the critical network, and an effects phase resulting in the 
desired degradation of the adversary.  
CRASHOVERRIDE supports the perspective positioning the Russians as technically and 
operationally mature but strategically lacking. The limited, high-visibility use of the malware revealed 
its existence and capacity to researchers worldwide, far before it was able to achieve any meaningful 
strategic effect. Where such a presence-based operation could have been leveraged to create cascading 
failures throughout the Ukrainian energy grid627, it instead triggered a localised event of limited 
operational impact. Where it could have resulted in increased coercive pressure or deterrence due to 
perceived Russian potency in network operations, it instead revealed Russian over-eagerness, and 
reduced deterrence due to the success of Ukrainian operators in rapidly mitigating the malware’s 
effects. A powerful presence-based operation was wasted on use with little perceptible value. While 
particularly notable, CRASHORVERRIDE is not the only instance in which a presence-based 
capability was used sub-optimally. 
In 2015, the French television channel TV5Monde was knocked offline for eighteen hours. In an 
unusually impactful network attack, an entity calling itself the Cyber Caliphate assumed responsibility 
and began posting cautionary posts via TV5Monde’s social media accounts calling French soldiers to 
leave territories controlled at the time by the Islamic State628. Operationally, it was a remarkable 
presence-based operation which initially succeeded in promoting the public perception that the 
Islamic State and its supporters can affect networks on a visible scale.  
The TV5Monde hack was then scrutinised for details in an attempt to unmask the attackers. 
Indeed, subsequent efforts by security companies FireEye629 and Trend Micro630 revealed technical 
indicators linking the operational infrastructure used in the TV5Monde attack to that previously 
associated with the Russian GRU. What was initially a clever deceptive operation against French 
critical infrastructure meant to weaken its military-strategic resolve to operate in the Middle East 
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instead galvanised it. Similarly, the clumsy attempt at deception cemented the notion that Russian 
operators lack operational maturity in their attacks. While the French government and its allies have 
not directly responded to the hack, it undoubtedly further signalled that the Russians are an 
aggressive adversary worth defending against. Overall, the strategic utility of the hack proved 
minimal, perhaps even orthogonal to the Russian agenda.  
The strategic inclination for deception by way of network attacks is not limited to the TV5Monde 
hack. As the Winter Olympics in PyeongChang ramped up in early 2018, the organisers found 
themselves on the receiving end of a well-planned disruptive network attack against their 
infrastructure. As networks faltered, drones were grounded and the official Olympics website was 
disabled631, security companies worldwide scrambled to analyse the available forensic data and 
produce findings. Security company Intezer quickly pointed out code similarities between the 
“Olympic Destroyer” malware and previous campaigns conducted by groups affiliated with Chinese 
intelligence632. A second company, McAfee, released a report and press release implying similarity 
with capabilities previously used by North Korean network intrusion groups. It was soon made clear 
that neither indicators of attribution were reliable. 
Further research into the Winter Olympics attacked revealed that the forensic evidence was likely 
planted by the attackers as a “false flag” to misdirect investigators. Russian security company 
Kaspersky claimed confidence that the attackers deliberately sought to impersonate North Korea by 
falsifying a technical fingerprint associated with North Korean network intrusion operators633. Cisco’s 
Talos published additional information claiming similarity between the Olympic Destroyer malware 
and MONOs previously targeting Ukraine634. Yet both were hesitant in attributing the latest attack to 
Russia, as false flags muddied the ability to determine the origins of the malware with a high degree of 
confidence.  
Even irrespective of the degree of attribution to Russian state involvement, the deceptive campaign 
failed. Tell-tale signs of purposeful misdirection were discovered within days, rendering the effort 
inert. Rather than committing to impersonating a single attacker, the malware developers instead 
borrowed components from several. Those too fell apart under scrutiny, indicating a lack of capacity 
to fully produce malware convincingly capable of impersonating another.  
It is further unclear what the underlying goal was in the Olympic Destroyer campaign. One curious 
hint emanates from the lack of effect rather than its presence. While disruption did take place, 
researchers suggested that the destructive capacity of the operation was far greater than executed, 
indicating that operators were perhaps interested in political messaging more than wanton 
                                                             
631 Nicole Perlroth, “Cyberattack Caused Olympic Opening Ceremony Disruption,” The New York Times, February 13, 2018, sec. 
Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/winter-olympic-games-hack.html. 
632 Jay Rosenberg, “2018 Winter Cyber Olympics: Code Similarities with Cyber Attacks in Pyeongchang,” Intezer (blog), February 12, 
2018, https://www.intezer.com/2018-winter-cyber-olympics-code-similarities-cyber-attacks-pyeongchang/. 
633 GReAT, “The Devil’s in the Rich Header,” Kaspersky Securelist (blog), March 8, 2018, https://securelist.com/the-devils-in-the-rich-
header/84348/. 
634 Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres, and Matthew Molyett, “Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics,” Cisco’s Talos 
Intelligence (blog), February 12, 2018, http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html. 
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destruction635. In such a case, Olympic Destroyer similarly falls short of achieving its stated goals and 
contributing to the Russian strategic mission.  
The underwhelming results of destructive MONOs should be alarming to Russian doctrine 
shapers. On several occasions including NotPetya, Olympic Destroyer, and TV5Monde, operators 
came dangerously close to conducting warfare-threshold attacks against several global adversaries. 
That is a tremendous degree of risk for a comparatively low-value potential. Considering numerous 
mistakes and lacklustre operational security exhibited in these attacks, they should perhaps be treated 
with far more care. Proper integration into strategy, tighter oversight, and dedication of requisite 
technical resources could both help reduce the risks and increase the odds of success for each one of 
these campaigns.  
Finally, it would be irresponsible to discuss Russian MONOs without mentioning the extensive 
Russian campaign in the runup to the 2016 US presidential elections. The elaborate multi-pronged 
campaign included numerous moving parts, including a network breach of the Democratic National 
Convention, several leaks targeting hawkish anti-Russian politicians such as Hillary Clinton and 
Victoria Nuland, and a large-scale disinformation effort against US public. While the nuances of the 
campaign are intricate and exceed the scope of this work, there are several key takeaways that are 
pertinent towards understanding Russian MONOs and their wider approach to information 
operations. 
The first is that the elections campaign definitively demonstrated Russia’s willingness to 
thoroughly violate another nation’s sovereignty through network activities. By targeting national 
elections, Russian decision-makers chose to compromise the core tenet of a democracy, a feat 
seemingly guaranteeing some form of retaliation. Yet even as it did so, Russia committed to operating 
at a sub-conflict level, leveraging soft tools and influence operations to achieve its goals rather than 
directly attacking voting infrastructure itself and altering results. As previously assessed, the elections 
hack was a significant breach of US sovereignty but ultimately not an act of warfare due to a lack in 
direct offensive impact, a purely political goal and lack of pre-existing conflictual relationship between 
the US and Russia.  
 The second takeaway is that while Russia arguably succeeded strategically636, it still failed 
operationally. Deconstruction of its various operations led to high-confidence attribution by both 
private sector researchers and the US government itself637. The operational deception undertaken by 
the Russians to thwart attribution efforts was of poor quality, falling apart even under minor scrutiny 
                                                             
635 Perlroth, “Cyberattack Caused Olympic Opening Ceremony Disruption.” 
636 This is assuming the stated goal was to facilitate a Trump-led Republican victory in the 2016 elections, as he was perhaps perceived 
as being more pliable to Russian grand-strategy and less hawkish in its geopolitical disposition.  
637 CrowdStrike, the security company solicited to assist in the investigation and cleanup of the DNC hack, was fairly straightforward in 
its attribution, see Dmitri Alperovitch, “Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee »,” June 15, 2016, 
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/. The US government publicly decried the 
Russian government as responsible on numerous official occasions, see for example DHS Press Office, “Joint Statement from the 
Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security.” 
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by journalists638. In this sense, it had almost seemed as if the Russians were surprised by their own 
success; the operations were designed to weaken American resolve en-masse rather than be 
individually successful in impacting the course of US politics. Perhaps it was the maelstrom of existing 
American social issues and political grievances that created a fortuitous turn of events in line with 
Russian desires.  
Russian success was arguably overly reliant on luck and circumstance, but it did not need to be so. 
As before, tighter integration into decision making cycles and a comprehensive doctrine guiding 
operators in their actions could have muddled investigations, hampered high-confidence attribution, 
and prevented galvanisation of the US Congress against perceived Russian interventionism. It was 
once again a significant impedance of Russian information operations in integrating the tactical, 
operational, and strategic elements.  
JOINT OPERATIONS 
Russia is one of few nations poised for success in realising the potential of MONOs. An aggressive 
pursuit of information operations, a willingness to engage in controversial behaviour, a relative lack of 
discipline in its intelligence agencies, and a storied history of manipulating information and 
perception all make Russia an incredibly prolific operator. Yet despite having all chances of success 
and the perception of unstoppable campaigns against the heart of Western interests, it routinely 
falters in its ability to achieve its goals through network activities.  
Russian MONOs fail to achieve what is expected of them primarily in the first and last stages of the 
operational lifecycles – preparation and effects respectively. In the initial preparation phase, they do 
well to develop offensive technical capabilities, but then fall short in crafting credible deceptive 
identities and maintaining operational security for their malware. They similarly dedicate far too few 
resources for preventing infrastructure reuse that could hamper subsequent adversary attribution 
efforts. In the final effects phase they often activate their offensive payloads in poor form, resulting in 
both limited lasting impact, compromise of sensitive capabilities, and even occasionally revealing 
operational intent. In other cases, a misapplication of force resulted in severe undesired collateral 
damage, perhaps outstripping the utility of the operation itself. These limitations are a deciding 
characteristic of both their presence and event-based efforts. 
Event-based operations have been surprisingly well-integrated into military-political conflict, yet 
without contributing sufficiently to the task. Both in the Georgian and Estonian conflicts, event-based 
attacks against adversaries were occurring daily alongside additional efforts, kinetic and diplomatic. 
Russian ability to craft, disseminate and facilitate targeting of pre-packaged, resilient event-based 
attack tools is a positive indication of a capacity to muster forces. Yet these forces were applied in a 
manner incongruent with Russian strategic aims, contributing minimally to the overall efforts. 
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However, there is indication of improvement as Russian event-based activities in Syria appear to be 
more effective and integrative. 
Treating event-based MONOs as the Russians have electronic warfare could have yielded far more 
promising results. As researchers often suggest, Russia has one of the most elaborate, well-crafted and 
dangerous electronic-warfare capacities globally639. This is in part due to thorough integration 
through its order of battle, including within infantry battalions and other mobile force structures. 
Considering the numerous characteristic similarities between electronic and network warfare, a 
comprehensive integration doctrine for the latter similar to the former could result in a far better 
application of it towards military needs.  
Russian presence-based operations have demonstrated a highly evolved capacity against 
technically complex targets, including those requiring assistance from subject matter experts. 
Presence-based malware frameworks have proven modular, and capable of exploiting a variety of 
targets towards achieving high-impact events. Experience in compromising military and critical 
infrastructure targets spans at least two decades, suggesting a substantial maturity in pursuing such 
adversaries. As such, Russia is uniquely positioned to be successful. 
What Russia lacks is strategic utility. Presence-based operations were often used as a form of hazy 
political signalling, or at times thinly veiled strategic misdirection. Both resulted in a decidedly 
underwhelming contribution to Russian interests, instead either consolidating adversary support, 
providing crucial insight into Russian capabilities, and compromising valuable offensive tools. 
Increased discipline and congruence with a broader military or even political strategy could have 
made far better use of these tools for a longer-term impact.  
The overall issue with Russian MONOs is their failure to apply core strategic principles. While they 
do well to target adversary centres of gravity in the form of critical infrastructure, military targets, and 
even the population itself, they falter on other guiding principles. Deception is often poorly exercised, 
and often used when either it is subject to immense scrutiny or altogether unnecessary. The indirect 
approach is often avoided in favour of tangling directly and overtly with well-defended enemy assets. 
Russian brashness and under-calculated aggressiveness in its MONOs demonstrates low 
contemplation of conservation of force. The consequence of this approach is a decidedly low success 
ratio, and a broad failure to strategically offset the existing military asymmetries. Most importantly, 
Russia’s approach to MONOs increased the risk of armed conflict instead of reducing it. Rather than 
being an effective component of reflexive control, crude attempts at misdirection in the face of 
aggressive attacks against critical infrastructure is a dangerous misstep that could eventually cross an 
undesired threshold. Successive attacks that face on consequence increase the onus of response on the 
affected parties; NATO would eventually be compelled to respond.  
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Russia would do well to learn from its own history. Soviet information operations are notorious, 
and while some were more effective than others, the overall blanket of disinformation effectively hid 
Soviet conventional deficiencies and strained global alliances. From the military angle, a thorough 
commitment towards integrating electronic warfare resulted in asymmetry-impacting capabilities and 
a deterrent that persists to this day. Learning from history, committing to the operational lifecycle, 
and cautiously integrating MONOs into existing doctrine could provide Russia with the tools to 
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7. CHINA AND THE TAIWAN CONTINGENCY 
 
OVERVIEW 
The waters of the South and East China Seas teem with geopolitical friction. The seas represent a 
crucial nexus for maritime international trade, a concentration of valuable natural resources, and a 
series of land features that – if militarised – can threaten a wide swathe of territory. To the nations 
straddling this tight space, the seas represent both an unparalleled opportunity for regional influence 
and an implement of sovereignty. Through centuries of conflict precipitated by both foreign and 
domestic forces, an uneasy status quo emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century. While many 
sides to this equilibrium are increasingly tenuous, one of its most explosive aspects is between two 
nations that were once one. Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China 
(ROC, or Taiwan) view themselves as the “true China”. Yet where the former seeks eventual 
reunification, the latter increasingly pulls towards independence.  
This trajectory puts both nations at dangerous odds. As the two nations drift further apart, 
perspectives on eventual resolution focus on a possible military scenario depicting China’s eventual 
attempt to forcefully reclaim Taiwan as its sovereign territory. The probability of such a scenario is 
neither remote nor improbable; Taiwan appears to gradually distance itself from the notion of 
peaceful reunification; in 2016, voters in Taiwan gave the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) its first 
ever legislature majority. At the same time, an empowered PRC shows increasing signs of regional 
assertiveness and a keen desire to pursue its goals militarily. Such a conflict would be far-reaching 
should it take place, and inherently involves numerous regional forces including South Korea, Japan, 
and perhaps most of all Taiwan’s closest ally – the United States.  
An amphibious invasion – which would be necessary in order to forcibly reclaim Taiwan - is 
considered one of the most complex operations to pull off. Such a campaign requires elaborate 
logistics, effective mobilization of landing forces, and rapid suppression of an entrenched enemy 
engaged in an existential battle for its own territory. Time works against the attacker. Should an initial 
landing attempt fail, defenders would have the opportunity to rally, marshal resources to subdue 
intruders, call upon regional allies to aid, and affect international diplomatic pressure. In this 
particular instance, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is surely to trigger the defensive pact the latter has 
with the United States. This will likely result in rapid deployment of a US carrier strike group to act 
both as a deterrent from hostilities and a potential mobile strike force should conflict indeed 
commence. China would therefore have two key goals; subdue Taiwanese forces as rapidly as possible 
and prevent allies from effectively deploying and contributing to the war effort.   
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The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is keenly aware that rapidly subjugating Taiwan is a 
monumental feat640. To achieve it would require Chinese mobilisation on a previously unseen scale. A 
crucial component of the effort would include overcoming entrenched Taiwanese defenders and either 
deterring or defeating US interdiction forces. Only complete strategic success can enable this, and as 
such the PLA is investing heavily in facilitating its potential victory. One notably novel element of this 
is the 2015 establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF), created to “…maintain local 
advantages in the aerospace, space, cyber, and electromagnetic fields” while also providing “…attack 
and defense in cyber and electromagnetic spaces641.” The enigmatic foundation of the non-frontlines 
SSF was accompanied by the understanding that network warfare must also be conducted by combat 
deployed troops at all levels642, thus splitting the responsibility between strategic and operational 
needs.  
This chapter will argue that China has developed a doctrinally mature approach to conduct 
effective MONOs, but it lacks crucial operational experience. The foundation of the SSF, which 
unifies operational, technical, and electromagnetic expertise from various areas of the PLA, is a 
recognition of both the high potential value of MONOs and the underlying difficulties in employing 
them effectively. This is followed by the understanding that even as the PLA rapidly increases its 
conventional capabilities, it continues to face a daunting challenge from both Taiwan itself and 
regional US reaction forces. The PLA must therefore lean heavily on strategic principles discussed as 
enabled by MONOs; attacking via the indirect approach, limiting detrimental asymmetries, achieving 
operational surprise, and directly targeting centres of gravity. 
The chapter opens with a review of Chinese military modernisation and its implication for MONOs. 
This includes a review of Chinese regional power projection alongside recent structural and doctrinal 
reform. The chapter then includes two major components; one reviewing how China would seek to 
overcome Taiwanese entrenched defenders rapidly and efficiently – a momentous challenge under the 
best of conditions. The latter and final component reviews how China would seek to deter and defeat 
US involvement in any such conflict, by limiting its capacity to operate while ideally limiting 
conventional damage to avoid broader, more encompassing engagements that would result in a loss or 
stalemate. The PLA faces numerous challenges alongside several interesting opportunities, yet it 
remains unclear whether it is fit to task in meeting them.   
The Chinese Civil War was a violent insurrection of the Communist Party against the reigning 
nationalist Kuomintang party. Spanning more than two decades from 1927, the resulting conflict 
stretched well into and beyond the Second World War. Fierce fighting devastated the Chinese 
mainland before Kuomintang forces were largely routed by their Communist adversaries in 1949. Loss 
of the mainland resulted in a full Kuomintang retreat to the island of Taiwan, where they re-
                                                             
640 Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat. 
641 Costello, John, “The Strategic Support Force: China’s Information Warfare Service,” China Brief (blog), February 8, 2016, 
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established a breakaway government optimistically named the Republic of China. With a communist 
victory now in hand, the mainland re-carved the battered nation in its image, establishing the People’s 
Republic of China.  
Both parties claimed – and indeed to a degree continue to claim – that they are the “true China”. 
The contest over legitimacy soon became a linchpin of the Cold War, which unsurprisingly saw a 
Soviet-backed PRC counterbalanced by a US-backed Taiwan. However, as years progressed and the 
Chinese mainland recovered, it became clear that Taiwan’s stake at recognition grew distant. 
Eventually, while the US maintained its stalwart alliance with its island ally, it recognized the PRC as 
China, a significant move reinforcing the mainland’s claim on the UN Security Council seat. China and 
Taiwan continued to co-exist in a state of pervasive friction. The two remain inexorably drawn to each 
other’s spheres of influence as both seek to define a political narrative on their own terms. Tensions 
between the PRC and the United States similarly flare hot and cold over Taiwan, with the US seeking 
to retain its influence over a pro-Western strategically-located island.  
An assertive US presence in the Pacific saw Taiwan thoroughly enmeshed in an alliance with the 
US, further straining relations between it and the mainland. This escalated several times to the brink 
of armed conflict, culminating in the 1996 Third Taiwan Straits Crisis which resulted in two US carrier 
strike groups responding to the area in response to PLA missile tests, and a subsequent PRC de-
escalation by way of concession643. It was an educational moment for the PLA; it poignantly 
internalized that conventional military parity was – at the time - infeasible against the highly 
coordinated, advanced US military. New approaches had to be developed, and new capabilities 
attained rapidly. 
The bilateral relationship between the PRC and US has ebbed and flowed over the last five decades. 
Previously seen as a soviet-era adversary, relations gradually warmed as the Chinese economy 
increased its interdependency with the global market, standing out as a powerful conduit for trade and 
manufacturing. This is by no means a steady state. The assertive Chinese push towards establishing 
soft power and advancing its economic interests has been met with suspicion by some, including the 
US administration under President Donald Trump644. At the same time, the relationship with Taiwan 
has fluctuated between relative warmth and bristling friction. These trends have largely been 
commensurate with perceived Taiwanese advances towards a fully-fledged independent democratic 
government, an unacceptable outcome for the mainland’s central communist government. The notion 
of an independent Taiwan is so offensive to China that officials have frequently and pithily claimed 
that such moves would result in an overwhelmingly assertive response645. 
                                                             
643 Jan Van Tol et al., “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept” (DTIC Document, 2010), 3, 
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The PRC’s rapid growth has been accompanied by an expected increase in Chinese political 
expectations and the will to pursue them. In part, this manifests in moves to project maritime power 
in the South China Sea through various contentious proceedings, while more forcefully asserting 
claims to the disputed territories therein. Controversies abound, including claims of sovereignty over 
the Spratly Islands, The Daiyou islands, a 200-nautical-mile range defined by the PRC as its Economic 
Exclusion Zone (EEZ), and of course the island of Taiwan itself. Put plainly, China now claims rights 
to regulate and enforce all maritime traffic within a large swath of the South and East China Seas. The 
resulting friction has led to several widely covered entanglements with fishing boats, foreign naval 
vessels and US military aircraft646.  
The latest development is the militarization of reclaimed islands off China’s littoral space. In one 
such example, the PRC paved a 3,000-meter runway, clearly geared towards hosting large military 
fixed-wing aircraft647. Since 2016, military reclamation efforts of contentious islands – in particular 
the Spratly Islands - have accelerated, including construction of runways, island defences, and 
listening posts648. This ratcheting up of adversarial behaviour has been poorly received by regional 
actors, perceived as part of a PLA grand-strategy to project power, enable rapid military response and 
illegitimately enforce claims of regional sovereignty.  
These longstanding strategic developments reflect the PRC’s active defence strategy. As the 2015 
Strategic White Paper details at length, the PRC does not actively seek conflict but rather swift 
superiority in the face of perceived grievance649. This grievance can take many forms; a military 
incident, Taiwanese independence, or overt assertions of dominance on disputed territories. It is 
therefore perceived as strategically desirable to preposition PLA forces for maximum effective 
deployment in their potential time of need. Commensurately, the United States has not remained idle 
in light of these developments. Over the last decade, the Asia-Pacific narrative within the US has 
undertaken several major revisions to attempt to both contain and accommodate Chinese regional 
aspirations. These have all been bound together in a strategy previously labelled during the Obama 
administration as “The Asia-Pacific Rebalance650”. Since then, the focus had shifted somewhat to the 
Indo-Pacific region, signalling a shifting tapestry of alliances and geopolitical circumstances.  
EVOLVING TO THE INFORMATION ERA 
The PLA now fields an increasingly modern and versatile military. Previous notions of focusing on 
numerical quantity and land-based force mobilizations have largely been cast in favour of securing 
                                                             
646 These include an incident in which a PLA J-11 fighter buzzed a US P-8A patrol plane, various incidents in which PLA Navy ships 
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China’s littoral borders, ensuring interests within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)651, deterring US 
regional involvement and potentially enabling coercive unification with Taiwan652. This has far 
reaching implications on the size, nature and manner of PLA force deployment. While the overall 
personnel capacity is gradually decreasing653, troop readiness and equipment quality have been 
rapidly increasing654. China has taken great strides to accommodate modern threats by modernising 
its doctrine, force building approaches, and strategies. Steps undertaken include reorganising PLA 
command structure and drastically altering resource allocation655. China therefore presents a more 
promising visage of military readiness, but one which has yet to be battle tested.  
Observing the last decade of Chinese doctrine strongly suggests an evolution of priorities. Namely, 
it has gradually been transitioning from the “People’s Army” approach towards a more quality-centric, 
network-aware, joint operations grand strategy that recognises the qualitative advantages of 
adversaries such as the United States or Taiwan, and appropriately attempts to alleviate any such 
asymmetries656. This observation has been accompanied by the realization that the next conflict is far 
less likely to be a massive land-based battle657, but rather a chain of smaller engagements off of 
mainland China’s shores. These relatively recent developments were labelled “Local war under the 
conditions of informatisation” by PLA strategists658. 
Active defence is a significant component of PLA doctrine659. It outlines that the PRC will 
supposedly never be the initiator of armed conflict, while retaining the right to proactively act against 
perceived threats should the need to do so arise. This rather murky language is open to interpretation 
and leaves a measure of leeway to PRC politicians when directing the use of force. A perceived 
grievance in the form of a bold Taiwanese step towards independence could readily be interpreted as 
an opening salvo660, one breaching existing agreements and therefore inviting direct military 
countermeasures. Even as China’s increasingly aggressive manoeuvres in its littoral seas are dismissed 
as political flexing, it is acknowledged by observers that the PLA continuously strives towards enabling 
potential unification, with a stated goal of achieving operational readiness by 2020661.  
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PLA references to weaponising information are no idle chatter. Chinese forces have been 
aggressively working to advance joint warfare capabilities alongside the capacity to target those in 
their adversaries662. Similar to the Russians and the United States, the PLA has identified that the 
synergy of joint operations results in tremendous value to the modern force; they must in turn both 
catch up to their adversaries663 while seeking to deny them those same advantages. At the heart of this 
process was the primacy of information as the medium permeating all warfighting. It is both a massive 
potential benefit to those who wield it effectively, but can also create crippling dependencies and deep 
vulnerabilities. In the latest version of its highly influential publication, the official Chinese 
publication “Science of Military Strategy” reversed the PLA’s previous tendency to deny the use of 
MONOs664. Instead, it both acknowledged and embraced MONOs as a potential differentiator in the 
modern battlefield.  
The PLA’s new Strategic Support Force represents the crystallisation of its new approach to 
informatisation. By consolidating aspects of conducting MONOs into a unified entity, the PLA has 
acknowledged both the significance and the difficulties in pursuing such capabilities. The new order of 
battle includes among others elements from the First Department (operations), Second Department 
(intelligence), Third Department (technical reconnaissance), and Fourth Department (electronic 
countermeasures and radar)665. China’s approach seems to echo two key trends in their observation of 
cyber warfare; that information superiority permeates all operational domains666, and that deployed 
forces must be capable of pursuing network operations themselves667. By seemingly assigning 
responsibility for operations of strategic worth to the SSF while allowing other forces to conduct 
tactical MONOs to achieve local goals, they in fact assign responsibilities roughly analogous to the 
division between event-based operations and presence-based operations respectively. This uniquely 
positions the PLA as comparatively doctrinally mature force when it comes to the integration MONOs. 
China’s greatest detriment in conducting MONOs is its lack of experience. This dearth manifests in 
two complementary aspects and a corollary. The first aspect is a lack of experience in waging combat 
operations at all, especially as a joint force relying on networked assets. While PLA military exercises 
increasingly involve joint operations668, unlike the United States or Russia it has precious little 
experience in fully engaging a committed adversary. The second aspect is its lack of experience in 
conducting offensive network operations. While the PLA is a notoriously prolific employer of network 
espionage operations669, there is little evidence suggesting it is routinely engaging in attacking 
networks to promote strategic-political goals. As a corollary to these two points, the PLA has little 
experience in applying MONOs alongside kinetic combat operations against an adversary. This places 
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the PLA at a relative disadvantage, as operational maturity is accrued by experience. Practice makes 
perfect.   
By radically altering its approach to information operations without field-testing the process, the 
PLA lacks visibility into its own faults. Establishing the SSF and assigning information operations to 
deployed forces is promising, yet it is unclear if they are capable of achieving any of their stated goals 
or how they intend to do so. The force structure is new, the technologies they will employ are novel, 
the challenges they face are fresh, and the adversaries are highly capable. To put it mildly, the degree 
of uncertainty surrounding any Chinese military action is immense. The Taiwan contingency shines a 
light on the myriad challenges PLA planners and operators are likely to face when attempting to apply 
MONOs to an intricate scenario where they could be immensely beneficial. 
It is nearly impossible to achieve strategic surprise in a Taiwan contingency. All involved routinely 
prepare for the eventuality, with most of Taiwan’s military forces uniformly dedicated towards 
curtailing it. Project 2049’s Ian Easton similarly acknowledged that “China’s leaders have good reason 
to assume their intentions will be discovered by Taipei well in advance of the attack. Strategic 
deception is viewed by the Chinese military as desirable, but probably not attainable. Tactical 
deception, on the other hand, is seen as vital670“. A pre-emptive Chinese “active defence” manoeuvre 
will likely initiate escalation of hostilities671. Notably, such a scenario is likely to be predicated by a 
perceived grievance inflicted by Taiwan’s government. This could be either an overt policy shift 
towards independence or as a result of a lesser political conflict spiralling out of control. Escalation of 
hostilities may indeed be limited to political exchanges or sabre-rattling, providing measures to 
depressurize tensions succeed in doing so. However, should the PRC assess the timing is right to 
attempt an overt military operation, the PLA will seek to swiftly overwhelm Taiwanese forces before 
regional US assets have time to mobilize and respond. Subsequently, the overall strategy sought out by 
the PLA would be to solicit a Taiwanese surrender as swiftly as possible. Delay entails far greater 
losses, regional unrest, ally mobilization and international pressure. Surprise, albeit difficult, would 
certainly help delay American intervention and disrupt Taiwanese mobilisation. 
The United States’ military is widely considered as one of the most highly-networked, 
technologically advanced and globe-spanning armed forces. Capably trained, battle-hardened and well 
suited to joint operation of massive firepower at relative accuracy, it is a difficult adversary to face 
directly and conventionally. As part of its obligations towards world security, safeguarding economic 
and geo-political interests while honouring commitments to regional alliances, the US maintains one 
of its heftiest armed presences in the Pacific. This deployment includes fixed assets, mobile platforms 
and bolstering those operated by friendly forces in the region672. 
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The regional US presence is overseen by the United States Indo-Pacific Fleet Command 
(INDOPACOM). It in turn strategically directs the various regional components, including some 
relevant to the contingency; forces in Guam, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and most critically – the US 
Seventh Fleet. The various combatants enable a host of varied fire and support roles. These range 
from the decidedly offensive such as missile cruisers, to superiority missions such as fixed-wing 
aircraft operating from both carrier and bases, to the deployment of Special Forces. Sea-based assets 
are complemented by land-based fixed resources, primarily operating out of Japan and South Korea. 
The largest of these is the Okinawan Kadena Air Base, hosting the US Air Force’s 18th Wing alongside 
other personnel topping 20,000 active members. The aggregation of various US capabilities in the 
region translates to a sprawling defensive posture spanning multiple locales, available mission types 
and capabilities. As such, US military concentrations in the region qualitatively outstrip even some of 
their hosting nations.  
US forces operating in the region benefit from an intricate mesh of interconnectedness between the 
various fielded elements. From tactical units comprised of infantrymen, warplanes, surface 
combatants and submarines to higher echelons such as forward operating bases, regional commands 
and continental agencies, all are thoroughly intertwined through the various incarnations and 
manifestations of the Department of Defense Information Network (DoDIN). The network serves as a 
compartmentalized, multi-tiered and multi-protocol communication grid tasked with facilitation of all 
manners of data transfer673.  
There are dozens of military networks of varying roles in constant use by US forces. Some are 
globe-spanning networks such as the unclassified NIPRnet and the classified SIPRnet, or the top-
secret intelligence-sharing JWICS network674. Others are specific to the region of operation, such as 
the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), used by US forces and their allies for 
some warfighter communication675. Others still are localized to either a single strike group or a limited 
operational frame, including closed radio groups and dedicated datalinks. The transmission mediums 
for such networks are as diverse as the networks themselves, ranging from military satellites, 
commercial satellites, and terrestrial radio to fixed fibre-optic links. The overall interconnectivity of 
these networks is a convoluted patchwork of connections, constructed piecemeal over the decades to 
support increased requirements for joint force operations.   
Complete destruction of US forces in the region is unlikely and unnecessary. Rather – and this 
approach is sponsored by PLA doctrine676 - an optimal solution is an indirect one that inhibits US 
capability to intervene in a timely manner. This is accomplished through three primary components: 
(1) degrading US military capability to conduct joint operations effectively; (2) deterring the US from 
activating assets due to overwhelming odds of casualties; (3) Directly reducing adversary available 
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wartime assets. This strategy has been labelled “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2AD) in some US official 
publications677, as it is clear that the PLA will seek to quickly prevent US from committing forces to the 
area in any military scenario. As there is currently no conventional military parity between both 
actors, the PLA has stated it will seek asymmetrical advantages by way of accurate missile capability, 
anti-satellite weaponry and indeed, cyber-warfare. Each of the above objectives stands to benefit from 
a pre-prepared well-crafted offensive network capability, arguably a significant symmetry equalizer.  
MONOs only partially fit an A2AD approach to defence. On one hand, denying adversary access to 
a region and freedom of action within it as a result of persistent event-based attacks against its 
networks is viable. Event-based capabilities are meant to be reusable and are therefore more robust, 
thereby implying a persistent threat of denial to would be intruders. In contrast, presence-based 
capabilities entail intruding directly upon adversary networks wherever those may be. Thus, the 
geographic aspect inherent to A2AD applies less to non-geographic operational capabilities such as 
presence-based attacks. They may be used de-facto to facilitate area denial of adversary forces, but 
such attacks do not as neatly conform to a “threat radius” as other A2AD components often do.  
Degrading the joint operational capacity of a thoroughly networked adversary entails striking at 
communication nerve centres. For a modern military force, these are embodied by ‘Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance’ – or C4ISR- nodes. 
These are information hubs tasked with coordinating the operation of local military assets, absorbing 
and disseminating intelligence, conducting mission tasking, locating and designating targets, and 
redirecting assets as required. While modern warfighters are more than capable of operating alone or 
within their tactical frame678, they are surely to be outmatched by even a relatively inferior opponent 
whose moving parts are working in relative operational harmony. PLA strategy recognizes the 
immense value embodied by C4ISR as a target679, specifically one that potentially reduces enemy 
preparedness when successfully compromised680.  
Offensive network operations offer an enticing alternative towards attaining the objective, 
provided they are employed effectively. MONOs provide a wide range of options, contrary to the 
rather straightforward, destructive qualities of kinetic weaponry. Compromising C4ISR for 
surveillance rather than kinetically attacking it affords unparalleled enemy situation awareness. As 
command and control nodes concentrate activity of warfighters in the region, the operational 
intelligence value of compromising them may be crucial to countering enemy deployments and asset 
distribution. By employing a network operation, a commander can possibly attain battlefield 
superiority before the first shots are fired. If situational awareness is insufficient to the task, 
disruptive MONOs also serve as a beneficial option. Whereas forcibly destroying command systems 
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will immediately trigger countermeasures and lead to conflict escalation, MONOs may enable subtle 
disruption of data pipelines681. 
OVERPOWERING TAIWAN 
Taiwan as an adversary presents numerous challenges and opportunities for MONOs. On one 
hand, limited access to military equipment acquisition and a reliance on aging platforms means that 
the networked attack surface is significant. Persistent use of the same technologies, networks, and 
systems leaves neighbouring China with plenty of opportunities to both develop presence-based 
operations and conduct research and development on event-based capabilities. Conversely, that same 
reality means that in contrast to their American allies, Taiwan’s military has physical redundancies 
and are likely more capable of conducting combat operations even bereft of networked command and 
control.  
Versus the Taiwanese military, stated PLA doctrine would seek to severely degrade anti-air assets, 
cripple command and control capabilities, disable defensive warfighting assets such as aircraft, ships 
and missile sites, and decapitate the military and civilian hierarchy. The opening salvo is designed to 
facilitate follow-up operations and erode the Taiwanese military’s capability to resist the more 
casualty-prone phases. Put simply, a successful opening salvo has the potential to significantly shorten 
the duration of conflict and reduce PLA losses, both elements defined as highly desirable by PLA 
leadership. To achieve this, the PLA is investing heavily in methods and capabilities that would 
increase the potency of the early stages of conflict, including ballistic missiles, amphibious landing 
hardware, air power, and MONOs.  
Some presence-based operations could yield returns prior to open hostilities. Due to the limited 
size of its defence-industrial complex, Taiwan presents a fairly small supply chain attack surface. Most 
of the national security research and development programs are spearheaded by the National Chun-
Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). Considering China’s proclivity for targeting 
adversary defence contractors, it undoubtedly attempts to similarly target the NCSIST. Successful 
compromise could result in intimate access to Taiwan’s indigenous technology, with the added 
potential benefit of introducing vulnerabilities that could be exploited in conflict time. The notion of 
bundling malicious software with equipment is not new to China; it has been previously implicated in 
a variety of supply chain compromises that either include its own hardware or tampering with existing 
components682. Thus, the operational expertise theoretically exists, yet it remains unclear whether 
China can wield it to impact the Taiwanese defence industry.   
A kinetic approach would rely on a mixture of shock operations and massive mobilisation. 
Extensive literature has been written on the PLA’s capacity to effectively render airbases out of 
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commission683. Strike vectors will include a high volume of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), 
land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and air-launched cruise missiles to overwhelm defences and 
penetrate hardened aircraft shelters, while simultaneously blanketing runway with specialized 
munitions designed to disable take-off capabilities. This brute-force approach stands to be highly 
effective against exposed targets, but is one expected by Taiwan’s armed forces for decades, which 
appropriately applied countermeasures. These include several highly resistant sprawling military 
command centres built into various mountainsides. The mountainous topography of Taiwan allows 
for effective dispersal of command and control, which in turn cannot easily be knocked out by ballistic 
missiles or air attacks, conventional or otherwise. Assessments suggest over 2 kiloton of conventional 
yield in order to breach compounds such as the Hengshan Military Command Centre in the Yuan 
Mountain684, a momentous task even for the burgeoning PLA Rocket Force.  
MONOs are uniquely advantageous in this instance by subverting physical barriers. Specifically, in 
order to effectively serve as command and control centres in wartime, hardened complexes must be 
networked both to warfighting platforms and other installations. As a result, they can be compromised 
via their datalinks from an external source, or internally by a sympathetic officer infecting internal 
nodes. Upon successful compromise, the attacks could potentially be crippling and severely degrade 
Taiwanese defensive coordination. As previously explored, the preparation phase for such presence-
based objectives can be pursued in peacetime, as penetrating, manoeuvring, and weaponizing 
adversary command and control networks may take months or years. During this time, presence-
based capabilities may offer incremental benefits by way of gleaned intelligence on Taiwan’s order of 
battle and force disposition.   
Presence-based attacks could offer early benefits against Taiwanese integrated air defence systems 
(IADS). The efforts to defend Taiwan’s skies must crucially be subverted early on to enable PLA 
theatre air operations and protect amphibious landings. Taiwanese air defence platforms include US-
made Patriot batteries, indigenous short-range Antelope systems that incorporate US Sidewinder 
missiles, and indigenous Tien Kung (Sky Bow) systems. As per a 2016 RAND report, while the PLA Air 
Force is increasingly capable of rapidly subduing its ROC counterpart, air defences potentially present 
a greater challenge with high attrition rates for attacking PLA aircraft685. Presence-based capabilities 
could temporarily interfere with air defence systems by partially disabling them or otherwise 
degrading the situational awareness they provide, allowing PLA aircraft and missiles to penetrate and 
defeat radars and missile batteries. Such an attack could yield a strategic benefit, but also requires 
significant skill and resources; while China surely has the former it may not yet have the latter. 
Penetrating secure military networks, remaining covert, and developing intricate offensive tools 
meant to impact dedicated military hardware is no mean feat. It requires familiarisation with the 
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platforms affected, technical skill to develop exploitation capabilities against them, and operational 
oversight to avoid exposing the presence-based campaign prematurely.  
Beyond the initial phases of the campaign options for MONOs become somewhat more limited 
against Taiwan’s forces. With the desire to shorten the conflict, it is likely that any sensitive military 
networks within the PLA’s grasp were already attacked in the opening phases of combat. While 
Taiwanese forces may be in disarray and scrambling to wipe clean their affected systems and 
networks, generating new presence-based attacks might become exponentially more difficult. This 
does not immediately imply, however, that MONOs cannot assist PLA efforts to attain airborne 
superiority and forge a path to expeditionary forces to successfully establish beachheads on Taiwanese 
soil. Furthermore, a body entrusted with metered use of MONOs such as the SSF may choose to 
reserve some strategic presence-based operations for this phase of the campaign. Overall 
opportunities for MONOs are plentiful, including affecting Taiwanese systems meant to provide 
situational awareness. Impacting these could assist incursion forces in surprising entrenched 
defenders and keeping them in disarray, a prerequisite if the campaign is to succeed. Event-based 
operations could be activated against pockets of resistance as these are picked off by the PLA, 
providing cover for kinetic operations and degrading defensive capabilities.  
Alternatively, event-based capabilities against Taiwanese military equipment may retain their 
potency during the course of the conflict. A few observations work in China’s benefit in this regard. 
The first is that Taiwan relies heavily on US-made equipment such as the F-16A/B multirole fighter. 
As the F-16’s in active use with US forces and their Taiwanese versions share technical characteristics, 
event-based attacks developed against US communication protocols may work well against their 
Taiwanese counterparts686.  Second, while Taiwan’s modernisation programs continue apace, they are 
hampered due to political sensitivities often preventing the US from significant sales of high-quality 
offensive platforms687. As a result, Taiwanese forces are limited to updating increasing quantities of 
aging systems such as the F-16 and the M60 Patton tank. This means that event-based capabilities 
developed against Taiwanese equipment may retain their potency for an extended time, allowing the 
PLA to gradually accumulate an arsenal of such options. Lastly, indigenous platforms such as the F-
CK IDF fighter aircraft would need to use systems and protocols compatible with their US-made 
counterparts in order to facilitate joint operations, thereby extending some of the event-based attack 
surface to them as well. 
Directly attacking civilian infrastructure may become an attractive option. While direct-fire 
resources are embattled with Taiwanese forces and potentially allied US assets, MONOs are 
purportedly standing by. Uniquely, the possibility for disruption of civilian life is both possible and 
mentioned in PLA doctrine688. As wholly conquering Taiwan militarily is both a lengthy, arduous 
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endeavour and prone to invoking deep civil unrest, coercing the government into capitulation is a far 
more promising scenario. As a corollary, while military forces attempt to cripple Taiwan’s self-
perceived chances of victory, network forces can begin to erode the public’s morale, stamina and 
wherewithal. As previously presented, network attacks are unlikely to affect coercion on their own; yet 
coupled with a withering kinetic campaign, they may serve a caustic function against Taiwan’s 
national fortitude.  
Perhaps mostly easy to target would be Taiwan’s internet infrastructure. This could be done in 
several ways, including kinetic operations against fibre landing points and satellite communication 
facilities used by internet service providers. Alternatively, China could fall back to tried and true 
methods. In April 2010, a sizeable of the global internet’s traffic was rerouted through China by 
provider China Telecom for 15 minutes in a phenomenon called BGP hijacking. The impact included a 
full redirection of traffic associated with a broad range of networks, including some sensitive – though 
ostensibly encrypted - Western government networks689. While the occurrence was brief and 
observers are unconvinced that it was intentional due to its technical characteristics, targeted 
takeovers of global or regional network traffic remains a distinct possibility. Including traffic hijacking 
attacks against Taiwanese internet providers could help sow confusion and limit the ability of the 
island to communicate internally and externally.  
Attacking Taiwanese civilian infrastructure with MONOs has several potential benefits. These 
include ambiguity, deniability and diffusion. Ambiguity is the sheer complexity derived from 
identifying the nature and source of the attack. Whereas a kinetic attack is immediately visible and 
detectable, a subtle cyber-attack against sewage treatment, electricity manufacture or civilian logistics 
is far harder to trace. Deniability relates to the attacker plausible distancing himself from the attack, 
again a feat nearly impossible with a war-time missile strike. While one can argue that deniability isn’t 
required in a state of warfare, a desire to avoid global escalation with perceived war crimes against 
civilians remains strong. Controversial actions may be blamed on “patriotic hackers” seeking to aid 
their country in a time of conflict, or even attributed to war-time chaos. Commensurately, one must 
recall that the CPC ultimately seeks reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, rather than its 
destruction. Alienating the population of Taiwan will only serve to complicate future attempts to 
enforce PRC sovereignty over Taiwan.  Finally, diffusion is the subtle art of conducting network 
operations over time. Rather than singularly striking a target, a clever operator can continuously 
influence systems by ebbing and flowing within a single presence-based intrusion. By mimicking 
natural system behaviour and periodically injecting interference, an attacker can negatively impact the 
target over time without being discovered. In contrast, conventional attacks immediately elicit 
adversary attention if successful, and therefore subtlety is rarely a requirement.  
DEFEATING NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
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Due to the unique blend of geopolitical circumstances, China cannot rely on MONOs to 
persistently keep it below the threshold of warfare690. As Taiwan drifts further away from its notional 
grasp, options towards reclaiming the island grow decidedly few. Yet even if kinetic conflict will 
eventually be deemed necessary, that does not mean that MONOs have no potential contribution. On 
the contrary, they may facilitate strategic surprise that otherwise denied to the PLA or assist in 
whittling down defenders and their capacity to operate as a joint force. Taiwan’s military, a force built 
in the shadow of its Western benefactors, relies on many of the same doctrinal principles and older 
versions of the same technologies.  It is therefore useful to examine how the new Chinese approach to 
intangible warfare may be used to counter US and Taiwanese advantages in the region.  
US C4ISR capabilities includes three main components that bear the brunt of such activity; aerial 
platforms such as AWACS691 planes, fixed bases in Japan such as Kadena or Sasesbo and the US 
Navy’s sole command ship in the Pacific, the USS Blue Ridge. All three assets are defended by fighter 
craft, anti-air batteries, ground detachments and assorted naval vessels. An effective kinetic strike 
against the unified C4ISR capability is quite possible given enough resources dedicated to the task of 
overwhelming the defenders, but it is a highly costly endeavour. In Liddell-Hart’s terminology, 
pursuing such an attack would be adopting the direct approach – a dangerous choice in which 
commanders strike against an enemy’s strongest flank. This would inherently result in far greater 
casualties and increased friction between the PLA and US forces, further decreasing chances of clean 
de-escalation.   
Due to its scenario-centrality, assaulting US C4ISR is worth examining with further specificity. 
There are several communication layers that all come together to form the complete command 
network, loosely corresponding to a simplified version of the well-known OSI Seven Layers Model692 
borrowed from computer science. The first meaningful layer is the physical layer, which includes the 
actual medium through which communication is conducted. The second shall be labelled the data-
packet layer, which signifies the passage of a signal encoded piece of digital data from origin to 
destination. The third layer shall be designated the data-stream layer, defined as continuous 
communication between two or more nodes. The fourth and final layer is the presentation layer, 
which entails reflecting communicated data to operators and allowing them to respond accordingly. 
Each of these layers can be compromised through different attack vectors, culminating in a highly 
varied attack surface. 
For C4ISR systems, the medium is mostly radio-frequency electromagnetic transmissions. In 
modern times, these are always encrypted and jam-resistant693 to prevent opportunistic listeners and 
standard jamming techniques. However, assuming the message has been successfully received and 
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decrypted by the other side, there is no originator verification in some US protocols694. Consequently, 
there is some vulnerability to spoofing attacks, provided correctly configured, viable equipment is 
employed.  
Several layers of data sharing and situational awareness protocols are used by the various US 
warfighters, constituting the overall C4ISR image. These include the JTIDS (Joint Tactical 
Information Distribution System), an encrypted, jam-resistant radio frequency data transfer platform. 
The system implements the widely-used Link-16 protocol695 to facilitate both data and tactical 
communication between various friendly assets operated by the US and its NATO allies696. The 
complete specification for Link-16, including frequencies, message codes and protocol options are 
freely available online697. Provided the PLA has compromised a single valid Link-16 decryptor, 
completely reconstructing the traffic is fairly intuitive. The lengthy JTIDS project is currently 
spearheaded by BAE Systems, a well-known British defence company. Of relevance, BAE had been 
previously breached in 2009 by malicious nation-state actors698. The hack reportedly resulted in data 
exfiltration, including data pertinent to the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program, the costly 
collaborative efforts geared towards producing the next-generation multirole warplane.  
The data-packet layer is easier to influence via an event-based attack. Curiously, the US regularly 
publishes a full account of its command and control protocols to a highly detailed technical 
specification, removing the need to reverse-engineer the protocol. Specifically, modern 
communication between Link-16 endpoints include ‘J12.0’ messages, defined in the protocol 
handbook as “Mission Assignment” messages699. Put plainly, a hostile participant in the network can 
potentially re-task warfighters and assign them new targeting information. Even if the human 
operator identifies a targeting anomaly, tracking friendly warfighters is usually accomplished via the 
standardized Link-16 and Link-22 protocols, among others. Due to the pervasive need for real-time 
performance, there are few to no security measures in place to ensure message legitimacy. As the 
protocol details, each Link-16 active node is expected to continuously report back its position and 
sensory output700 to assist in the overall battlefield awareness. As such, a new Link-16 node could 
easily register on the current network as a command-capable node. Tracking the origin of a network 
compromise is difficult in the middle of combat operations. 
The data-stream layer holds potential for a different variety of MONOs. If a hostile entity has 
successfully been introduced into an enemy Link-16 or Link-22 network, it can effectively begin to 
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transmit conflicting messages to all participants and command units. A repeated attempt at 
overloading the regional Link-16 deployment is equivalent to a battlefield Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack. The resulting chaos would be difficult to distinguish in the heat of conflict, especially if a wily 
attacker is both generating a great deal of traffic while simultaneously spoofing its origin.   
Finally, compromising the presentation layer, or specifically the terminals used by US forces is the 
most plausible scenario by way of a presence-based operation. As seen in architecture diagrams, 
C4ISR nodes are highly networked to support common services offered by DoD networks, including 
intelligence sharing, data communication and logistical support701. As a result, attacker lateral 
movement towards C4I networks is expected, where a great deal of damage can be done. Once there, a 
compromised terminal means the attacker can effectively manipulate any message both received and 
transmitted. Targets can disappear off screen, and fake messages can be cascaded from the system 
and onto the unsuspecting network. This will inherently complicate attempts to launch missiles, 
assign targets to friendly assets and simply conduct battlefield assessments.  
The critical hardware and software that makes up US deployed electronics is developed by its 
expansive defence-industrial complex. These are spearheaded by several corporations such as 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, who most often win the lucrative contracts. 
Examples are plentiful, including the AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare Suite used by multiple naval 
platforms and developed by Raytheon and the Navy’s Distributed Information Operations System, 
designed by Lockheed Martin to facilitate battlefield situational awareness702. Lockheed Martin was 
too notoriously breached in 2011 by a foreign entity, during which copious amounts of sensitive 
intellectual property were exfiltrated from their internal networks703. While security and awareness 
have increased, so has the rate and quality of the subsequent attempted attacks on the company’s 
assets704.  
A clear example of the operational attractiveness of an MONOs against a C4ISR node is the US 
Navy’s Aegis Destroyer. The ship class is entrusted with both air-defence and missile-defence roles for 
naval strike groups. As such, these combatants are fitted with a highly capable combat management 
environment named the Aegis Combat System, or ACS705. This is a catchall phrase encompassing the 
destroyer's radars, targeting and ordnance capabilities. Considering its centrality and the 
interconnectedness of the Aegis platform, the opportunity and potential advantages of MONOs are 
abundant.  
                                                             
701 Global Security, “AEGIS Combat System,” Global Security, accessed October 2, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/aegis.htm. 
702 Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin to Enhance U.S. Navy’s C4ISR Capabilities,” Naval Today, July 1, 2014, 
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At the heart of the ACS is the AN/SPY-1 radar by Lockheed Martin, which is managed by the 
Navy’s standard AN/UYQ-70 computer terminals706. As documentation reveals, modern iterations of 
the project have taken strides towards Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) solutions by adopting well-
used architectures that would be cheaper to maintain and upgrade707. Updating software versions on 
shipboard components requires a hefty cycle of preliminary testing and preparation, which means that 
if a vulnerability is discovered in the legacy Solaris operating system variant used aboard the 
AN/UYQ-70, it could take several long months before it is subsequently patched out. A shift to 
standardized, commercial products ensures greater availability of documentation, software and 
hardware samples to the adversary, reducing the level of complexity required to craft a suitable event-
based capability. Once developed, these may retain their efficacy for a number of years, and are not 
likely to be mitigated during conflict time short of turning off the system itself. A successful event or 
presence-based attack against the Aegis Combat System could disrupt the trust between operator and 
machine, thereby increasing confusion and decreasing overall combat effectiveness.   
In another valuable example, the latest incarnation of the Tomahawk missile (block IV) used by US 
forces incorporates full-duplex satellite networking708. It both transmits telemetry in flight and is fully 
capable of receiving remote commands, such as retargeting parameters or an abort order. Data 
communication is facilitated over a network aptly named “Tomahawk Strike Network” (TSN), which 
reportedly allows “…anybody who has the authority to log-on… [and] take control of the missile”709. 
The granularity of control is significant enough to allow inflight retargeting of the missile, by an 
operator situated in a wholly different facility than the operator who originally launched the missile. 
Plans are underway to even further integrate the missile with its surroundings. This will be 
accomplished by allowing its targeting module to receive sensory output from friendly assets such as 
UAVs and land radars while also integrating the entire network to work over the aforementioned 
Link-16 protocol.  
Multi-tiered integration of Tomahawks into a software-managed, remotely-controllable 
environment means the cyber-attack surface is massive. Indeed, provided the PLA successfully 
compromises a TSN control node, they can effectively neutralize Tomahawks en-route to strike PLA 
missile bases, thus preventing the US from intervening in the conflict prior to naval craft arrival on the 
scene. Interference may be subtle; rather than having missiles veer off course or return to their 
senders, simply increasing their circular error probable (CEP) by a few metres would result in difficult 
to detect errors. Even if US operators are eventually alerted to a compromise, they will nonetheless be 
forced to bring the TSN down pending a forensic investigation in order to avoid possible friendly fire 
                                                             
706 PR Newswire, “Lockheed Martin and DRS Technologies Deliver 4000th AN/UYQ-70 Ship Display System to the U.S. Navy,” PR 
Newswire, May 11, 2012, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lockheed-martin-and-drs-technologies-deliver-4000th-anuyq-70-
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708 U.S. Navy, “The US Navy Fact File: Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” US Navy Official Website, accessed October 1, 2015, 
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709 Jane’s, “Exploiting The Network For Smarter Weapon Effects” (Jane’s International Defence Review, August 2015), 2. 
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incidents or any further mishandling of launched Tomahawks. For the duration of the conflict, the 
damage to combat readiness and efficacy will have already been done.   
In the final phase of conflict, a more cautious outlook becomes crucial as all parties involved 
scramble to adapt and return to operational capacity in the wake of conventional strikes and MONOs 
used against key networked assets. Some networked platforms have likely been sufficiently 
compromised as to be extricated from their respective operators’ trust circles, therefore rendering 
them ineffective while they are thoroughly scrubbed. Conversely, intensive measures to rapidly restore 
reliability to critical networks (such as the US NIPRnet710) would likely return some operational 
capacity, with future attacks much harder to execute. US forces routinely practice recovery 
procedures, reducing the overall operational cycle duration711. This will perhaps give the US and 
Taiwan a slight edge as networked capabilities gradually return, once again enabling the 
overwhelming force of the US joint warfare apparatus to function as required.  
China’s strategy entails utilizing critical capabilities in a single, pre-emptive decapitating strike 
against US and Taiwanese forces. As a corollary, key MONOs against hardened military targets have 
likely been spent, leaving PRC capability arsenal rather limited, if not altogether eliminated. A 
different vector of attack – not easily countered – now becomes far more attractive for PLA operators. 
These would be keyed towards continued degradation of US and Taiwan military forces still active, 
while physical forces continue their engagement.  Key among these are event-based denial attacks, 
centred around hampering quality of communications between networked components. Several 
considerations contribute to the likelihood and success probability of such attacks. Firstly, copious 
amounts of US military traffic are routinely channelled through public transport means712. This 
includes the civilian Internet, commercial satellites and various other multi-use platforms. Even if the 
transmitted traffic itself is encrypted - which it often is - disruption of the entire channel via a 
concentrated traffic flooding will cause reduced service for the medium itself, effectively knocking the 
communicating parties offline. Secondly, denial attacks are feasible even in the absence of persistent 
network presence, as they can be launched against the medium itself, much like Internet-based 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks commonly wielded by low-level hacker-activists and 
cybercriminals against websites. Thirdly, Taiwan presents a relatively limited attack surface, as the 
small nation has a comparatively diminutive network infrastructure that may be easily overwhelmed 
by PLA operators. Fourthly, magnification of attack strength is possible even in lieu of substantial 
infrastructure, by employing “amplification” attacks713. 
                                                             
710 USCYBERCOM devotes ever-increasing budgets and attention to both safeguarding and recuperating from attacks against critical 
networks.  
711 U.S. Homeland Security, “Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future” (U.S. Homeland Security, November 2011), 16. 
712 U.S. Army, “Deployed Tactical Network Guidance,” 1; Coile, “WIN-T SATCOM Overview Briefing,” 8; Epperson, “Satellite 
Communications Within the Army’s WIN-T Architecture,” 9. 
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TOWARDS RAPID RESOLUTION 
China must exploit asymmetry in its military operations. Whether it is trying to reclaim Taiwan, 
deter US freedom of navigation operations, project power across the South and East China Seas, or 
forcibly claim other disputed islands in its vicinity, conventional strength matters but is insufficient. 
The region arguably presents the greatest concentration of modern military power in the world, 
fragmented across numerous stakeholders. As the Taiwan Straits and the adjoining seas represent 
critical economic interests for all, any conflict waged would ideally be short and decisive. The PLA 
clearly pursues this direction, by developing a host of capabilities and doctrine to rapidly offset the 
advantages of its adversaries. 
With its expeditious pursuit of modernisation, the PLA has invigorated its doctrine to reflect 
lessons learned from its global adversaries. Conflicts waged by and against the US prove both the 
importance of integrated, network-laden operations and the unique attack surface that they afford. 
MONOs are emerging as one of several asymmetric capabilities that may subvert the advantages of a 
technological force heavily reliant upon its qualitative superiority. Creating pockets of operational 
space can mean the difference between swift victory and protracted stalemates, the latter clearly 
detrimental to Chinese objectives. Doctrinal writings including Unrestricted Warfare714 but more 
importantly the Science of Military Strategy715 do well to reflect the understanding that information 
shapes the battlefield. Dominance in the information space may permeate into other operational 
spheres. The establishing of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) has been opaque to external observers, 
but similarly indicates an understanding that MONO efforts must be consolidated if they are to be 
done right. Rather than claiming cyberspace as a domain, Chinese doctrine recognises that 
information operations and MONOs are present in all other facets of warfighting across the 
conventional domains. It is about exacting value and efficiency rather than codifying combat in 
networks as a separate entity with its own governing rules. This early maturity may assist China in 
rapidly integrating MONOs into warfighting. 
As with many PLA capabilities, it is unclear how this Chinese maturity extends beyond the 
theoretical. Creating organisational entities and organising strategic thought is important, but not 
nearly sufficient to become operationally successful. In contrast to its prime competitor in the region, 
the United States, China lacks prerequisite experience in conducting MONOs, joint military 
operations, and amphibious campaigns. Considering the previously discussed complexity of both 
presence-based and event-based MONOs, it is unclear whether at this point in time they will serve the 
nascent SSF well if required. However, the PLA benefits from extensive experience in network 
espionage campaigns including against applicable defence industries and government organisations. 
This in turn may offer a degree of familiarity which would reduce the overhead in weaponizing these 
networks against their owners.  
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Against Taiwan, the PLA would seek to rapidly achieve victory to avoid an extend period of conflict 
which would inevitably drag allies such as the US into the fray. Campaign objectives mesh well with 
the potential benefits of MONOs; achieving strategic and tactical surprise, bypassing concentrations of 
forces, and degrading networked defences along with the capacity to wage joint operations. For the 
PLA, MONOs may find a natural slot alongside ballistic missiles in limiting the Taiwan’s ability to 
marshal an effective defence before it is too late. Similarly, a measure of ambiguity afforded by 
MONOs and their ability to afford pin-point targeting may offer value in creating an expanded anti-
air, access-denial (A2AD) envelope against interceding US forces. By creating confusion, degraded 
situational awareness and reducing hard power projection, US carrier groups and land-based assets 
may only be able to effectively assist Taiwanese defenders when it is too late, or at least too late to 
prevent initial amphibious landings.  
Finally, while the Taiwan Contingency presents a uniquely complex military scenario for the PRC, 
its principals reverberate through others. Sudden campaigns to overtake territory are commonplace 
for the PLA, and regional powers have expressed concerns that this strategy approach may be applied 
towards their own disputes. In an alarming scenario to Japan and its US ally, the PRC has previously 
threatened to overtake the disputed Senkaku Islands - or Daiyou by their Chinese name – by what 
they called “a short, sharp war”. This portends exactly the type of conflict in which MONOs could 
increase the fog of war in service of a limited island-hopping campaign against unprepared defenders. 
Whether the PLA is capable of pulling an elaborate joint campaign such as this remains to be seen, but 
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8. A REVOLUTION IN CYBER AFFAIRS 
OVERVIEW 
Technology advances at an accelerating pace. Where scientific discoveries were once few and far in 
between, the twentieth century has reduced the turnaround rate for innovation. This trend has 
accelerated over the twenty-first century, in which products and devices once considered 
revolutionary may seem dated within five years of their inception. It is therefore understandable to 
contend that any model offered for operations in and against networks would not stand the test of 
time; these too would lose their relevance within a few years of their conception. The very agility that 
is required in those that operate against technology is required by those who write about it.  
The characteristics of modern digitization are accelerated by a few key trends that are expected to 
become prevalent over the coming years. The first is the development of artificial intelligence (AI), 
software capable of independent problem-solving in a capacity exceeding existing deterministic 
methods and machine-learning algorithms. The second is tightly linked to the first and entails the 
meteoric rise in autonomous platforms across their myriad uses. Self-governing systems are becoming 
increasingly adept at solving complex tasks previously only accessible to humans, which in turn 
results in more responsibilities and tasks being offset to them. Lastly, an adoption of simulated 
environments – augmented reality (AR), virtual reality (VR), and mixed reality (MR), are likely to 
create new forms of communication, congregation, and operation that may deeply impact the 
interface between man and machine. Each one of these three trends are already seeping into military 
research and development, and could adversely affect the manner in which networks may be 
targetable in the coming future. Yet that is not necessarily the case.  
This chapter contends that the underlying characteristics of MONOs will remain viable at least in 
the short and medium terms. The nature of intangible warfare will not inherently change with the 
next iteration of technology, but rather will exasperate even further. Incorporating AI into decision-
making at all levels of warfare would further distance the ability of people to grasp its complexities, 
thereby increasing the value of targeting technology. An increased reliance on autonomous platforms, 
rich sensory input overlaid on reality, and opaque algorithms assisting in all aspects of warfare 
ensures that these would become crucial targets. The notion of weaponizing an adversary against itself 
becomes even more prevalent. 
These latest trends in technology do not represent a break from existing themes; they represent the 
latest cycle of counter-innovation accompanying intangible warfare. The rise of networking has 
resulted in MONOs, which in turn might eventually breed counter-MONOs in the form of autonomous 
AI-based defences716. Sparks of this already exist; such mechanisms are now purportedly included in 
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recently proven by the DARPA-supported “Cyber Grand Challenge”, in which multiple AI “Cyber Reasoning Systems” competed against one 
172 
 
  Daniel Moore 
various offering by private-sector information security companies. These claim to employ limited 
implementations of AI in various instances, such as network anomaly detection, malware analysis, 
and social network analysis. Such solutions rely on the flexibility of modern learning algorithms to 
enrich existing approaches rather than supplant them; they are not autonomous network defence 
solutions. Network defence AIs – potentially capable of outpacing human operators – could be 
countered by AI-supported MONOs capable of higher levels of agility and adaptability within 
adversary networks. Rather than targeting sensory inputs which would in turn deceive the operators 
that observe them, it becomes useful to target technology at more abstract levels. Target the data flows 
that shape perception for AI, which then incorrectly inform their operators and misalign their 
situational awareness. The idea of shaping human behaviour remains the same, the attack simply 
distances further from the humans being targeted. 
It is important to continuously evaluate the viability of MONOs. As information security practices 
arguably improve over time, we theoretically expect to generate less software vulnerabilities. As a 
result, networks should gradually become increasingly resilient and less susceptible to MONOs. While 
that may eventually be the case, as of 2018, even decades-old techniques continue to be effective 
against “hardened” targets, and organisations large and small are repeatedly breached. Trends in 
increased security are countered by others, such as the proliferation of low-cost, low-quality, low-
security devices that impact daily life on a greater scale717. Even as the rate of by-default network 
encryption increases718, individuals increasingly introduce always-on microphones and GPS tracking 
into their lives, thereby opting in to monitoring that was previously difficult to achieve. Existing 
approaches to exploiting software may eventually diminish, only to be replaced by logical flaws or the 
“poisoning” of the algorithms to which we have delegated so much responsibility.   
Even as Libicki claimed software vulnerabilities to be a transient feature of computing, others 
remain unconvinced719. Certain categories of software bugs may reduce in prevalence as issues are 
systematically addressed and development practices improve. Others would remain and are 
inherently more difficult to stomp out. New types of vulnerabilities would likely be introduced, 
corresponding to new technologies. Some may be logical in nature rather than directed at breaking 
code and would instead seek to subvert the algorithms themselves by manipulating their inputs in 
significant ways.  
The trajectory of software vulnerabilities is extrinsic to the success of MONOs; it is the increased 
human dependency on technology which ensures continued vulnerability. As humanity delegates 
more functions to increasingly complex autonomous systems, the very ability to detect that something 
is amiss decreases. Already, the specific decision-making process that guides algorithms such as 
                                                             
another in autonomously detecting threats, thwarting attacks, and mitigating vulnerabilities. See Teresa Nicole Brooks, “Survey of 
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718 Adrienne Porter Felt et al., “Measuring HTTPS Adoption on the Web,” in 26th USENIX Security Symposium, 2017, 1326–29. 
719 Libicki, “Why Cyber Will Not and Should Not HAve Its Grand Strategist,” 31. 
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neural networks is fully opaque to all but a handful of people. The sophistication of software logic is 
rapidly deepening, rendering its rationale hazier to users and even many developers. It becomes 
therefore plausible that at some point, errors maliciously introduced into these processes may become 
unnoticeable by people. By one way or another MONOs will likely remain possible for the foreseeable 
future.  
Despite rapid progress, humanity is only at the early stages of autonomous software and is hence 
limited in its capacity to assess its impact. This is no less true for the viability of MONOs, though some 
key indicators are already emerging. Militaries are already introducing growing quantities of 
autonomous platforms across all levels of operations. These platforms will be more capable of 
performing complex tasks. Use of artificial intelligence may enable battlefield superiority in a 
networked world, but at a cost; human ability to comprehend and directly control the elements of 
warfare may shrink, increasing the threat and potential efficacy of MONOs as an operational method 
of choice. If more aspects of warfighting are governed by software and software-controlled hardware, 
the software itself becomes a key target worth relentlessly pursuing, either through event-based or 
longer presence-based capabilities. 
This final chapter is understandably more limited than its formers. For one, access to details on 
bleeding edge military developments mentioned throughout is understandably restricted. Still, 
strategic publications indicate overall directions and developmental priorities. Similarly, 
developments within the military sector are often tightly correlated to advancements in the private 
sector, those being less opaque. At the same time and with the accelerating pace of technological 
advancements, even trends may shift or be rendered obsolete within a relatively limited timespan720. 
As previously detailed, advancements form counter-innovation cycles that may be difficult to predict. 
Each cycle is reflective of the previous step, which makes predicting beyond a single cycle unwieldy. 
Yet, even modern advancements in networking, robotics, multi-domain warfighting, and artificial 
intelligence have all been discussed extensively since the twentieth century. As previously indicated in 
the chapter on intangible warfare, technological developments and their integration into warfighting 
are firmly rooted in history. While the pace of advancement may accelerate, its products have a 
traceable lineage to existing developments. The challenges of tomorrow may be different, but they will 
undoubtedly evolve from todays.   
BECOMING LESS VULNERABLE 
It is a point of contention whether software is becoming more secure overall. If exploitable 
software vulnerabilities are on the decline, network operations against secure environments become 
significantly harder to accomplish without an immense investment of resources. Were this to be true, 
the economy of MONOs would alter to where resource cost appears less inviting, deterring decision-
makers from risking remaining capabilities within the arsenal. Opinions on the direction of overall 
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vulnerability of software run the gamut and include perspectives both grim and optimistic. In reality, 
both sides offer merit in the arguments. It is reasonable to simultaneously claim that security practices 
have dramatically improved over the last two decades while acknowledging that the attack surface has 
remained massive, and in some cases expanded significantly. We are safer in some respects and more 
exposed in others. This is true both for the military use-case and the civilian. 
On the positive, major operating systems now enjoy significant security features rendering 
compromise increasingly difficult. This extends to up-to-date versions of Microsoft Windows, but also 
improvements to the various Linux/Unix implementations frequently also used in servers and 
hardware deployed in military equipment. These improvements are accompanied by streamlined 
patching cycles that mitigate risks faster than previously possible, further degrading the long-term 
viability of a given attack vector.  Additional, security-centric operating systems have been publicly 
available for several years, offering a tight controls and compartmentalisation of sensitive 
environments, limiting the overall impact of compromising specific software721. Even as mobile 
devices proliferated, they have become increasingly resistant to compromise. Technology company 
Apple has enshrined security as one of its key tenets, and its signature hardware and software 
environments are often favoured by security researchers for their more limited attack surface. 
Security mitigations applied across all levels of computing have made achieving full system 
compromise trickier. Success may now require complex exploit-chaining722, raising the cost of success 
against capable defenders. Perhaps the biggest evidence of this may be seen in the booming exploit 
market, in which private companies seeking to purchase exploits offer rapidly increasing pay-outs723. 
Exploits against high-value targets are more expensive both because of increased demand but also due 
to a declining supply. The entry price has therefore increased to levels that may deter some under-
resourced militaries from effectively participating.  
In sharp contrast, even ancient techniques have retained their operational utility. The underlying 
model of network operations has not changed, despite best efforts by network defenders to reduce its 
effectiveness. Perhaps most pertinently to the military domain, frequently updating vulnerable 
hardware and software remains a key challenge in maintaining an operational environment relatively 
resistant to MONOs. The need for extensive testing, associated costs, risks of decommissioning 
equipment for upgrades, and the continuous need for interoperability with legacy equipment means 
that upgrades may be few and far in between. In some cases, recently detected vulnerabilities were 
embedded so deep in the hardware stack that only radical patching of core functionality could mitigate 
the vulnerability724. In other cases, military equipment developed opaquely by contracted providers is 
                                                             
721 Examples include Qubes, a fully open-source secure Linux variant pertaining to compartmentalise running processes, and Trusted 
End Node Security (TENS), A US Department of Defense lightweight Linux variant. 
722 This process entails capitalising on multiple vulnerabilities within the targeted system in order to gain administrative access and 
achieve persistence. At times, the original exploit used to gain foothold is insufficient to the task and requires lateral movement within the 
system itself through privilege escalation exploits. 
723 For example, as of mid-2018, private exploit company Zerodium offers 1.5 million dollars for a remotely executable exploit 
requiring no user interaction for Apple mobile devices. See https://zerodium.com/program.html.  
724 See for example the Spectre and Meltdown CPU vulnerabilities, which led to widespread panic as they were originally deemed 
unpatchable. While the vulnerabilities were eventually addressed via manufacturer patches and operating system kernel fixes, it indicated 
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not subjected to the same levels of public scrutiny and may therefore exhibit flawed secure 
development processes. Considering the exponentially increased intricacy of a single unit of military 
hardware, the vulnerable attack surface has possibly grown faster than commensurate mitigation 
efforts725.  
Vulnerabilities are not inherently about software. As often repeated, the most vulnerable element 
in many circumstances is the people within them. While the argument on the prevalence of exploitable 
software bugs is certainly relevant, humans retain their innate vulnerability to compromise. The 
evidence to this is damning; even low-quality phishing still succeeds at scale, including against high-
value targets726. Many successful network operations were in some part facilitated either knowingly or 
unwittingly by a compromised individual. This reality is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. 
Perhaps even the opposite is true; people would become even more vulnerable as software gradually 
becomes less so. 
Humanity has gradually introduced vulnerability into its own circumstance. One anecdote that 
demonstrates this is the story of Strava. A seemingly benign private-sector company developing 
fitness devices that track user performance found itself engulfed in an inferno of global attention from 
security researchers after it unveiled an interactive map in late 2017727. The map – intended to be an 
attractive visualization of Strava’s market penetration - aggregated anonymized user activity into heat 
maps, showing where its fitness trackers were used. As many observers quickly realized, the map 
inadvertently revealed patrol routes within military bases, sensitive facilities, and foreign deployments 
of forces728. It was also possible to deanonymize users with relatively minor effort. There was no 
software vulnerability involved with this incident, but it had shown how even military forces could be 
threatened by improper use of civilian technologies by its members. It demonstrated a radical 
expansion of the threat model previously only minimally considered. 
Strava was not an isolated incident; individuals and groups blindly give themselves to technology. 
For perceived benefits people relinquish privacy, sensitive data, or control over aspects of their lives. 
As people increasingly intertwine their daily routine with more connected devices, they further 
increase their vulnerability. These devices become increasingly significant in shaping perception of 
reality itself; tampering with them and the data they rely on may therefore alter that perception in 
weaponizable ways. Military forces are no different in this respect, a growing reliance on data feeds 
and technology makes users inherently more dependent, and therefore – vulnerable.  
                                                             
how complex mitigation was for some hardware vulnerabilities.  See CERT.org, “CPU Hardware Vulnerable to Side-Channel Attacks,” 
Carnegie Mellon University CERT, January 3, 2018, https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/584653. 
725 One apt anecdotes describes the exponential increase in code complexity deployed within military aircraft. See Robert N. Charette, 
“This Car Runs on Code,” IEEE Spectrum: Technology, Engineering, and Science News, February 1, 2009, 
https://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation/systems/this-car-runs-on-code. 
726 Verizon, “2018 Data Breach Investigations Report” (Verizon, 2018), 8, https://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-
lab/dbir/. 
727 Drew Robb, “Building the Global Heatmap,” Strava Engineering (blog), November 1, 2017, https://medium.com/strava-
engineering/the-global-heatmap-now-6x-hotter-23fc01d301de. 




  Daniel Moore 
One such example of this is the increased use of augmented reality (AR). AR includes technology 
that overlays what the eyes normally see with contextual information. Versions of this have existed in 
militaries for many years – heads-up displays for aircraft that overlay targeting information and 
telemetry are long operational. As the technology matures and becomes more prevalent in military 
use, it becomes a vulnerability in its own right. Relying on augmented displays rather than physical 
perception can create a dependency which could be exploited through MONOs that seek to shape what 
the operator sees, causing undesired behaviour. With some MONOs already seeking to softly impact 
the overall perception of reality, this trend may gradually increase in prominence.  
ON INTELLIGENCE 
As with countless other concepts, artificial intelligence (AI) lacks a consensual definition. Even as it 
explodes in popularity and brandished in corporate marketing campaigns, the boundaries of where an 
algorithm ends and artificial intelligence begins are blurry. Per Horowitz, one largely agreeable 
component of AI is that it is capable of achieving its goals in a broader range of circumstances and 
environments than traditional algorithms729. Others designate AI by being able to solve tasks of sheer 
complexity normally handled only by humans, such as speech analysis and contextual decision-
making730. The underlying approach to solving tasks more organically mimics human behaviour by 
gradually adapting and learning from experiences both failed and successful731. AI is thus an 
approximation of facets of human intelligence by software patterns adapted to improve with further 
exposure to inputs.  
It is important to distinguish between two primary forms of AI. Limited applications are already at 
play in various capacities as narrow or modular artificial intelligence, capable of solving domain-
specific tasks. These systems may exhibit above-human levels of success at environments with limited 
variables and rules but cannot be broadly applied against any domain without significant adaptation. 
Examples of this include the “Deep Blue” system that defeated Garry Kasparov at chess in 1997732, or 
the systems competing in DARPA’s Grand Cyber Challenge733. Such systems may achieve previously 
unseen performance when set to specific tasks but would otherwise not be immediately useful to 
solving others. The other type refers to artificial general intelligence (AGI), capable of assessing and 
resolving challenges across any number of domains by intaking environmental data and generating a 
favourable behaviour. Such systems are infinitely harder to create and would represent a substantial 
leap in the field if successfully developed, though they form the original crux of AI research734. AGI is 
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viewed with apprehension by many who are concerned with the unpredictability of an entity capable 
of rapid self-evolution beyond human control or understanding735.  
The overall appeal in AI – even narrow AI - is understandable and extends far beyond military 
applications. Autonomous vehicles capable of responding responsibly to their surroundings promise a 
revolution in transportation. It may assist individuals in making responsible choices daily by more 
objectively assessing data and achieving bias-free optimal decisions. At higher levels, AI may 
contribute to running increasingly complex networks such as so-called smart cities. This includes 
automated allocation of resources as they are needed, rapid detection and mitigation of faults, and 
aggregated feedback to operators who can then action as necessary. The motivation to adopt AI for 
numerous uses is mounting, and its integration into the security domain will likely be correlated with 
its overall adoption by society at large736.   
Artificial intelligence is already being considered for numerous military applications. The People’s 
Republic of China invests heavily in a spectrum of AI developments in an attempt to ensure long-term 
technological superiority over its global competitors737. The United States has similarly identified AI 
as significant to its technology-led “Third Offset” strategy first penned in 2014, whereas such 
technologies serve alongside autonomous platforms in cementing US power projection in an 
increasingly contested geopolitical environment. In a 2016 speech by then Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Robert Work, he openly stated that “…we believe quite strongly that the technological sauce 
of the Third Offset is going to be advances in Artificial Intelligence and autonomy738.” Applications 
range from the tactical to the strategic, from more capable missile guidance and steering to battlefield 
planning. Considering their limitations to domain-specific problem solving, AI is not the panacea it 
seems to be. Much like MONOs, it will only be useful if used correctly. It requires identification of 
opportunities, generating appropriate datasets, and responsible incorporation of such mechanisms 
into both new and existing platforms. Perhaps even more so than in other areas, artificial intelligence 
offers unique opportunities in enabling both event and presence-based offensive network operations. 
Seeing that MONOs represent the repeat compromise of computers and networks, they enjoy a fairly 
predictable set of rules and characteristics that would fit narrow AIs.  As Horowitz claimed, rather 
than being the weapon itself “AI is actually the ultimate enabler739.” 
The use of artificial intelligence in strategic decision-making is particularly of note. The allure 
certainly exists. The modern battlefield is complex and difficult to effectively assess by the human 
mind, which is both inherently limited in its capacity to process sensory inputs and heavily prone to 
decisional bias. As such, autonomous platforms capable of objective analysis represent the potential to 
aspire to an objective strategic optimum. Yet handing matters of strategic consequence to AI risks 
                                                             
735 The list of those concerned from the potential impact of AGI includes physicist Stephen Hawking and technology industrialist Elon 
Musk, among others.  
736 Brundage et al., “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation,” 61. 
737 Kania, Elsa, “Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power” (Center for a New 
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738 Robert Work, “Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Third Offset Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 28, 2016, 
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turning them into centres of gravity by their own right; these platforms may eventually become pivotal 
to command and control thereby becoming worthwhile targets by their own right. Adversarial 
algorithms meant to specifically pray on weaknesses manifest in such systems already exist, with the 
field potentially facing a surge of research activity as their importance increases740.  
For presence-based operations, relying on AI may assist decision-making and manoeuvring within 
adversary networks. By automatically assessing sensory input received from malware infections in 
adversary networks, viable options may be rapidly generated and actioned upon by operators. The use 
of such platforms may effectively shorten the presence phase by reducing the need for operator-led 
lateral movement within networks. Autonomous presence-based operations may also fair better at 
detecting fault lines within networks and vulnerable endpoints, increasing the chance of success. 
Alongside with shortened presence, reducing the chance of human error due to AI-led command and 
control would reduce the risk of detection. As previously explored741, the presence phase of an 
operation consists of numerous micro-cycles in which operators manoeuvre implants within 
compromised networks, retrieve additional information, perform assessments, and decide on follow-
up actions. While creativity may be useful, these processes are often repetitive and conform to the 
same set of circumstances. The laundry list of activities includes maintaining operational security, 
identifying vulnerabilities and credentials used for further lateral movement, locating key sources of 
intelligence, and obtaining privileged access to the objective systems.  The methods to accomplish 
these activities is often also repetitive and directly in response to certain telemetry; use a certain 
vulnerability against a certain type of endpoint, run a certain module to obtain additional data, avoid 
endpoints where a certain brand of anti-malware solution may be deployed. Consequently, training AI 
to mimic operator behaviour may not only be possible but a relatively cost-effective way to 
dramatically scale MONOs. By relegating all but the most complex, hard-to-breach target networks to 
autonomous network intrusion platforms it may be possible to generate higher-quality effects against 
a broader set of targets. 
For event-based operations, limited-scope artificial intelligence incorporated into weapon systems 
may increase their robustness. A single platform may be able to; (1) intelligently curate viable targets, 
(2) enumerate vulnerabilities per target, (3) choose applicable exploits, and (4) choose mission-
relevant offensive payloads742. This reduces both the overhead and expertise required by deployed 
operators, which may reduce hesitation by commanders in employing such capabilities. If such a 
system is able to calculate the probability of success for attempting to compromise an adversary 
system or network, commanders can more realistically assess whether such an option is viable. 
In the preparation phase, AIs may eventually contribute to both presence and event-based 
MONOs. As vulnerability research is often a significant component in facilitating offensive operations, 
                                                             
740 Examples include the 2014 paper demonstrating fooling classification neural networks, see Christian Szegedy et al., “Intriguing 
Properties of Neural Networks,” ArXiv:1312.6199 [Cs], December 20, 2013, http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199. 
741 See Chapter 2: “Offensive Network Operations”. 
742 Patents suggesting this course of action have already been approved, though their method of implementation is unclear. See for 
example Hershey, Chapa, and Umberger, Methods and apparatuses for eliminating a missile threat. 
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an AI capable of more rapidly and thoroughly dissecting adversary protocols, software, and hardware 
may prove invaluable. While some automated capabilities already pervade vulnerability research743, 
these are more limited in scope and primarily serve in identifying potential bugs meriting additional 
investigations. As previously mentioned, the vulnerability research process is expensive in both time 
and resources; even capable entities such as the NSA have only so much top-tier talent to assign to the 
task. Being able to delegate aspects of this research to artificial intelligence approximating their 
human counterparts could both broaden the scope of available targets while reserving key talent to 
unique and novel challenges where human creativity is irreplaceable.  
Contribution may not be limited to assisting human operators; it may eventually supplant them. At 
least initially, some capable nations are seeking to augment network defence with autonomous 
capabilities that have reaction times and agility outstripping that of a person or group of people. To 
parse and assess massive quantities of data requires significant computational resources. These 
quantities grow as sensors improve and proliferate, a distinct characteristic of both the modern 
battlefield and modern networking in general. DARPA invests in many such projects, ranging from 
anomaly detection, improving the resilience of networks to attack, and automatic patching of 
vulnerabilities744. The innovation cycle that had bred network operations will eventually result in AI-
enabled network defence as a counter-innovation.   
Innovative network defence solutions would require innovative MONOs. As operators become 
insufficiently dynamic as to overcome automated network defences, the business case for autonomous 
offensive capabilities may evolve organically. Beyond just facilitating rapid lateral movement, 
offensive platforms would need to make intelligent decisions and respond to high-tempo changes 
made in networks by deployed defences. This eventual maturation of MONOs into autonomy offers 
advantages but also considerable risk; it becomes difficult to detect the point in which operators and 
system developers lose effective control. MONOs may become opaque black boxes, which must be 
trusted to perform as desired behind enemy lines even in highly variable situations. The amount of 
uncertainty introduced and the necessity to cut the human operator out of the decision-making loop 
may prove dangerous, as the risk of cascading impact that already characterises MONOs may 
exponentially increase. Even after two decades of network operations and within manually-controlled 
operations, capable nations still frequently fail to safeguard their tools and avoid collateral damage745. 
The significance of autonomy in MONOs is therefore an unknown quantity.  
Unmanned platforms have been in military service for over two decades. Their classic roles vary 
but often concentrate either on reconnaissance or as precision weapons. As the underlying 
technologies matured and proliferated, drones increasingly occupied additional battlefield roles, 
including communication, electronic warfare, logistical support, transport, and even search and 
                                                             
743 One such automated method is called fuzzing, in which software attempts to automatically find faults in other software by 
providing it a variety of unexpected inputs in hopes of creating unexpected, exploitable behaviour.  
744 Shen, “The Information Domain and the Future of Conflict.” 
745 Many such examples have been mentioned throughout this thesis including internal threats such as Edward Snowden exfiltration 
of broad NSA data and external threats such as the Shadow Brokers theft of NSA TAO network operation capabilities.  
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rescue. They come in every size and are deployed across all physical domains; air, land, sea and 
space746. Today’s unmanned platforms are more versatile and capable of enabling accurate operations 
at scale while minimising physical risk. With improvements in robotics and the aforementioned 
artificial intelligence, this trend is unlikely to reverse in the foreseeable future.  
Autonomy in military platforms had become realistic. In addressing the viability of such systems, 
the question has gradually transformed over the last two decades from “can this be done?” to “how 
should this be done?” The tide of robotics cannot be prevented, only channelled in directions where it 
may have higher utility and lower risk; such considerations exceed the scope of this thesis but would 
become instrumental to modern warfare. For those who assess the potential impact of robotics, 
concern mounts to alarming levels. The US Army Training and Doctrine command views them as 
“potential game changers” that “…can provide a decisive edge over an adversary unable to match the 
capability or equal the capacity747.” Russian military scholars have repeatedly expressed that robots 
are due to perform myriad tasks in modern warfare, making them a key characteristic of new-
generation warfare748.  Official Chinese publications view unmanned intelligent platforms as a key 
reason that the traditional centres of gravity in warfare have been displaced749. The consensus seems 
to be threefold; (1) there will be an exponential increase in the use of autonomous platforms; (2) these 
platforms will become increasingly capable of performing complex roles, and; (3) they are both a 
threat and an opportunity to upset existing symmetries.  
Increased adoption of unmanned platforms increases a military’s exposure to MONOs. Capable as 
they may be of feats unattainable by human beings, they also incur unique vulnerabilities. Subversion 
of software used by a human operator may cause undesired results and – in extreme circumstances – 
even physical harm, but it does not directly target the individual. By their nature as governed by 
software, unmanned systems are fundamentally exposed to compromise by MONOs either directly or 
indirectly. As aptly put by Hartmann and Steup in 2013; “[Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] must be 
classified as highly exposed, multiply linked, complex pieces of hardware750.” The possibility to inflict 
complete combatant shutdown as a result of a successful network attack against the system is both 
real and significant.  
The United States was caught by surprise in 2011 when a RQ-170 Sentinel UAV suddenly became 
unresponsive while conducting a mission within Iran’s borders. Iranian media soon announced that 
they had not only intercepted the drone, but effectively interdicted its directives to force it to safely 
land on an Iranian airstrip. While the United States had not officially acknowledged the details of the 
incident, the Obama administration had officially petitioned the Iranian government for the return of 
the aircraft. Theories of how this came to pass were plentiful, but one likely explanation persisted; 
                                                             
746 One example of an unmanned space vehicle is the Boeing X-37, used by the US Air Force for repeat undetermined missions. 
747 TRADOC, “The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare” (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, May 31, 2017), 11. 
748 Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War.” 
749 People’s Liberation Army, “顺应军事变革潮流把握改革主动 - 中国军网-军报记者,” January 5, 2016, 
http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_6843416.htm. 
750 Kim Hartmann and Christoph Steup, “The Vulnerability of UAVs to Cyber Attacks - An Approach to the Risk Assessment,” n.d., 2. 
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spoofed GPS data combined with jamming of US GPS signals allowed the Iranians to provide 
overriding coordinates751. This form of protocol compromise was effectively an event-based attack 
against the Sentinel, conducted by a second-tier regional power. The potential for more intricate 
attacks against autonomous platforms by more capable parties is significant. 
With a rich array of sensory and external inputs, unmanned systems are intrinsically vulnerable to 
external compromise. Sensors can be fooled to produce erroneous analysis, while external data 
sources such as command and control, guidance, and telemetry can be overtaken to fool a platform 
into behaving unexpectedly. Consequently, an overreliance on drones could eventually create new 
centres of gravity in their command and control centres. If military power is increasingly facilitated by 
remote operation centres guiding fleets of mixed autonomous platforms, targeting these centres 
becomes a viable method to reduce adversary fighting strength.  
The issue of targeting unmanned command and control is further exasperated by the introduction 
of so-called “swarming” tactics. Rather than relying on a limited number of potent high-cost systems, 
militaries may opt to instead deploy cheap formations in high quantity, overwhelming defenders. As a 
thorough RAND publication from explained as early as 2000, swarming is not uniquely related to 
unmanned systems and has been applied by human forces for centuries with variable success752. The 
tactic allows remediating asymmetries against well-resourced or massed adversaries with 
comparatively lesser efforts. Such an approach is already a significant component of Iranian doctrine 
for dealing with the United States and Israel753; it is a component of modern Chinese doctrine754; it 
was used by jihadi forces in Syria to overwhelm deployed Russian forces755; and is actively pursued by 
the United States via DARPA756.   
Unmanned swarms require an increased degree of autonomy as agility becomes essential. 
Individual warfighters would need to respond rapidly to changes in their surroundings, adversaries, 
and coordinate with adjacent and remote systems. This will be made possible by extensive mesh 
networks governed by intricate software. Ostensibly, operational oversight would in the near future 
remain in the hands of human operators, but those would not be able to directly pilot the dozens or 
hundreds of drones participating in any given swarm. Autonomous piloting authority would be 
transferred to the system itself, further extending its vulnerabilities.  
Event-based attacks against deployed swarms may be devastatingly effective. By disrupting 
sensory flow, interfering with telemetry and command channels, or even sending contradictory data to 
the participating drones, it may be possible to achieve a wide range of effects previously infeasible 
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752 Sean J. A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000). 
753 Brett Davis, “Learning Curve: Iranian Asymmetrical Warfare and Millennium Challenge 2002” (Center for International Maritime 
Security, August 14, 2014), http://cimsec.org/learning-curve-iranian-asymmetrical-warfare-millennium-challenge-2002-2/11640. 
754 Kania, Elsa, “Swarms at War: Chinese Advances in Swarm Intelligence,” Jamestown, July 6, 2017, 
https://jamestown.org/program/swarms-war-chinese-advances-swarm-intelligence/. 
755 Sanchez, “Russia Uses Missiles and Cyber Warfare to Fight off ‘swarm of Drones’ Attacking Military Bases in Syria.”  




  Daniel Moore 
against deployed manned forces that rely on both machine-fed data and their own deduction and 
contextual situational awareness.  The potential for presence-based attack is similarly broad; targeted 
operations against theatre command centres used to govern drones or against the communication 
infrastructure used to facilitate control of swarms may confer significant advantages to an adversary.   
It is possible that as unmanned systems proliferate in quantity and significance to modern 
societies, the spectrum of network warfare will commensurately shift. Where today even impactful 
network intrusions are often discarded as unworthy of countermeasures by the victim, the future may 
alter this calculus. If unmanned systems become a new form of critical infrastructure, even non-
offensive intrusions against the networks that house them may spark grave alarm in victims. The 
dangers of the cybersecurity dilemma as posited by Buchanan757 may be irreversibly aggravated – it is 
impossible to determine whether breaches against networks encompassing autonomous systems and 
artificial intelligence are meant for intelligence collection or a corruptive attack.   
CYBER AS A DOMAIN 
The story of “cyber” as a domain of war stretches back less than a century. Even as its roots trace 
back to Norbert Wiener’s notion of cybernetics as the persistent relationship between humanity and 
machines758 it already becomes tenuous to envision networks as a separate manmade cyberspace, 
detached from other aspects of humanity and subject to its own rules. The inverse is the reality; the 
more networks became integrated into other aspects of warfare, the more they became intricately 
bound to war’s innately human circumstances.  
It is unlikely that information and the medium that bears it will fade into obscure irrelevance. A 
retreat into connectionless warfighting devoid of the ever-present hunger for data seems a remote 
possibility. Yet, that does not imply that “cyber” will necessarily remain as a distinct domain or 
warfare, or even as a pervasive term. As networks fully permeate warfare, they may simply become 
implied. Military planners already struggle when accounting for the interplay of networks and the 
other domains; information seems to seep into the all aspects of warfare, muddling the forced 
attempts at separation. As this exasperates, attempting to distil a perception of warfare in the so-
called fifth domain will become more difficult. MONOs of varying types and intensities may eventually 
find their way into an integrative doctrine, but they do not inherently require the benefits that 
domainhood provides, and may indeed suffer from it. Irrespective of the assumed increased 
susceptibility to network attacks, the ability of network operations to coerce would arguably remain 
limited. In such a scenario, MONOs will maintain their dependence on the physical domains for 
pursuing objectives, as a network attack against a defender would predominantly be followed by a 
kinetic force meant to subdue it.  
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The idea that cyber will not retain its domainhood is not revolutionary. Many other nations – 
primarily non-Western – already do not envision computers, the networks they form, or the logical 
entities they create as a separate domain of war. While nations prolific in network operations such as 
Russia, China, Iran and Israel have an aggressively proactive view of MONOs as a key enabler of 
modern military success, they primarily view the operational space as information-led, and tasked 
with enabling broader strategic goals or kinetic operational forces. In this sense, the strategic 
perspective comparison between east and west differs from the Cold War. As the US focused on a 
potent air force and absolute technological supremacy, the Soviet Union focused on tight air defence 
grids, potent rocketry, and proliferation of affordable equipment to global allies. Today, global 
contenders large agree that information is pivotal to succeed in modern warfare, and that qualitative 
technological superiority is essential. It is how this technology interplays with the existing tenets of 
warfare that differs. Where the US and its NATO allies invest in the uniqueness of cyberspace, others 
espouse holistic warfare through which information is a constant, unrelenting, and crucial 
undercurrent. 
Regardless, MONOs as presented within this thesis are independent of the status of cyber as a 
domain. Whether carried out by a dedicated military command, intelligence agency, a theatre 
command centre, or an individual aircraft, the characteristics remain much the same. The operational 
cycles that enable MONOs require a grand commitment of staff, resources, intelligence, and research. 
These do not necessarily need to be delivered by a dedicated domain structure, as indeed is the case 
for many militaries globally. As such, the models presented within this thesis on the integration of 
MONOs to military doctrine and strategy perform equally whether observing cyberspace as a domain 
or grasping information holistically. As long as their requirements and parameters are considered and 
weaved into the decision-making process, they may prove their utility today or in the foreseeable 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
MODELS AS SCAFFOLDING 
Cyber-security is naturally a multi-disciplinary field. At its core, the field often reflects the 
intersection of securing networks with all other domains of study and practice. Cyber is where 
networks meet criminality, health, safety, finance, commerce, sociology and psychology. As a 
corollary, cyber-warfare is the intersection of military thought and network security. In cyber, 
technical and operational aspects are uniquely inseparable and equal in importance; we cannot and 
should not separate them, or favour one over the other in analysis. Sophisticated offensive and 
defensive capabilities developed without being understood by their designated users will remain 
unused, or perhaps misused. Similarly, military strategy that does not account for the radical changes 
in the operational environment over the last two decades would find itself lacking, even against 
seemingly disadvantaged adversaries. A reliance on warfare spearheaded by cutting-edge technology 
must reconcile the vulnerabilities that it creates. These will increasingly be preyed upon by others.  
It is easy to label network incidents incorrectly.  Some media coverage of high-profile incidents 
involving networks remains laden with hyperbole, despite a positive trend towards nuance. Security 
researchers worldwide routinely lament the lacklustre progress in adopting even basic protections, 
and companies continue to get breached over basic lapses in security. Password reuse, unpatched 
systems, misconfigured networks, and susceptibility to phishing remain potent ways of compromising 
even seemingly secure environments. When so many malicious activities occur within the research 
space, it may become difficult to identify the subtler interplay of network operations and military 
activities.    
Not all network intrusions are attacks, and not all attacks are warfare. While humanity has 
millennia of experience in distinguishing between malicious activities in the physical domains, the 
struggle yet continues for distinctions in activity targeting networks. Recognising the differences is 
significant not only for policy or law-centric analysis, but also for the military domain. Determining 
which activities could reasonably be assigned to military agencies and units and which should remain 
civilian is key. Determining which activities are included when discussing national approaches to 
military approaches is crucial.  
Even the perception of cyber itself varies wildly. Some – such as the US and its allies – codify cyber 
as a domain of warfighting and establish distinct commands to tackle it. Russia adopts a more 
pragmatic approach to MONOs, viewing them as a fragment of activity within a far broader scope of 
information operations occurring in both peacetime and conflict. It is a way of achieving or 
approaching objectives with reduced friction and chances of kinetic escalation. For China, network 
operations of varying kinds are key facilitators of their modern doctrine, which envisions rapidly 
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reducing Western technological advantages in any conceivable way. There is no distinctly right or 
wrong approach, rightness is a measure determined by context. Part of the advantage of network 
operations lies in their flexibility; they may be applied in many ways against an adversary depending 
on the circumstance.  
The core argument was presented that viewing offensive network capabilities as a monolithic 
stretch of operational space is risky and counterproductive. Though they differ, Russian, US, and 
Chinese doctrine primarily treat MONOs as a single spectrum of possibilities that share most 
characteristics. Yet, network operations were not all created equal. Some may be instantly deployed on 
the battlefield by an infantry detachment, while others would be carefully managed, multi-year 
operations against sensitive adversary command centres. On the other, most offered taxonomies 
splice network operations across numerous variables and parameters, making them useful for post-
hoc academic analysis but more limited in utility for military planners. The goal of this thesis was 
therefore not to generate models that cover every manifestation of operating against networks – 
though that certainly has its value. 
Cyber did not wink into existence overnight. Operations carried out today are a natural result of 
counter-innovation cycles that have accelerated in the twentieth century. The need to deceive and 
manipulate the machines on which we have become reliant intensified when militaries turned to radar 
for guidance and the radio for communication. As these technologies proliferated and became 
complex, the desire to target them and the possibility to gain value from doing so commensurately 
increased. This intangible warfare became doubly important as computer networks became an 
intangible crutch within modern warfighting, one deeply reliant on ever-active datalinks providing 
sensory data, command and control, and telemetry. Any models pertaining to network warfare must 
therefore account for their roots in electronic warfare and signals intelligence; cyber is essentially 
their technological lovechild.  
The goal was therefore to craft models which categorise cyber operations in useful ways. By 
dividing MONOs into event-based and presence-based operations, immediate fault lines begin to 
surface. When subjecting each of these high-level categories to the operational process underpinning 
all MONOs, it becomes clear just how much they differ, and how risky it is therefore to bundle them 
together. Event-based operations are primarily robust, multi-use capabilities requiring high reliability 
and intensive research and development cycles. Conversely, presence-based operations require 
permanent intelligence support, covert operational nuance, and would likely eventually compromise 
themselves upon use. The former befits use with deployed forces, while the latter may be best retained 
by intelligence agencies with an operational mandate.  
This thesis sought to create a robust perspective on MONOs in accumulative layers. Each layer was 
meant to focus discussion, exclude possibilities that muddle analysis, and offer straightforward 
classification criteria that are easy to implement both in subsequent research but also in strategy for 
employing offensive network operations. Each of the four chapters offers self-sufficient analysis from 
a different perspective. When combined, they indicate that cyber operations can tremendously benefit 
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from implementing lessons from other forms of technology-focused warfare. A clear typology for 
offensive network capabilities can then assist in further development of the overall field, by facilitating 
examination of how each category can be incorporated into strategy, operations, and tactics.    
Chapter one examined the spectrum of network operations, setting boundaries around the 
conceptual perimeter of cyber-warfare. The chapter was intended to narrowly focus the debate itself in 
a two-pronged approach. The first exercise included identifying which incidents do not merit 
examination within the prism of offensive network operations undertaken by parties involved in 
warfare. This excluded a broad range of activities frequently encountered within the debate, such as 
intelligence collection, criminal activities, information operations, or loosely affiliated ideological 
hacking. The second exercise sought to offer five escalating criteria which in turn help assess which 
malicious incidents are worthy of inclusion within the observed dataset. This has the significant side 
benefit of illustrating how the vast majority of malicious incidents assessed today should likely not be 
labelled as cyber-warfare. 
Chapter two surveyed how each of the main characteristics of MONOs are thoroughly rooted in 
historic intangible warfare. The twentieth century demonstrated how a rapidly growing reliance on the 
electromagnetic spectrum initiated a process that culminated in what is now labelled cyber 
operations. From jamming, to electronic warfare, to command and control and network-centric 
warfare, each of these iterations of intangible warfare contributes characteristics that accompany 
modern cyber capabilities. By presenting how MONOs draw from an existing strong foundation, 
further research can be made on integrating electronic warfare and MONOs along their parallels. 
Chapter three introduced the distinction between MONO archetypes – event-based and presence-
based operations. The argument was that these two categories are both simple enough to be easily 
usable while disparate enough to be useful. Event and presence-based capabilities were shown to have 
distinct characteristics across the entire operational lifecycle. The resource requirements are often 
unique, the development process differs, targeting is undertaken with different goals in mind, and 
even the operational staff itself may be altogether distinct. As such, lumping these two operation types 
together may result in overly broad results. 
Chapter four dissected the utility of event and presence-based operations. The goal was to 
interleave the characteristics of the two MONO archetypes with strategic considerations to determine 
when, where, how and why they should be used. By examining how pre-existing strategic wisdom 
remains wholly applicable to cyber-operations, it became clear that event-based capabilities would 
usually fit tactical or operational needs, while presence-based operations are often best suited for 
strategic support and pursuit of loftier objectives.  
While each of the major powers relies on network operations to a degree, they do so imperfectly. 
Assessing the various ways key nations fall short of optimally utilising MONOs was the goal of the 
subsequent three chapters. The United States exhibits top-tier technical capabilities but a limited 
capacity to operationalise them across all operational spaces due to bureaucratic difficulties, extreme 
compartmentalisation, and a siloing of MONOs within a separate military command. Capabilities 
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therefore exist, but are often not applied where they are needed most. Russia is the most visibly 
aggressive user of MONOs globally, but does so with reckless abandon and little consideration to their 
overall impact on the underlying military-political objectives. Success is often incidental, limited, or a 
result of committing to operations in low-quality bulk. Russia has integrated MONOs so thoroughly 
that they are treated as simply another tool in the information-operations toolset, with narrow regard 
to how they could be more nuanced in order to pursue more intricate goals. China appears relatively 
doctrinally mature with a cohesive structure amalgamating cyber-capabilities from across different 
branches, but a desire to view the information space holistically is not yet backed up with any 
profound operational experience. Each nation could benefit thoroughly from embedding the 
characteristics of MONOs into their doctrine, and thoughtfully construct strategy that befits their 
unique situation.  
While a generic model was offered, implementation may still vary. Much like other aspects of 
military strategy, there is no one optimal approach. Smaller militaries such as the Israeli Defense 
Forces may focus heavily on event-based capabilities meant to support its strategically crucial air 
force, while at the same time engaging in presence-based operations to soften adversaries and impact 
their readiness. Taiwan may disproportionately focus on presence-based operations against the PLA 
Rocket Force or regional command and control, in efforts to sufficiently delay any PLA advancement 
so that US forces or the international community may interdict in any attempt to subdue it. Iran may 
increase its reliance on strategic event-based operations against critical targets within asymmetrically 
stronger adversaries in order to weaken political resolve and act as a de-facto deterrent. MONOs can 
act as either a force multiplier, an operational enabler, or even as limited means of pursuing 
objectives; it all rests on context.  
The degree to which nations may rely on MONOs may also understandably vary. An attempt to 
overly emphasize MONOs in Israeli campaigns against the Palestinian Hamas may be fruitless. While 
they do rely on information infrastructure, Hamas doctrine broadly assumes distrust in its own 
equipment and even a total command disconnect when conflict ensues759. While the PLA may enjoy 
some success in subduing a Taiwanese attempt at organising defensive efforts by degrading their 
command and control, the island campaign would still incorporate multiple layers of entrenched 
defenders fighting bitterly and autonomously regardless of available networks760.   
MONOs are not one size fits all. The models developed in this thesis are meant to be partially 
abstract and broadly scoped. This allows flexibility in implementation, one that draws from the 
particularities that characterise situational parameters. It also means that extrapolation is risky and 
must be undertaken with care. What has been seen is not necessarily indicative of what will come 
next. The prime example for this is Stuxnet; there has been no further public disclosure of similar 
incidents incorporating deceptive presence-based operations against energy facilities to deter nuclear 
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760 Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, 132. 
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aspirations of rogue nations761. What followed Stuxnet was an array of high-profile destructive attacks 
against critical infrastructure such as in Ukraine, often used as a tool for political signalling rather 
than a true ploy to covertly influence adversary grand strategy. Any further analysis of cyber 
operations must therefore be tightly paired to the specific scenario being assessed.  
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis focused on introducing and testing core concepts for military use of network 
operations. As such, it leaves many areas relatively undeveloped yet primed for future work. As the 
use of MONOs evolves and more public evidence provided, the role of these capabilities must be 
consistently re-evaluated. Each of the conceptual aspects introduced in the thesis may be further 
developed with additional works, including those that explore the implementation of event and 
presence-based capabilities, MONOs in low-intensity conflict, the use of MONOs by sub-national 
fighting groups, and the use of network operations by other actors not considered within this work. It 
is also advisable to pursue research into the next “swing” of the innovation cycle, which would bring 
forth autonomous platforms and artificial intelligence into the set of considerations.  
The United States has been embroiled in decades of low-intensity combat operations against 
disparate enemies. Priorities have begun to shift back towards preparing for conflict with near-peer 
adversaries only over the last few years in light of a resurgent China and an increasingly belligerent 
Russia. Israel, Russia, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others have been combating irregular or 
sub-national groups in the Middle-East and elsewhere.  While briefly touched on within this thesis, 
the specific considerations for using both event and presence-based MONOs against irregular forces 
could be explored in depth. These groups are often reliant on civilian infrastructure and a 
mismatching set of appropriated tactical equipment. As such, they are both more and less vulnerable 
to different types of operations. An analysis of effective MONO use against sub-national groups could 
contribute greatly towards the robust understanding of offensive network capabilities as a whole. 
Flipping that, it is also imperative to assess how sub-national groups may employ network 
operations. These are already occurring in limited forms, with Hamas and Hezbollah known to 
undertake limited offensive network operations against Israel in times of conflict762. While both 
groups enjoy a measure of autonomy and access to resources, they are inherently disadvantaged when 
it comes to acquiring manpower and facilitating the high-cost operational cycles that MONOs 
commonly entail. It thus becomes useful to explore how low-cost, high-yield MONOs may be attained 
by such groups, what targets they are likely to pursue, and how they may incorporate such capabilities 
to enable and augment their accomplishments in the kinetic space.  
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Examining the integration of MONOs into the strategy of other nations would also contribute to a 
broader understanding of the toolset. North Korea is a prolific user of network operations in pursuit of 
its grand strategy, making it a prime candidate for case study analysis. Iran is similarly prolific in 
using offensive network capabilities, either to project coercive political power or to degrade its 
enemies. With a penchant for network operations and an integrative approach to technological 
warfare, Israel remains a prime case study for any use of MONOs against adversaries. Implementing 
the assessment models offered in this thesis against the countries may both strengthen their validity 
and also offer additional insights unobtainable from observing relatively unshackled global powers. 
Trends must consistently be accounted for and incorporated into any assessment. While some 
aspects of network operations have remained static over the last two decades, technological adoption 
and development have radically changed. With technologies set to enmesh even further into modern 
life and gradually increase in autonomy, they may adversely impact both the significance of MONOs 
and how they are carried out. Timespans are notoriously difficult in technology, so it remains 
challenging to tell when artificial intelligence would become crucial to this field. The trajectory, 
however, is clear. Humanity has already peaked in its ability to process the reams of data that 
networks provide and relies heavily on software to assist. With more data, sensors, and requirements, 
the need to delegate a greater portion of analytical processes to increasingly intelligent software is 
becoming clearer. 
Autonomous platforms may both target and be targeted through networks. The more computerised 
these platforms become, the more our overall network attack surface increases. Similarly, such 
platforms may deliver offensive payloads of their own, potentially assisting in acquiring access to air-
gapped networks within well-defended territories. The implication of autonomous platforms should 
therefore be gradually explored as their adoption increases and data emerges; they may increasingly 
become a significant component in MONOs, both as target and offensive platforms. 
The future role of artificial intelligence in MONOs is indeterminate. As with autonomous 
platforms, they may both be targets or a vehicle for offensive operations. Much like the adoption of 
networks and computers, a gradual dependency on artificial intelligence may emerge as they become 
more adept at solving complex tasks and achieving optimal battlefield results. This may extend to all 
tiers of military thought; the tactical, operational, and strategic. Where tactical, limited-scope AI may 
assist in situational-responsive weapons guidance, strategic AI may help direct resources and 
operational planning at the theatre level. At the same time, other forms of narrow AI may also be used 
to scale the use of MONOs, effectively shrinking the resource constraints detailed in the operational 
life-cycle. In adherence to the cyclical mentality, narrow AI may also be used for network defence, 
thereby drastically reducing the success rate of deterministic approaches to MONOs so often relied 
upon. All such applications – and their potentially unique impact – could be thoroughly explored in 
further research.  
Finally, defensive operations are crucial to operating in and against networks. While they were 
largely excluded from this thesis, assessing the offense-defence balance would make for a valuable 
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supplement. The various strategic approaches to MONOs can and should be countered with risk 
mitigation approaches. These include a frank reconsideration of the Western approach to technology-
laden superiority, in which equipment is often superfluously networked. As a response to the utility of 
MONOs presented in this thesis, perhaps it would be wise to consider the vulnerability of certain 
platforms and systems prior to networking them. This type of analysis is particularly relevant in light 
of some ongoing debates, such as the ongoing debate in regards to the US nuclear arsenal763.  
This thesis generates some answers with those potentially leading to numerous additional 
questions. If strategic planners and military analysts more thoroughly understand the utility of 
MONOs, they may do better to gear the analytical conversation and doctrinal construction towards the 
right questions. One certainty is that networks will both retain and increase their prevalence in all 
military affairs. Recognising this, it is essential to continuously challenge how MONOs are used and 
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